Rogge v. Rogge

Citations: 509 N.W.2d 163; 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS 1175; 1993 WL 499134Docket: C2-93-1179

Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota; December 7, 1993; Minnesota; State Appellate Court

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Karen Lee Rogge appealed a trial court modification order granting sole legal and physical custody of their child, B.L.R., to Leonard John Rogge, Jr. The Court of Appeals of Minnesota found that the trial court did not adequately consider critical 'best interest' factors under Minn. Stat. 518.17, subd. 1(a) and remanded for additional findings.

The marriage between the parties was dissolved in 1986, with Karen receiving custody of B.L.R., born in February 1985. Following the dissolution, Karen lived in the marital home and did not remarry, while Leonard remarried in 1989. A history of contentious visitation disputes led to Leonard seeking modifications to the visitation schedule, which the trial court eventually granted. 

In August 1991, Karen denied visitation, alleging abuse by Leonard, which the court found to be unsubstantiated, leading to a contempt ruling against her. The court ordered a custody evaluation, prompted by Leonard’s prima facie case for modification. A year-long evaluation included psychological assessments of both parties and B.L.R., alongside unsuccessful counseling aimed at improving co-parenting.

The psychological evaluations revealed different personality traits: Leonard exhibited rigidity, while Karen showed emotional reactivity and dependency. Therapists concluded that Karen had not moved on from the marriage and failed to recognize Leonard’s positive traits. B.L.R. was found to have serious emotional issues exacerbated by custody disputes, with recommendations for ongoing therapy but a caution against modifying custody at that time due to potential harm to B.L.R. The evaluator suggested reconsideration of custody if Karen undermined therapeutic recommendations.

Both custody evaluator Donna Berner and guardian ad litem Mary Buxton reported that the appellant hindered the respondent's efforts to build a relationship with B.L.R., negatively impacting B.L.R.'s development. Despite this, neither recommended immediate custody changes, citing potential harm to B.L.R. Instead, Berner suggested a six-month delay for therapy. Following a seven-day evidentiary hearing in February 1993, the trial court modified custody in May 1993, granting sole custody to the respondent. 

The key issue on appeal is whether the trial court's findings support the custody modification without specific findings on all relevant 'best interest' factors. A modification requires evidence of a change in circumstances that justifies a change in custody to protect the child's best interests, as per Minn.Stat. 518.18(d)(iii) and case law. While the trial court noted a substantial change in circumstances and potential danger to B.L.R., it failed to address several critical statutory factors, including B.L.R.'s preference, which professionals indicated favored the appellant. Additionally, the court did not consider continuity factors regarding B.L.R.’s primary caretaker, adjustment to his environment, and the stability of his current home. This omission raises concerns that the trial court's decision may not reflect a comprehensive analysis of B.L.R.'s best interests, warranting a remand for further findings.

Appellant has been the primary caretaker of B.L.R. throughout his life, and testimony indicates that B.L.R. is thriving in school, has friends, and participates in community sports. The court did not adequately address how modifying custody would affect B.L.R.'s established relationships. It may have prioritized other factors over continuity, contrary to the requirement to consider multiple factors in determining the best interests of the child, as outlined in Minn.Stat. 518.17, subd. 1(a). The lack of findings from the trial court inhibits meaningful appellate review, as highlighted in Moylan v. Moylan, and raises concerns about whether all relevant best interests factors were considered. Consequently, a remand is necessary to ensure proper findings are made.

Appellant argues that the modification lacks professional support, but the district court has the discretion to diverge from recommendations, provided it either articulates reasons for doing so or provides detailed findings related to those recommendations. The current modification order does not meet these criteria, necessitating a remand. Although this will prolong uncertainty for B.L.R. and the parties, it is essential to comply with statutory mandates. The modification order does indicate that appellant interfered with visitation; however, precedent from Grein v. Grein clarifies that such interference alone does not justify custody modification without comprehensive findings.

The court acknowledges that B.L.R. has been under respondent's custody since June 1993 and recommends that custody remain with respondent during the remand, allowing the trial court to consider additional evidence. Both parties are seen as responsible and loving parents, but their ongoing legal disputes negatively impact B.L.R. At just 8½ years old, B.L.R. needs the nurturing support of both parents, who must recognize their influence on his well-being and work together for his best interests.

B.L.R.'s best interests are to be prioritized in the custody modification proceedings. The trial court's custody modification order is remanded for further findings on best interests factors and expedited proceedings. A dissenting opinion argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, noting the child's current environment endangers his emotional health due to factors such as his separation anxiety disorder, the mother's insensitivity to his need for a father-child relationship, and interference with the father's visitation rights. The court took extensive testimony during a seven-day hearing and concluded that a change of custody was in the child's best interests, balancing the trauma of change against potential emotional benefits from living with the father. While an eight-year-old child may suffer from a custody change, the ongoing conflict between the parents necessitated the trial court's decision. The dissent contends that a remand for further findings would not enhance the child's situation or align with the legislative intent of custody modifications. Additionally, it notes that some of the trial court's findings merely recounted testimony rather than constituting substantive findings.