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State v. JLM

Citations: 996 So. 2d 740; 2008 Miss. LEXIS 592; 2008 WL 5089710Docket: 2007-CA-01160-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; December 3, 2008; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

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The case involves J.L.M., a sixteen-year-old charged with two counts of sexual battery against his eight-year-old cousin, B.S. Initially filed in the Youth Court of Pearl River County, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. J.L.M. was later indicted in circuit court, where he filed a motion to transfer the case back to youth court, opposed by the State. Following a hearing where expert testimony was provided, the circuit court transferred the case to youth court, deeming it in the best interest of J.L.M. The youth court accepted the transfer, leading to J.L.M. being adjudicated a delinquent child and pleading no contest to the charges, resulting in a fine and a psychological evaluation. 

The State appealed the circuit court's decision to transfer the case, arguing that the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy protection does not apply to youth court proceedings and that the circuit court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court's decision, referencing that the Fifth Amendment does apply to youth court proceedings, which means further adjudicatory actions post-transfer would constitute double jeopardy. The court noted that the State's opportunity to appeal was lost once the youth court issued a final judgment, rendering the State's position moot.

The State argues that the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy protections apply solely to criminal proceedings, citing a statute classifying youth court cases involving children as civil rather than criminal. However, this argument is rejected, as constitutional rights must be considered beyond mere labels applied to juvenile proceedings. The youth court's final judgment bars the State's appeal from circuit court based on double jeopardy principles, rendering other arguments moot.

Despite affirming the circuit court's decision, the opinion reflects discomfort with the outcome, particularly concerning the leniency faced by a serious offender. The court emphasizes its duty to uphold constitutional protections, even in undesirable cases, and warns against governmental overreach that could undermine respect for the law. The court concludes by affirming the circuit court's decision, with various justices concurring and one dissenting without a separate opinion. A separate concurrence highlights concerns regarding procedural handling in the lower courts.

J.L.M., a sixteen-year-old, was indicted by the Pearl River County Grand Jury on December 7, 2006, for two counts of sexual battery against his eight-year-old cousin, B.S. The first count alleged that on July 31, 2005, J.L.M. committed sexual battery by performing oral sex on B.S., who was over two years younger than him. The second count involved J.L.M. inserting a rope-like item into B.S.'s anus. An incident report revealed that B.S.'s father caught J.L.M. masturbating in a vehicle with B.S., and B.S. later recounted to his mother, in the presence of law enforcement, that J.L.M. had coerced him into undressing and performed sexual acts on him. Both counts violated Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-95(1)(d), which defines sexual battery involving a child under fourteen by an individual at least twenty-four months older. The case was transferred to youth court on June 11, 2007, where J.L.M. was adjudicated as a delinquent. Although the majority opinion focused on the double-jeopardy issue, it was noted that the State had the right to appeal the transfer order under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-35-103(a), as established in State v. U.G., which determined that such a transfer could quash a grand jury indictment.

J.L.M.'s double-jeopardy claim is deemed valid based on established precedents, including Walls v. State and Breed v. Jones. Concerns are raised regarding the circuit court and youth court's handling of the case, particularly the absence of the youth court's adjudicatory order following a swift transfer from circuit court on June 11, 2007, to youth court the next day. The record lacks clarity on whether the youth court adhered to statutory requirements for adjudicatory and disposition hearings. It is acknowledged that J.L.M. was adjudicated as a delinquent for two counts of sexual battery shortly before his eighteenth birthday, highlighting the urgency for a resolution due to the impending age threshold that would remove his eligibility for youth court jurisdiction. The assistant district attorney recognized this timing issue during the transfer hearing. The text emphasizes that both defendants and the State are entitled to fairness in criminal proceedings, indicating a concern that the justice system may have failed in this instance due to the expedited process and potential lack of due diligence.

A retired justice characterized the judicial system as a "crude approximation of justice," a sentiment echoed across several Mississippi cases involving both criminal and civil disputes. In a specific case involving J.L.M., counsel described him as a victim of circumstance regarding a serious incident with a significantly younger cousin. However, the author disagreed with this portrayal, emphasizing the gravity of the sexual offenses J.L.M. was charged with, which were not merely "sexual overtones" but rather serious criminal acts. 

Despite the State of Mississippi appealing a circuit court transfer order, the author noted that the appeal was rendered ineffective due to a swift subsequent decision in the Youth Court. The author concurred with the majority opinion that further prosecution against J.L.M. was barred by the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause. 

The author expressed hope that J.L.M. could rehabilitate and become a productive citizen. They clarified that the case did not have family consensus on resolution, highlighting that B.S.'s family sought punitive measures and expressed concerns about the psychological effects of the incident on their child, who continued to receive counseling. The author emphasized that the age difference between J.L.M. and B.S. was legally relevant, as J.L.M. was charged under a statute pertaining to sexual battery against a child under 14, affirming that J.L.M. was over the legal threshold for such charges.