Richardson v. Rockwood Center, LLC

Citations: 737 N.W.2d 801; 275 Mich. App. 244Docket: Docket 274135

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals; August 29, 2007; Michigan; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

In the case of Richardson v. Rockwood Center, L.L.C., the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed a premises liability claim stemming from a pedestrian accident in a shopping center parking lot. Plaintiff Robert Richardson was struck by a vehicle driven by Diana Barbu while crossing the parking lot. Barbu claimed she was blinded by the sun and unaware of Richardson's presence until after the collision. The plaintiffs sought damages under premises liability and loss of consortium theories against Rockwood Center and the vehicle's driver.

Rockwood Center appealed a circuit court order denying its motion for summary disposition, which was based on the open and obvious danger doctrine and lack of causation. The defendant argued that the parking lot did not present an unreasonable risk of harm and that the design did not cause Richardson's injuries. In contrast, plaintiffs contended that the danger of being struck by a vehicle was unavoidable and posed a high risk of severe harm.

The trial court did not grant summary disposition regarding proximate cause and took the open and obvious danger argument under advisement, ultimately denying it as well. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case, emphasizing that property owners generally owe a duty to invitees to protect them from unreasonable risks, but this duty does not typically extend to open and obvious dangers.

An open and obvious danger is identified when invitees are aware of a risk or when it is apparent enough that an average person could discover it upon casual inspection. The focus lies on the premises' condition. Even if a danger is obvious, if the risk of harm is still unreasonable, special circumstances may require the property owner to take reasonable precautions to mitigate the hazard. Special aspects that remove a condition from the open and obvious doctrine include situations that pose a high likelihood or severity of harm if not avoided. Examples include an unguarded pit or unavoidable standing water at an exit.

There is limited case law on the open and obvious doctrine concerning parking lot design. In Kirejczyk v. Hall, the court examined whether the dangers of navigating through a parking lot were open and obvious, concluding that the parking lot's design was not unreasonably dangerous. The court emphasized that invitees are expected to rely on traffic laws in typical parking lot conditions, which often lack signage or controls. Consequently, the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant was affirmed because the parking lot condition was deemed open and obvious and not uniquely dangerous.

Hazards to pedestrians in parking lots from motor vehicles are considered open and obvious to an average person. The absence of signs or traffic controls does not negate this open and obvious danger. A pedestrian pushing a shopping cart across a vehicle's path intuitively signals a vehicle to stop, and pedestrians are expected to look both ways before crossing. The court noted that a driver unable to see should stop. The plaintiff did not identify any special circumstances that obstructed visibility or prevented safe actions. The trial court's failure to grant summary disposition based on the open and obvious danger doctrine was an error. Therefore, the ruling is reversed, and summary disposition in favor of the defendant is instructed. The dissenting opinion emphasizes the case's focus on premises liability and the requirement for genuine factual disputes in summary dismissal cases, acknowledging the plaintiff's status as a business invitee owed a high duty of care by the defendant.

The traffic lanes on the premises were unmarked and lacked control devices for pedestrian crossing, creating a hazardous situation for pedestrians, particularly as the plaintiff was struck while returning a shopping cart. Shoppers must cross these lanes to access the store. Legal precedents establish that even if hazards are open and obvious, property owners may still be liable if there are "special aspects" that create a uniquely high likelihood or severity of harm. The key issue is whether the conditions on the premises present such risks that would necessitate the owner to take reasonable precautions, despite the obvious nature of the hazards. The determination of "special aspects" can be met if a condition is unavoidable or poses an unreasonably high risk of severe harm. Comparatively, a cited case involving a vehicular accident in a parking lot is not directly applicable as it does not address the pedestrian hazard issues at hand. The focus remains on the property owner's responsibility to mitigate hazards that could lead to pedestrian injuries, especially given the layout that places drivers in close proximity to pedestrians.

The majority's emphasis on the driver's responsibility is deemed irrelevant to the landowner’s liability. Judge Griffin’s assertion that common or avoidable conditions are not inherently dangerous is critiqued, particularly in relation to prior cases discussing conditions like snow and ice. The case Kirejczyk highlights that many commercial parking lots lack traffic controls, but this is differentiated from the discussed dangers of snow and ice, which are considered open and obvious. The Corey case ruled that the icy steps were avoidable, contrasting with situations that present a significantly higher risk of harm. In Kenny, the plaintiff's awareness of ice did not negate the responsibility of the landowner, as the risk was not deemed uniquely severe for a seasoned Michigan resident. The document underscores that the absence of traffic controls in parking lots introduces varied risks that are not simply “common conditions.” The Supreme Court's Lugo case is interpreted to mean that hazards can have "special aspects" making them more dangerous, particularly if they cannot be avoided or pose a significant risk of severe harm. The potential interaction between pedestrians and vehicles creates an abnormal risk when patrons must cross traffic to access businesses. The landowner’s obligation to mitigate such hazards is questioned, suggesting that reasonable disagreement exists on whether they must take action to protect invitees. The trial court's denial of summary disposition to the defendant is affirmed as appropriate.