State v. Doss

Citations: 355 N.W.2d 874; 1984 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1234Docket: 83-477

Court: Supreme Court of Iowa; September 19, 1984; Iowa; State Supreme Court

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Murray Lee Doss was convicted of first-degree murder through aiding and abetting, as determined by a Lee County jury. The conviction, based on sections 707.1 and 707.2 of the Iowa Code, stemmed from a violent incident on September 2, 1981, during a prison riot at the Iowa State Penitentiary. Inmates discovered the body of Gary Tyson, an inmate who had been stabbed multiple times. Tyson was affiliated with the "Almighty Vice Lords" gang, which had been implicated in another murder. Tensions arose within the gang as Tyson was suspected of planning to testify against members involved in a prior homicide.

On the night of the murder, gang members, including Doss, congregated to discuss eliminating Tyson. After a brief assembly led by gang leader Allen Langley, Doss and others were ordered to capture Tyson. Witness testimonies indicated that Doss was present during the planning and execution of the murder, with conflicting accounts regarding his exact position during the stabbing. Ultimately, Langley and another gang member fatally attacked Tyson while Doss's involvement as either a participant or observer was debated in court. The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed Doss's conviction.

Taylor testified that Doss participated in the assault on Tyson, leading to Doss being indicted for first-degree murder on July 7, 1982. The indictment included over fifty pages of grand jury minutes. Doss filed two motions on July 27: one to dismiss the indictment for lack of a prima facie case, and another for a bill of particulars; the trial court denied the dismissal but granted the bill of particulars. Doss made a second motion to dismiss and for a supplemental bill of particulars on September 23, both of which were denied. At the close of the State's evidence, Doss moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing the State failed to prove his guilty knowledge and lacked corroboration from accomplice testimony. This motion was denied, as was a renewed motion for acquittal after all evidence was presented.

On appeal, Doss raised three issues: the denial of his motions for judgment of acquittal, the denial of his motions to dismiss and for a supplemental bill of particulars, and an objection to jury instruction number 11. His post-trial motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment were based on these same alleged errors. 

Regarding the sufficiency of evidence, it was noted that when evaluating such challenges, the evidence must be viewed favorably to the State, and it must allow a reasonable person to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State's position was that Doss aided and abetted in the murder, with Iowa law stipulating that an aider and abettor is treated as a principal. A conviction requires evidence of the defendant's assent to the crime, demonstrated through active participation or prior encouragement. Knowledge alone does not suffice for a conviction; rather, it must be established that the defendant's actions were consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis of innocence.

Circumstantial evidence is deemed as probative as direct evidence for establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as affirmed in State v. O'Connell. In the case at hand, there was no direct evidence of the defendant Doss's knowledge regarding the Vice Lords' plan to murder Tyson, but substantial circumstantial evidence was presented. This evidence suggested that Doss, being a high-ranking member of the gang, was aware of the threats against Tyson, especially since several gang members, including leader Allen Langley, believed Tyson was cooperating with authorities. Testimony indicated that Doss was present during a meeting where Langley ordered the execution of Tyson. Despite some ambiguity about Doss’s awareness of Langley's intentions, the jury could reasonably infer from his presence that he was cognizant of the plan. Additionally, there was testimony implicating Doss in the murder itself, further supporting the inference of his complicity.

Doss challenged the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, referencing an outdated legal standard from Barnes, which required that such evidence be inconsistent with any rational hypothesis of innocence. However, the court noted that this standard is no longer applicable in Iowa law following O'Connell, and the jury appropriately weighed circumstantial evidence equally with direct evidence. Doss also argued that the testimonies of the State's three primary witnesses lacked sufficient corroboration, invoking Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(3), which mandates that testimony of accomplices be corroborated by additional evidence linking the defendant to the crime. Doss contended that Wilson was an accomplice and could not act as a corroborative witness, while the State argued otherwise, leading the trial court to submit the matter to the jury for determination.

The trial court's determination of whether a witness is an accomplice hinges on the ability to charge and convict that witness for the same crime. An accomplice is defined as someone who actively participates in or has a significant connection to the crime, beyond mere knowledge or presence at the scene. In cases where facts are undisputed, the court decides the accomplice status as a matter of law; if disputed, it is a jury question.

In this context, Doss argued that Wilson was an accomplice due to several factors, including Wilson’s status within the Vice Lords, his awareness of a planned murder, and his presence at the crime scene according to Currington’s testimony. However, conflicting testimonies indicated that Wilson was not present at the murder scene at the critical time. Thus, the jury was correctly tasked with determining Wilson's status as an accomplice.

Additionally, Doss contended there was insufficient corroboration for the accomplice's testimony. Iowa law requires corroboration to mitigate the doubts raised by an accomplice's account, though this corroboration need not be overwhelming or confirm every detail of the accomplice's testimony. The existence of corroborative evidence is a legal question, while its adequacy for supporting the accomplice's claims is a factual question for the jury.

In this case, the trial court found sufficient corroborative testimony, with witnesses affirming Doss's presence with the Vice Lords before and during the events leading to Tyson's murder. Thus, the trial court did not err in its findings regarding both Wilson’s status and the corroborative evidence supporting the accomplice's testimony.

Corroboration sufficiency was determined to be a matter for the jury. Doss raised three errors in his second assignment: (1) the trial court's denial of his July 27 motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming it contravened Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(3); (2) the denial of his September 23 application for a supplemental bill of particulars; and (3) the overruling of his second motion to dismiss the indictment on September 23. The court found the indictment and accompanying minutes insufficient to warrant a conviction if not explained, but noted that challenges to evidence supporting an indictment do not justify dismissal, as established in State v. Graham. Doss’s motion to dismiss was also deemed improperly filed under rules 10(6) and (7), as a bill of particulars had not been issued, which is necessary for such a motion. The trial court correctly rejected Doss's request for a supplemental bill of particulars, determining that the indictment was sufficiently clear in conjunction with the provided minutes. The court holds discretion over the necessity of a bill of particulars, and no abuse of that discretion was found in this case. Doss did not demonstrate prejudice from the ruling, and the second motion to dismiss was also rightfully denied as he failed to specify grounds under rule 10(6)(a). The indictment remained valid as it adequately alleged Doss's involvement in the planned murder, fulfilling the legal requirements to uphold the indictment.

The prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitations, and the bill of particulars did not demonstrate that Doss did not commit the charged offense or constitute a different crime. The trial court's dismissal grounds under rule 10(6)(a) were thus exhausted. Over Doss' objection, the court utilized Uniform Jury Instruction number 201 to define "accomplice." Doss requested a more comprehensive definition, asserting that it was supported by prior Iowa case law. However, the court's definition included all individuals who knowingly aided in the commission of the offense, and a separate instruction adequately defined "aiding and abetting." While Doss' proposed instruction might have been clearer, the court's instructions sufficiently addressed the topic, and there was no error in refusing his addition. Consequently, Doss' claims of error were found to be without merit, and the district court's judgment was affirmed.