Tom Riley Law Firm, P.C. v. Glass

Citations: 620 N.W.2d 252; 2000 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 241; 2000 WL 1853390Docket: 99-0204

Court: Supreme Court of Iowa; December 20, 2000; Iowa; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Iowa case 620 N.W.2d 252 (2000) involves a legal dispute between Tom Riley Law Firm and Milo and Jerolene Glass concerning legal fees and a counterclaim for legal malpractice. The law firm, represented by Riley, sued the Glasses for fees stemming from their representation in a 1993-94 condemnation proceeding initiated by the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) to address potential landslides on the Glasses' property.

The Glasses counterclaimed, alleging that Riley was negligent for not serving notice of appeal regarding an inadequate compensation award from the DOT, which they argued resulted in a significantly lower outcome than they were entitled to. The case went to a jury trial, where the district court ruled in favor of Riley, awarding them $28,833 in attorney fees and rejecting the Glasses' malpractice claim.

The court's findings highlighted a previous condemnation award in 1984, where the Glasses successfully contested the compensation amount. In the second proceeding, initiated after a new road project was proposed in 1993, the DOT offered $293,500, which the Glasses rejected. Subsequently, the commission awarded $380,000, prompting Riley to prepare an appeal for a higher amount. However, due to the failure to serve necessary parties, the appeal was dismissed, which Riley acknowledged as negligence. The jury's verdict affirmed the district court's decisions on both the attorney fees and the malpractice claim.

Three errors are assigned by the defendants: 1) the jury instruction regarding damages for loss of lateral support not duplicating previous awards; 2) the recovery of attorney fees by Riley despite admitted negligence; and 3) the admission of hearsay evidence. 

The court’s instruction No. 28 stated that damages from condemned property are assessed conclusively to include all present and future damages, thus preventing double recovery for loss of lateral support already addressed in a 1985 verdict. The Glasses argue that the instruction improperly introduced issue preclusion to the jury; however, Riley contends it merely communicated a principle of condemnation law against double recovery. The court finds that, regardless of the instruction's nature, the jury’s determination that all damages for the 1994 taking, including loss of lateral support, were included in the compensation commission award negates the Glasses' claim. They argue that Riley's negligence led to their loss of compensation for this loss, but the jury found no damages exceeding the $380,000 awarded, implying that an appeal would have been ineffective. Therefore, the judgment for Riley on the malpractice counterclaim is affirmed.

Regarding attorney fees, Riley sought to collect a one-third contingent fee based on the difference between the DOT's offer and the commission's award. The jury ruled in favor of Riley, awarding $28,833 in fees, which the Glasses contest as improper due to Riley's negligence in the appeal process.

An attorney is not entitled to compensation for negligent services that result in substantial damage to a client, as established in *Crookham v. Riley*, 584 N.W.2d 258 (Iowa 1998). In this case, attorney Riley's negligence did not harm the Glasses, as his services led to a recovery of all damages awarded by the jury. Therefore, Riley's claim for attorney fees is upheld. 

Regarding a hearsay issue raised by the Glasses, the court admitted a written statement from their former attorney, which was part of the court file from an earlier condemnation proceeding. The Glasses objected, arguing it constituted hearsay. However, Riley's counsel contended that the document was relevant and part of the official record. The trial court allowed its admission. The Glasses further argued that the statement regarding lateral-support issues supported Riley's claim that such matters had been previously litigated and were not recoverable in the current proceeding. The court found that the admission of the attorney-fee statement was not prejudicial since the existence of a fault causing landslides was already established in the record by expert testimony, rendering the statement cumulative. Consequently, the court rejected the Glasses' arguments and affirmed the previous ruling.