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People v. Sexton
Citations: 580 N.W.2d 404; 458 Mich. 43Docket: 108195, 108749, 109143, Calendar Nos. 3-5
Court: Michigan Supreme Court; July 1, 1998; Michigan; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Michigan addressed whether its ruling in *People v. Bender* should be applied retroactively, determining that it should not. This decision reversed the Court of Appeals' rulings in the cases involving defendants Corey Edward Sexton, Clifton Davis, and Bryce W. Young, and remanded for further proceedings. In the case of Corey Edward Sexton, following the shooting death of Damian Phillips on September 8, 1993, Sexton and two other individuals were present at the crime scene when police arrived. Initially, they were questioned and subsequently agreed to provide statements at the police station. Detective Melvin Marchlones informed Sexton that he was not under arrest and could leave at any time. Sexton denied involvement in his first statement, which conflicted with the accounts of the other individuals present. After being confronted with these inconsistencies, he provided a second statement claiming the gun discharged accidentally. Sexton requested to call his father prior to making this second statement but was told he could do so "later." He later agreed to a polygraph examination, during which his Miranda rights were reiterated and waived again. Meanwhile, Sexton’s father arrived at the police station to see his son but was denied access. He subsequently contacted Sexton’s attorney, who also attempted to stop the questioning upon arrival. However, the police desk officer did not facilitate contact with Sexton or disclose his whereabouts. The attorney's request to halt questioning was documented but not acted upon by the police. At 10:20 p.m., Corey Sexton provided a statement at the police station, where he was informed of a lawyer's presence. Following a polygraph, Sexton was advised that his responses were deemed untruthful, leading him to admit he intentionally shot Phillips. He was arrested and re-read his constitutional rights, indicating he understood and did not wish to consult a lawyer before further questioning. Sexton gave a recorded confession at 11:35 p.m., reiterating his admission of shooting his cousin. He faced charges of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The defense's motion to suppress his statements was denied, with the trial court finding the admissions were made voluntarily. Sexton later pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, preserving the right to appeal the confession's admissibility. He was sentenced to 20-40 years for murder and an additional two years for the firearm offense. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision regarding statement suppression, ruling that all statements made after 5:30 p.m. were inadmissible. Defendant Clifton Davis, charged with first-degree murder and firearm possession in the shooting death of Allen Murriel, was arrested along with his brother. His mother retained attorney Elliot Margolis, who arrived at the police station at 8:10 p.m. Davis signed a Miranda rights waiver at 7:45 p.m., and Sergeant Monti began questioning him at 8:20 p.m. Margolis arrived after the questioning had started and testified that Monti informed him of a prior confession from Davis. At trial, Davis sought to suppress his confession, arguing he was not informed that his lawyer was present. The trial court granted this motion, based on precedent, despite acknowledging that part of the statement may have been given before Margolis's arrival. The Court of Appeals later affirmed the suppression order, and the plaintiff's application for leave to appeal was granted. On September 7, 1991, James Curenton was shot and killed by a gunman wearing a ski mask who stole a gold chain from him. Curenton's friends, Dondrea Smith and Joseph Broom, witnessed the incident, during which Curenton was chased and shot. On September 9, 1991, Bryce Young, the defendant, was arrested for Curenton's murder. He was questioned by Sergeant Lee Caudill after being informed of his Miranda rights, which he waived. Initially, he denied involvement but later confessed after undergoing a polygraph examination. The confession occurred after the police received a call from an attorney seeking to see Young, of which he was unaware during the examination. Young's motion to suppress the confession was denied, and he was convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, receiving sentences of twelve to thirty years and two years, respectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The case was remanded for reconsideration based on the precedent set in People v. Bender, which established that police must inform a suspect when counsel is available, and that failure to do so would lead to suppression of any subsequent statements made by the suspect. The Court of Appeals ruled that Bender should be applied retroactively, as it did not contradict existing case law and served to maintain an accusatorial criminal justice system. The legal issue at hand is the retroactive application of the Bender decision, which is reviewed de novo, focusing on the basis of its holding. In Griffith v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court established that new rules for criminal prosecutions apply retroactively to all cases that are pending on direct review or not yet final, regardless of whether these rules represent a significant departure from prior law. However, this principle is limited to rules grounded in the United States Constitution. The case specifically addressed the retroactive application of the ruling in Batson v. Kentucky, which allowed defendants to challenge racial discrimination in jury selection based on the Fourteenth Amendment. Griffith emphasized that newly declared constitutional rules must be applied to cases on direct review, aligning with Justice Harlan's distinction between final and non-final cases. The Court asserted that failing to apply these rules would violate fundamental norms of constitutional adjudication. Importantly, the ruling in Bender does not stem from a constitutional mandate. The Supreme Court's decision in Moran v. Burbine clarified that police failure to inform a defendant about a lawyer's attempts to contact them does not infringe upon the Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. This interpretation of Griffith's retroactive application is consistent across federal and state courts. For instance, in Commonwealth v. Waters, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that a new rule from Commonwealth v. Allen, which mandated a judicial determination of voluntariness for statements made to private citizens, should not be applied retroactively as it was not based on the Federal Constitution. Similar considerations were examined in People v. Erickson regarding the retroactive application of the Daley v. Hett decision. The defendant argued that Hett prohibited death penalty inquiries of potential jurors when a sentencing jury is waived prior to trial. The court determined that Hett left this issue unresolved and chose not to address it directly. Even if Hett supported the defendant's view, the court concluded it would not apply retroactively to the defendant's case. The court referenced Griffith, asserting that retroactivity is applicable only when two conditions are met: 1) the case affected by the new rule was not final or was under direct review when the rule was announced, and 2) the rule is of constitutional significance. The court emphasized that the right to a sentencing jury is statutory, not constitutional, and thus Griffith did not apply. Consequently, the court employed a three-part retroactivity test from People v. Laws, which it found similar to the test used in People v. Hampton. It noted that since Griffith was not applicable, it had the authority to define retroactivity parameters. Citing Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil Refining Co., the court recognized that states can choose between prospective and retroactive application of legal principles. Although it acknowledged Griffith's rationale, the court opted for the analysis in Stovall v. Denno regarding the retroactivity of United States v. Wade, which mandated the exclusion of certain in-court identifications. The Stovall Court prioritized the administration of justice and reliance over distinctions based on the stage of conviction. While acknowledging potential inequities in applying new rules, the court maintained that such concerns are minor compared to the need for consistent decision-making. Professors LaFave and Israel suggested that reliance should focus on the regulated event rather than the conviction's finality, meaning new rules should only apply to actions occurring after the ruling was established. Bender is to be applied prospectively only, aligning with the Stovall Court's view that no distinction exists between final convictions, those under direct review, and various trial stages. The court declines to extend Bender’s exclusionary rule to cases lacking a deterrent purpose. A three-part retroactivity test from People v. Hampton evaluates (1) the purpose of new rules, (2) reliance on old rules, and (3) the impact of retroactive application on justice administration. The Bender rule is designed to provide prophylactic protection against Miranda violations, focusing on deterrence of police misconduct rather than affecting the truth-finding process. Consequently, it is suitable for prospective application only, as retroactive enforcement would not serve its intended purpose, given that police acted according to existing laws at the time. The second and third factors often intertwine, as greater reliance on the prior settled law warrants prospective application for new procedural rules that do not influence guilt or innocence. The defendants assert that Bender was anticipated by People v. Wright, which involved a similar issue regarding confession admissibility and the necessity of informing defendants about attorney contact efforts. In Wright, a majority ruled against admitting the confession, referencing the Michigan Constitution's requirement for police notification about attorney interactions. Thus, the defendants argue that Bender should not be seen as an unexpected decision. Justice Brickley articulated a distinct rationale for his conclusion, differing from Justices Mallett, Levin, and Cavanagh, focusing on a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. He determined that the coercive nature of the defendant's interrogation invalidated any voluntary waiver of the right to remain silent. The majority opinion in Wright did not support the idea that a failure to grant access to retained counsel automatically warranted the exclusion of statements, indicating that Wright did not set a binding precedent for future cases. In contrast, Bender established a per se exclusion rule, marking a significant departure from prior legal standards. According to Michigan law, a binding precedent requires a majority agreement on the grounds for a decision—merely achieving a majority result does not create authority beyond that case. Consequently, Wright did not create a clear mandate for evidence exclusion related to counsel access, and police could rely on the Supreme Court's ruling in Moran v. Burbine, which deemed a suspect's awareness of an attorney's presence irrelevant to the voluntariness of a waiver. The voluntariness assessment must encompass various factors, such as the accused's age, education, prior police experience, interrogation duration, and overall conditions during questioning, as highlighted in People v. Cipriano. Prior to Bender, police could reasonably assume that statements would not be automatically excluded due to not informing a suspect about counsel's presence, a view supported by subsequent Court of Appeals rulings. These rulings reinforced a traditional totality-of-the-circumstances approach. In Bender, the Court mandated that police must inform suspects about any attorney's attempts to contact them, establishing that failure to do so renders a Miranda waiver invalid per se, leading to the suppression of the statement. Bender represents a new legal standard, making retroactive application potentially disruptive to the justice system. Convictions may be challenged and evidence could be excluded if it was obtained in accordance with prior legal standards, potentially leading to numerous retrials and burdening the criminal justice system. Consequently, the ruling in Bender is applied prospectively only. Defendants Sexton and Young argued for the suppression of their statements on the basis of involuntariness, which is assessed using a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Although the trial court determines voluntariness, appellate courts independently review the record. For defendant Young, the appellate court found no error in the trial court's determination of voluntariness, despite his claims of being uninformed of counsel's attempts to reach him and being deprived of food and sleep. Young received a snack on the day of his arrest and his lack of sleep was attributed to fear rather than police coercion. Thus, Young's statement was deemed voluntary. The appellate court did not address defendant Sexton's case, which is remanded for further proceedings. In all three cases, the defendants' statements were initially suppressed based on Bender; however, since Bender applies only to interrogations post-July 23, 1996, the suppression is reversed, and the cases are remanded for actions consistent with this opinion. Justice Brickley dissented, advocating for a reassessment of retroactivity jurisprudence and challenging the majority's analysis, arguing that the Bender rule was anticipated by prior case law and asserting that it possesses constitutional significance. The excerpt emphasizes the importance of a suspect's right to counsel and protection against self-incrimination as fundamental constitutional liberties. It argues against any legal rule that allows law enforcement to withhold information about the availability of counsel during custodial interrogations, asserting that suspects must be informed not only of their right to counsel but also of the fact that counsel has been retained for them. This requirement is seen as essential for maintaining an accusatorial rather than inquisitorial justice system, highlighting that the good will of state agents is insufficient to safeguard constitutional rights. The author critiques the majority's interpretation of the Bender ruling, asserting that it was intended to protect a fundamental trial right linked to the Fifth Amendment and that the Bender rule is relevant to the integrity of the fact-finding process in criminal law. The author disputes the majority's view that the Bender rule is merely a prophylactic measure lacking constitutional grounding, arguing that it reflects decades of legal analysis and should not be dismissed solely because it is rooted in state, rather than federal, law. The Supreme Court has established a rule for the retroactive application of new criminal procedure rules that balances defendants' constitutional rights with the state's interest in the finality of judgments. This rule, articulated in Griffith, mandates that newly declared constitutional rules be applied retroactively to all cases under direct review, regardless of whether the new rule represents a significant departure from prior law. Not applying this retroactively undermines fundamental principles of constitutional adjudication and compromises the integrity of judicial review by failing to treat similarly situated defendants equitably. The decision not to apply the Bender rule retroactively similarly violates these principles. The majority opinion neglects the precedent established in Shea v. Louisiana, which supports retroactive application of rules that protect rights, such as the rule from Edwards v. Arizona, requiring cessation of interrogation once a right to counsel is invoked. This principle is rooted in Miranda protections. Even if the Bender rule is not directly related to constitutional rights, the same retroactivity principle applies to "prophylactic" rules. The majority’s reliance on older cases like People v. Hampton and Linkletter v. Walker is critiqued for its complexity and susceptibility to manipulation, as highlighted in United States v. Johnson. Factors for determining retroactivity have proven inconsistent and problematic, especially given that a defendant's liberty is at stake. The administration of justice factor is also criticized for being prone to misuse. The author calls for a reevaluation of the retroactivity framework, acknowledging that the Supreme Court has recognized the need for a reassessment of retroactive application standards. The Court determined that its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment should apply to all convictions that were not final at the time of the decision, aligning with Justice Harlan's views. It emphasized that a criminal is only released if the government violates constitutional principles, and similar relief must be granted to like defendants unless a principled distinction is made. The application of the ruling from Payton v. New York to non-final convictions represents a shift towards consistent retroactivity jurisprudence rather than an ad hoc approach. Justice Harlan's dissent highlighted the need for fairness and equal treatment of similarly situated defendants, criticizing the majority for lacking a principled reason for differing treatment. The discussion referenced the challenges of selectively applying legal benefits and burdens, which often arise from arbitrary case selection. It was argued that the majority's test failed to address the hardships faced by those denied the benefits of new legal standards. The Court noted its prior engagement with federal retroactivity analysis, indicating that it had not stagnated following earlier decisions such as Hampton. It pointed out that despite the adoption of Linkletter, subsequent rulings showed a shift away from strict adherence to the dual sovereignty doctrine, which had become questionable. The Court asserted that applying the Cooper rule retroactively was necessary to ensure fair distribution of fundamental rights. The Bender rule is recognized as protecting a fundamental trial right, despite its prophylactic nature. Similar to the Gay case, Bender requires retroactive application based on the protection of state constitutional rights, but this does not dictate the application of the current federal retroactivity model. In People v. Woods, the court evaluated whether the precedent set in People v. Wright, which was influenced by Sandstrom v. Montana, should be applied retroactively. Both Wright and Sandstrom determined that due process is compromised when juries are instructed to presume intent in a way that may shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant. The Woods decision utilized the Johnson analysis, despite its focus on Fourth Amendment violations, and applied the Linkletter factors to conclude that full retroactivity would be detrimental to Michigan’s justice system due to the reliance on previously approved jury instructions. The court found that the extensive number of cases relying on such instructions warranted limited retroactivity. However, it mandated retroactive application for defendants whose cases were pending on direct appeal when Sandstrom was decided, provided the issue was raised and preserved. This approach aligns with the Supreme Court's preference for limited retroactivity, ensuring justice for litigants while treating similarly situated defendants equitably. The author contends that the majority's retroactivity analysis in the current case is flawed, particularly in its "foreshadowing" analysis related to the second and third factors of Hampton, indicating a misunderstanding of its primary purpose. Judicial decisions are generally applied retroactively, except when a ruling overrules established case law, which is limited to "unexpected" or "indefensible" decisions. A new principle of law must be clearly established for retroactive application to be questioned. A rule is considered "new" if it either overrules precedent or addresses an issue not previously decided by an appellate court. In the case of Wright, the court found that police failure to inform a suspect of an attorney's presence constituted impermissible conduct, suggesting that police were aware of the misconduct. Bender is not a new rule in light of this precedent. The majority erroneously equates foreshadowing with stare decisis, undermining the significance of prior rulings. The majority's reasoning implies a lack of awareness regarding the impermissibility of certain police actions, which should not excuse misconduct. Consequently, Bender should be seen as foreshadowed by Wright and not classified as a new rule. The majority's analysis parallels a rejected argument in Johnson, where only violations of pre-existing guidelines warrant retroactive application. The Government's theory posits that all Fourth Amendment rulings should be excluded from retroactive application, a position mirrored by the majority's stance in the current case. This interpretation distorts retroactivity jurisprudence and undermines future retroactivity analyses by disallowing any retroactive application of rules deemed "unsettled." The majority also misapplies the Hampton/Linkletter factors, which assess the purpose of a new rule, reliance on the old rule, and the impact of retroactive application on justice. Contrary to the majority's claims regarding the Bender rule, the Bender majority deemed it essential to protect a fundamental trial right linked to accurate guilt determinations, thus supporting its retroactive application. The majority's assertions that police complied with existing laws and that retroactive application would not prevent misconduct are inconsistent with established precedents, particularly Wright. The argument that retroactive application of Bender would jeopardize convictions obtained under prior laws is flawed, as requiring adherence to rules protecting constitutional rights does not burden justice. Ultimately, the conclusion reached by the majority is viewed as illogical and unjustifiable, advocating instead for a straightforward approach to retroactivity consistent with federal court practices. The majority's retroactivity analysis is criticized on two grounds: first, Bender is not considered a "new rule" of law, as it was anticipated by Wright; second, the application of the Hampton/Linkletter factors supports the retroactive application of Bender. The conclusion reached is that retroactive application of Bender is warranted regardless of the test used. Justices Michael F. Cavanagh and Marilyn J. Kelly concur with Justice Brickley. The discussion clarifies that the current cases do not allow for a reassessment of Bender's holding, focusing solely on whether Bender should be applied retroactively. Key points include details of police questioning the defendant, the absence of an arrest notification, the administration of an atomic absorption test prior to questioning, and the circumstances surrounding a murder case involving the defendant's brother. The Court of Appeals determined that statements taken after a phone call must be suppressed, although the sufficiency of phone contact to invoke Bender's protections is not examined. Constitutional references are made to the right against self-incrimination and the right to a fair trial. The dissenting opinion argues that the significance of Bender is underappreciated by characterizing it merely as a prophylactic rule. The Bender majority characterized the new rule as prophylactic, clarifying that it was not mandated by the Michigan Constitution. The Supreme Court, in Allen v. Hardy, ruled that the Batson decision would not apply retroactively to convictions finalized before Batson. The application of Griffith to constitutional rules is underscored by the Court's review of a three-pronged analysis for retroactivity from Linkletter v. Walker. In Diggs v. Owens, the court confined Griffith to constitutional rules of criminal procedure, stating it does not necessitate retroactive application of new procedural rules lacking constitutional grounding. Similarly, in Mason v. Duckworth, the court determined that Griffith applies only to new federal constitutional rules, rejecting retroactivity for Indiana’s evidentiary changes. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Abronski, declined to retroactively apply a ruling requiring police to inform defendants of counsel presence, using a three-part test to establish that the rule would apply only prospectively. This test evaluates the purpose of the new rule, reliance by law enforcement on prior law, and the impact of retroactivity on justice. The Griffith rationale encourages careful consideration of the implications of expanding constitutional interpretations, balancing recognized rights against the justice system's burdens. Defense counsel requests the Court to apply retroactivity to the Bender decision, citing the Supreme Court's extension of the Edwards rule in Edwards v. Arizona to pending cases. However, the analysis from Stovall v. Denno is viewed as more aligned with Bender's purposes. The Edwards rule is identified as not being constitutionally mandated but rather justified by Miranda's prophylactic purpose. The Court also references the precedent set in Desist v. United States, which held that the Katz decision should only apply prospectively. The ruling in Bender is deemed fully prospective, acknowledging that this retroactivity analysis is no less arbitrary than federal standards. The dissent argues that the Bender rule is not new, suggesting that police should have been aware of the requirement to inform suspects about the presence of counsel. However, this reasoning is critiqued for lacking logic, as the totality-of-the-circumstances test does not designate specific factors as inherently illegal. Under People v. Phillips, a rule is considered new if it overrules clear precedent or addresses an issue of first impression without clear foreshadowing. The Bender decision established, for the first time, that police must inform suspects of an attorney's attempted contact, which invalidates any subsequent Miranda waiver if not communicated. The discussion also references Teague v. Lane, which highlights the complexity in determining when a case announces a new rule, emphasizing that a new rule is recognized when it breaks new ground or imposes new obligations. A case establishes a new rule if its outcome is not determined by existing precedent at the time the defendant's conviction is finalized. The Linkletter v. Walker analysis, which was later replaced by Griffith, was initially supported by two factions within the Supreme Court. One faction saw Linkletter as a way to mitigate the rapid constitutional changes introduced by the Warren Court, while the other regarded it as a method to promote long-overdue reforms without causing mass releases of incarcerated individuals. The concept of nonretroactivity allowed the Court to expand criminal procedure without fear of overwhelming consequences for the justice system. The term "prophylactic" was used in the context of procedural safeguards that are not directly constitutionally mandated, as seen in Miranda v. Arizona. The Johnson case applied the Linkletter test, determining that Miranda's principles should apply to trials starting after its decision date. Various Michigan cases illustrate the precedent and the focus on due process claims, particularly regarding the involuntary nature of confessions due to coercive interrogation techniques. The text also references binding precedents established by earlier Michigan cases and the implications of administrative orders on legal rulings. The majority asserts that Griffith mandates retroactive application solely concerning federal constitutional rules, aligning with both federal and state court approaches. It emphasizes that U.S. Supreme Court precedents do not dictate state law decisions. The central question is not whether Griffith should be applied, but rather whether it ought to be. The case of Edwards was not retroactively applied in pending collateral reviews, consistent with Griffith's distinction between direct and collateral reviews. While advocating for a thoughtful consideration of federal retroactivity precedents, the dissent cautions against uncritically applying them. The dissent acknowledges Justice Moody's critique of Michigan's inconsistent retroactivity decisions and expresses hope for a reevaluation of retroactivity in the state. Limited retroactivity is defined as applicable only to cases pending on timely direct appeal or timely applications to the Michigan Supreme Court. The majority references the "new rule" definition from Teague v. Lane, but the dissent notes that the court currently follows the definition from Phillips and suggests that the majority may choose to overrule Phillips if desired. There is a contention between the majority and dissent regarding the application of federal precedent, with the dissent favoring adherence to federal standards over the majority's complex and criticized test for retroactivity. The dissent critiques the majority's retroactivity analysis as similar to a test deemed an "absurdity" by the Supreme Court in Johnson, highlighting prior questions about the constitutionality of warrantless arrests that predate the Johnson decision. The Court rejected the government's position that only established Fourth Amendment issues should be applied retroactively, arguing that awareness of questionable practices would not shield law enforcement from the consequences of their actions. The ruling criticized a potential approach where police might wait for definitive legal rulings before respecting constitutional rights, which could undermine the enforcement of Fourth Amendment protections. The majority opinion acknowledged the "dubious constitutionality" of not informing suspects about their attorney's presence, indicating that the police had sufficient warning of the impermissibility of this practice. Furthermore, the majority asserted that the Bender rule, meant to prevent Miranda violations, does not directly relate to determining guilt or innocence but is rooted in Michigan constitutional rights. The Court emphasized that federal law does not govern this case, as the Bender ruling is controlling. The majority noted that retroactive application could be warranted when court decisions affect guilt or innocence determinations. The opinion highlighted a significant distinction between the totality-of-the-circumstances approach and the creation of per se exclusionary rules, criticizing the notion that police could engage in questionable practices until a court later deemed them illegal. The dissent argued that the articulation of factors in this approach is meant to inform law enforcement of acceptable conduct, suggesting that police actions in this context were not legally permissible.