Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Ramirez v. State
Citations: 739 So. 2d 568; 1999 WL 506949Docket: 89,377
Court: Supreme Court of Florida; July 8, 1999; Florida; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled on the appeal of Nathan Joe Ramirez, who was sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of Mildred Boroski. The court reversed his conviction and remanded for a new trial, citing four primary issues raised by Ramirez. First, he argued that his confession was not voluntary and did not comply with Miranda rights, a claim the trial court denied when it allowed the confession as evidence. Second, he contended that his constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated when a detective testified about Grimshaw's confession, which implicated Ramirez. Third, Ramirez challenged the sufficiency of evidence supporting the cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravator, claiming it conflicted with the aggravator for avoiding arrest. Lastly, he asserted that the death penalty imposed was disproportionate. The investigation revealed the victim had been murdered, with evidence of theft and rape. Grimshaw, initially a suspect, confessed after various interviews and implicated Ramirez as the leader. A recorded phone call between Grimshaw and Ramirez, monitored by detectives, discussed evidence related to the crime. Following this call, police confronted Ramirez, who initially hesitated but eventually surrendered items linked to the murder. Ramirez was taken to the sheriff's office for questioning after initially being asked if he would cooperate. At the station, he was interrogated by two detectives, with the entire session videotaped. The lead detective confronted Ramirez about his involvement in a case, suggesting that evidence indicated both he and Grimshaw were implicated. Ramirez initially claimed Grimshaw provided him with certain items but eventually admitted to breaking into the victim's house during the murder. It was only after this admission that the second detective informed him of his Miranda rights, which Ramirez acknowledged. Following this, he confessed to the murder, claiming he acted under Grimshaw's direction, while denying involvement in a rape. A written waiver of his Miranda rights was obtained only after his full confession. The detectives clarified that no promises or threats were made to him, to which Ramirez replied that the only promise was friendship. The excerpt emphasizes that under both U.S. and Florida laws, individuals cannot be compelled to testify against themselves during custodial interrogation, and any confession must be shown to be voluntary to be admissible in court. Miranda v. Arizona establishes that suspects must be informed of their rights to remain silent and to have an attorney, thereby ensuring their ability to choose whether to speak freely during interrogation. Warnings and waiver of rights are essential under the Fifth Amendment, serving as necessary protections against the pressures of in-custody interrogation that can undermine an individual's will to resist speaking. In the absence of these warnings, any evidence obtained cannot be used against a defendant. The Miranda protections are integral to Florida's legal framework. Ramirez contends that his confession should be deemed inadmissible since he did not receive Miranda warnings prior to interrogation. Interrogation is defined as any state agent's questioning that would lead a reasonable person to provide an incriminating response. Although the State claims that Miranda warnings were unnecessary because Ramirez was not in custody, this is contested. Custody encompasses not just formal arrest but any significant restriction on freedom of movement. A reasonable person’s perception of their situation, rather than the police's intentions, determines custody status. Identifying whether a suspect is in custody involves both legal and factual considerations, utilizing a four-factor test that examines the police's method of summoning, the nature of the interrogation, the confrontation with evidence of guilt, and whether the suspect knows they can leave. In this case, it is undisputed that by the time police approached Ramirez for questioning, he had already been implicated in the crime and had voluntarily surrendered physical evidence linked to it. Detectives informed Ramirez they were aware of his involvement in a case, but he was never explicitly told he was free to leave, indicating he was effectively in custody during the interrogation. At seventeen and with limited prior contact with the justice system, both a reasonable juvenile and adult in his situation would perceive themselves as being in custody, especially given the small interrogation room, the presence of two detectives, and the nature of the questioning. The absence of handcuffs or formal arrest does not negate the custodial nature of the interrogation, which necessitated the administration of Miranda warnings prior to questioning. Consequently, any statements made before these warnings should be suppressed as they were improperly admitted against him. Regarding statements made after the Miranda warnings were finally provided, the Supreme Court's decision in Oregon v. Elstad clarifies that a failure to administer warnings initially does not automatically render subsequent statements inadmissible, provided the warnings are given in a careful and thorough manner, and the rights are waived knowingly and intelligently. In contrast, Ramirez's situation involved a failure to properly administer the Miranda warnings, as the police downplayed their significance. This undermines the validity of any statements made after the warnings, which were not administered in a careful or thorough manner as required by law. The validity of a waiver of Miranda rights hinges on two primary inquiries: the waiver must be a voluntary choice, free from intimidation or coercion, and the individual must fully understand the nature of the right being waived and the consequences of that decision. Courts assess the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the interrogation to determine if both conditions are met. The State has the burden to prove that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, particularly placing a heavier burden when the suspect is a juvenile. This burden must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. The assessment of voluntariness is a legal question, and factors influencing this determination include the method of administering Miranda rights, the suspect's age and background, whether parents were contacted in juvenile cases, the setting of the interrogation, and the absence of a written waiver. Evidence of coercion or trickery undermines the assertion of a valid waiver. Ultimately, the assessment of whether a waiver is valid is closely linked to the absence of police overreach. Miranda warnings were administered to Ramirez only after he had made significant admissions of guilt. Prior to the warnings, a detective downplayed their importance, suggesting that he did not believe Ramirez would assert his rights, which undermined the purpose of the warnings intended to inform individuals of their rights. The administration of these rights was not thorough and careful, contrasting with prior cases where confessions were deemed admissible. The detectives' approach involved "cajoling" and "trickery," exploiting Ramirez's earlier unwarned statements against him. This diverged sharply from cases where suspects were ensured understanding of their rights. Ramirez, a juvenile with limited experience in the criminal justice system, was misled into a false sense of security regarding his legal position at the moment the warnings were given. Although neither the court nor the Supreme Court has established a strict rule on juvenile confessions, factors such as age, experience, education, and intelligence are considered in determining the voluntariness and understanding of a waiver. Police were required to notify Ramirez's parents upon his custody due to his status as a juvenile, as mandated by Fla. Stat. 39.037(2) (1995). Although a failure to notify does not automatically render a confession involuntary, it is a significant factor in evaluating its admissibility. The analysis regarding the voluntariness of a confession applies similarly to the knowing and intelligent nature of a Miranda waiver, particularly given how the warnings were administered in this case. The court cited a precedent where it was deemed erroneous for police to continue questioning after a parent's request to speak with the suspect. In Ramirez's situation, his parents were not allowed to see or speak with him prior to or during the interrogation, distinguishing it from other cases where parents were present or given the opportunity to be involved. The State's assertion of attempts to contact Ramirez's parents was insufficient, as mere perfunctory efforts do not fulfill statutory requirements. Furthermore, the oral administration of Miranda warnings occurred only after Ramirez made incriminating admissions, and a written waiver was obtained post-confession. Key factors against the waiver's validity included the delayed Miranda warnings, inadequate administration of the rights, and the absence of parental presence during interrogation, all compounded by Ramirez's juvenile status and lack of experience in the justice system. The oral waiver was deemed invalid, leading to the conclusion that the confession should have been suppressed. Since the admission of the confession could not be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a new trial is mandated. Additionally, the trial's reversal necessitates addressing the improper admission of Grimshaw's confession details, which implicated Ramirez. During cross-examination, defense counsel raised questions about Grimshaw's inconsistent statements and the nature of Ramirez's involvement in the murder. On redirect, the prosecutor, despite objections, introduced specifics from Grimshaw's confession, asserting it contradicted Ramirez's claims. The State acknowledged that admitting a non-testifying codefendant's confession typically constitutes hearsay, violating the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. However, the State contended that Ramirez's earlier inquiries during cross-examination allowed for the admission of this testimony under the "opening the door" principle, which permits otherwise inadmissible evidence to clarify prior testimony. This principle aims to uphold fairness and truth-seeking in trials, as illustrated by relevant case law. The Court determined that the defendant's questioning might mislead the jury into confusing the appellant's conviction for assault with intent to commit murder with his prior misdemeanors. As a result, the state was justified in questioning the defendant about his prior felony to counteract these misleading implications. The concept of "opening the door" relates to the rule of completeness, codified in section 90.108 of the Florida Statutes, which allows an adverse party to introduce other relevant parts of a statement when a portion has been presented. While this rule emphasizes fairness, it is not absolute; the court must assess whether fairness necessitates presenting additional statements to the jury based on the context. In the case of Walsh v. State, the defendant's questions allowed for the admission of a co-defendant's complete confession. However, in the current case, the defendant did not bring out any part of Grimshaw's confession during cross-examination, making the rule of completeness inapplicable for introducing details of that confession. The Court noted that fairness considerations should guide whether otherwise inadmissible evidence should be allowed. In Pacheco v. State, the Court allowed the State to inquire about a co-defendant's implication of the defendant, as the defense implied exclusivity in the incrimination. However, specifics of the confession were deemed inadmissible, violating hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause. The Second District identified a significant issue regarding cross-examination, specifically whether any external influence led the detective to suspect the defendant, which warranted the reversal of the conviction due to the admission of a codefendant's statement. The defense's limited cross-examination of the officer sought to clarify any other evidence implicating Ramirez or contradicting his claim of acting under Grimshaw's direction. This opened the door for the State to reference Grimshaw's confession but did not permit further details about Grimshaw’s statements, especially since Grimshaw was unavailable for cross-examination. The introduction of inflammatory details from Grimshaw’s confession during the penalty phase was deemed inadmissible, as these statements were hearsay and violated Ramirez’s constitutional rights to confront witnesses. The State conceded that such testimony is typically inadmissible but argued its relevancy due to prior admission in the guilt phase, a point the court disagreed with. Consequently, the court indicated a need for a new penalty phase regardless of any guilt phase outcomes. Additionally, the court noted two deficiencies in the sentencing order: the trial court assigned minimal weight to Ramirez's age, despite his being slightly over seventeen and having demonstrated emotional, intellectual, and behavioral immaturity, and it did not give significant weight to his lack of prior criminal history, citing a juvenile prosecution for auto burglary. Ramirez was seventeen at the time of the murder, and expert testimony indicated that he exhibited significant emotional, intellectual, and behavioral immaturity, comparable to that of a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old, without any evidence of retardation or subnormal IQ. Although age is generally considered a mitigating factor, the trial court assigned it little weight, referencing prior cases that suggested age alone does not significantly mitigate sentencing. However, the court must give full weight to the mitigating factor of age for minors, which can be reduced by evidence of unusual maturity. In this case, there was no evidence of such maturity to lessen the weight of Ramirez's age. Additionally, the trial court incorrectly asserted that Ramirez's juvenile arrest for a minor theft detracted from his lack of significant prior criminal activity, despite the adjudication being withheld and his successful completion of an alternative program. This was deemed an abuse of discretion. Ultimately, it was concluded that the confession obtained prior to a written waiver should have been suppressed. The trial court's decision to allow details of a codefendant's confession during both the guilt and penalty phases was deemed erroneous, as cross-examination did not permit disclosure of the hearsay statements from the non-testifying codefendant. Consequently, the court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The ruling highlighted a significant violation of the Miranda rights, particularly concerning the treatment of a minor defendant. The police interrogated the minor before issuing Miranda warnings and contacting his parents, undermining the protections intended by the Supreme Court. The opinion emphasized that the focus should be on the circumstances of the defendant’s detention and interrogation rather than the emotional context of the murder itself. It was stated that pre-Miranda statements were inadmissible, and the nature of Ramirez' initial confession, obtained in violation of Miranda, was crucial for assessing the voluntariness and admissibility of subsequent statements made after the warnings were given. The police had sufficient probable cause to arrest Ramirez based on the codefendant's confession and a controlled telephone conversation that corroborated his involvement. The authorities could not evade Miranda requirements by claiming a lack of probable cause, as substantial evidence against Ramirez already existed. Ramirez self-incriminated during a conversation by acknowledging knowledge of stolen items from a victim's house, including a gun, rings, and handcuffs. This conversation corroborated Grimshaw's statement to the police implicating Ramirez. Following this, police visited Ramirez's home without notifying his parents, who were absent, and confronted him about the stolen items without providing Miranda warnings. Ramirez voluntarily handed over a stolen ring and was asked to lead the police to the murder weapon and other stolen items, again without parental notification or Miranda warnings. At the police station, he was interrogated about the murder without being informed of his rights to remain silent or to an attorney, nor was he told that his statements could be used against him. It was only after he confessed to the murder that the police issued Miranda warnings, which they did so inadequately. The situation violated Miranda rights, as established in Oregon v. Elstad, which requires that unwarned statements can only be used if there is no coercion and if proper warnings are given subsequently. The totality of circumstances surrounding Ramirez's case indicated that neither condition was met, particularly since he had already implicated himself before receiving any warnings, and the police failed to contact his parents despite knowing he was a minor. This context highlights the violation of his rights and the improper conduct of the police. The analysis applies the first prong of the Elstad decision to the circumstances surrounding Ramirez's interrogation. At the time the police approached Ramirez, they were already aware of his involvement in the crime, having received a statement from Grimshaw implicating him and corroborated through a telephone conversation. Despite this knowledge, the police did not notify Ramirez's parents and placed him in an interrogation room rather than a familiar environment. The police informed Ramirez that they knew he and Grimshaw were involved in the incident, contradicting their initial claim that he was merely a potential witness. Although the police had sufficient probable cause to arrest Ramirez, they misled him by stating he was not under arrest, and he was never released from custody. Regarding the second prong of Elstad, the dissent argues that Elstad supports the admission of Ramirez's subsequent confession, as officers read him his rights similarly to how they did in Elstad. However, the context of the two cases differs significantly. In Elstad, the statements were made in the respondent's home with his mother present, and the parents were aware of the situation. Crucially, in Elstad, the officers did not exploit the unwarned admission to pressure the defendant into waiving his rights. Conversely, in Ramirez's case, the police used his unwarned statements to coerce him into waiving his rights. Detective Jones downplayed the significance of the Miranda warnings and suggested that Ramirez's prior admissions would motivate him to cooperate, failing to provide a thorough administration of Miranda rights as required by the Supreme Court. The record indicates a deliberate effort by law enforcement to secure Ramirez's involvement in a crime before providing Miranda warnings, subsequently aiming to elicit further admissions based on his prior confession. This practice is particularly coercive, as a suspect may feel compelled to continue confessing after already having done so. The legal precedent (Darwin v. Connecticut) highlights that suspects might view their situation as having little to lose by repeating confessions. Additionally, individuals unaware that pre-waiver statements are inadmissible may feel it is worse to assert their right to remain silent after confessing. Crucially, the circumstances surrounding Ramirez's confession are exacerbated by his status as a minor, necessitating heightened scrutiny in accordance with Haley v. Ohio, which emphasizes the need for special care when evaluating juvenile confessions. Florida law mandates that police must promptly notify a child's parents upon taking them into custody, as outlined in section 39.037(2) of the Florida Statutes. This law requires continuous attempts to notify the parents until either notification occurs or the child is handed over to an intake counselor. In this case, officers failed to adhere to these legal requirements, with the interrogation videotape showing that the mention of Ramirez's parents did not occur until nearly an hour into the questioning, after he had already confessed. The officers informed Ramirez of the legal requirement for parental notification, indicating their awareness of their obligations, unlike in the case of Elstad, where the mother's presence sufficed to fulfill this requirement. The Supreme Court's decision in Fare v. Michael C. establishes that the government bears the burden to prove a minor knowingly and intelligently waived their rights against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. Courts must assess the totality of circumstances surrounding an interrogation, including the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, to determine if the waiver was voluntary. In Fare, the police ensured the defendant understood his rights, and he had substantial prior experience with law enforcement, contrasting with Ramirez's minimal interaction with the police. The courts are responsible for protecting a defendant's constitutional rights, emphasizing that the police must not compel self-incrimination but rather gather evidence independently. Miranda mandates that rights be communicated at the beginning of an interrogation, not at the convenience of law enforcement. The case at hand is an exception to the general conduct of police officers, who typically uphold the law. The majority opinion requires that Ramirez's confession be suppressed in accordance with established law from Miranda v. Arizona. Justices SHAW, PARIENTE, and KOGAN concur with this decision, while Justice WELLS partially concurs and partially dissents. Wells agrees with the majority's conclusion to vacate Ramirez's death sentence and order a new penalty phase due to an error regarding a detective's testimony about John Grimshaw's statements, referencing Franqui v. State. However, Wells dissents from the majority's determination that the trial court erred in denying Ramirez's motion to suppress his pretrial confession. The trial court's finding that Ramirez was read his Miranda rights, validly waived them, and voluntarily made inculpatory statements is upheld. Upon reviewing the suppression hearing record, including the confession videotape, Wells concludes that the detectives acted properly under Miranda. The factual background reveals that the crime, which involved burglary, rape, kidnapping, and murder, occurred between midnight and 7 a.m. on March 11, 1995. The perpetrators, John Grimshaw and Ramirez, both seventeen, targeted Mildred Boroski, a widow living alone in a retirement village. They broke into her home after disabling her phone lines and attacked her after killing her dog. Grimshaw restrained Boroski, while Ramirez stole a gun and handcuffs belonging to her late husband. The details of the crime and subsequent interrogation are critical for understanding the detectives' actions. Ramirez reported that Grimshaw raped Ms. Boroski, after which they placed her, along with her deceased dog, in her car and drove to an open field. There, they forced Ms. Boroski to lie down, and Ramirez shot her twice in the head, resulting in her death. They then abandoned her car in a wooded area, and Ramirez disposed of the keys in a lake, which were later recovered by a fisherman. Ramirez hid the murder weapon under his waterbed mattress, where it was later discovered by his stepmother. Following a directive from his father to remove the guns from the house, Ramirez gave the firearms to a friend named Rodney, who was on probation. He also gave handcuffs to his girlfriend. Grimshaw and Ramirez took money from Ms. Boroski's purse, which they spent on video games the next day. Ms. Boroski's car was found on March 11, 1995, and upon investigation of her home the following day, deputies discovered signs of forced entry, missing or disconnected phones, and evidence of a violent struggle, including blood and fecal matter. A crime team was called, and Grimshaw attempted to assist in the search for Ms. Boroski but was unsuccessful. Her body was ultimately found on March 14, 1995, in a compromising state that suggested sexual assault. Grimshaw became a suspect and was taken into custody on May 3, 1995. During a lengthy interview, he provided inconsistent accounts of the events. He claimed that Ramirez had some of Ms. Boroski's possessions, prompting investigators to record a phone call between Grimshaw and Ramirez. In this conversation, they discussed possession of Ms. Boroski's items, including a gun, rings, and handcuffs. Following this, Detective Blum was sent to retrieve the items and gather information from Ramirez, who initially hesitated to cooperate. The lead detective noted that at the time of sending Blum, he did not consider Ramirez a suspect in the murder. Detective Blum informed Ramirez that his conversation with Grimshaw was recorded. Ramirez surrendered one ring, claiming the other was lost, and stated he had given the handcuffs to his girlfriend and the firearm to a friend. The detective retrieved these items from their respective locations. During questioning, Ramirez mentioned his parents were at work. Upon arrival at the sheriff's office, he was taken to an interrogation room where he was interviewed for two hours, and the session was videotaped. Detective Bousquet, who primarily interrogated Ramirez, did not read him his Miranda rights initially as he was not considered a suspect at that time. Approximately five minutes into the interview, after Ramirez made a brief admission regarding his presence in Ms. Boroski's home, Bousquet issued the Miranda warning. Following this, after acknowledging his rights, Ramirez detailed his involvement in the crime, including the murder of Ms. Boroski and various violent actions taken against her. He later signed a waiver for a search of his residence as well as a written waiver of his Miranda rights, continuing to provide explicit details about the offenses. During the suppression hearing, the trial court reviewed testimony from Detective Blum and Bousquet, along with the videotape. The judge denied Ramirez's motion to suppress, noting that he appeared to be a potential witness initially and only received the Miranda warning once his involvement was suspected. The judge observed that Ramirez spoke clearly and logically, showing no signs of stress, and characterized Bousquet's approach as friendly rather than abusive, emphasizing that Ramirez did not appear to be in fear during the interrogation. The Court found the young man's physical and verbal affirmations regarding consent to search to be sufficient, indicating that a written consent may not have been necessary. The Court noted that law enforcement had adequate grounds for obtaining a search warrant without needing the young man's consent. Observations about the young man's demeanor suggested he was aware of the situation, though he appeared saddened once he recognized the gravity of his circumstances. The motion to suppress was denied. The excerpt then discusses the legal framework surrounding confessions, referencing key Supreme Court cases that established the standards for admissibility under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The totality-of-the-circumstances approach is emphasized for determining both the voluntariness of confessions and the validity of waivers of rights. The discussion includes the significance of Miranda rights, clarifying that while these are not constitutional rights per se, they are protective measures against self-incrimination. The Court's rulings also suggest that a waiver does not necessarily require a written statement but can be implied from the circumstances. Additionally, it is noted that prior unadvised questioning does not preclude a suspect from later waiving rights after receiving Miranda warnings, and voluntary statements made in violation of Miranda can still be used for impeachment during cross-examination. In *Michigan v. Tucker*, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that evidence obtained through statements made in violation of Miranda warnings is not automatically inadmissible unless there is actual coercion or circumstances undermining a suspect's free will. The majority opinion did not find that Ramirez had not received Miranda warnings, as the videotape confirmed he was advised of his rights twice. The decision to suppress Ramirez's confession was primarily based on the detective's demeanor and Ramirez's age, suggesting his waiver of rights was involuntary, despite a lack of supporting evidence for this claim. The state bears the burden to prove a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. A thorough review of the police investigation and the confession videotape indicated no coercive police conduct, leading to the conclusion that the confession was voluntary and should not be deemed inadmissible. The trial judge's findings were accepted as factual and legally sound. Criticism arose regarding the police's approach to administering Miranda warnings, with claims that the significance of those rights was downplayed. The dialogue between detectives and Ramirez during the warning process highlighted that he understood his rights and voluntarily chose to speak about the case, contrasting with prior case law concerning juvenile defendants. The author argues that the cases in question are similar, with the case of Fare supporting the affirmation of the trial court's decision. In Fare, a 16½-year-old juvenile challenged the denial of his motion to suppress a confession, claiming police coercion in his waiver of Miranda rights. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected this argument, emphasizing that the interrogation transcript demonstrated the police's thorough explanation of the defendant's rights. The Court applied a totality of the circumstances test, considering the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence. It concluded that the police ensured the juvenile understood his rights and that he willingly waived them to continue the interrogation. The juvenile had prior experience with law enforcement, including several arrests and time in a youth camp, indicating he was capable of understanding the implications of his actions. There was no evidence suggesting he lacked the intelligence to comprehend his rights or the consequences of waiving them. Respondent voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment rights, as evidenced by the absence of improper interrogation tactics or coercion during the process. A review of the videotape indicates no material difference in the administration of Miranda warnings by officers in this case compared to the Fare case. The majority's argument that Detective Jones' comment undermines the significance of Miranda is seen as flawed. The record shows no evidence of police overreach, coercion, or deceit influencing Ramirez's waiver. The court references past rulings, emphasizing that police are not obligated to inform detainees of every potential consequence of waiving their rights nor to act as legal advisors. The fact that the interrogation was videotaped supports the legitimacy of the confession, as it mitigates concerns of coercion. The majority's concerns regarding Ramirez's age, lack of experience with the justice system, and absence of parental notification are noted, but it is highlighted that he had prior encounters with law enforcement, including a previous admission of guilt in a separate case. Ramirez was mandated to attend six sessions of a seminar titled "Consequences of Crime." A legal question arose regarding how many juvenile arrests would lead the Court to consider a defendant experienced in the criminal justice system, highlighting uncertainty about whether a juvenile could effectively waive their Miranda rights. This uncertainty contradicts the Court's previous ruling in Doerr v. State. Ramirez's waiver was captured on videotape, where he interrupted the detective during the Miranda rights reading to assert his understanding. Despite this, the detective continued reading the rights, although Ramirez's demeanor indicated comprehension. The majority opinion emphasized the failure to notify Ramirez's parents prior to interrogation, referencing Florida Statutes requiring an attempt to notify a parent or guardian. However, the precedent set in Doerr indicates that lack of parental notification is a factor but not a statutory prerequisite for interrogation. The majority's assertion that the State's attempts to contact Ramirez's parents were merely perfunctory overlooks evidence from the record, including sworn testimony and the videotape, which documented attempts to ascertain the parents' location. The trial court determined that Ramirez's interrogation began as a witness inquiry, a finding the majority disregarded. The Court is bound to respect a trial court's factual findings unless there is an abuse of discretion. Detective Blum testified regarding efforts to locate Ramirez's parents, which the majority also ignored. At the end of the interrogation, Ramirez remained unhelpful about his parents' whereabouts, and the detectives acted diligently under the circumstances. Lastly, the majority criticized the belated acquisition of a written waiver from Ramirez, but under Florida law, such waivers are just one factor in assessing the overall circumstances of the case, which aim to confirm that a defendant understands their rights. In the absence of a videotape, a written acknowledgment of Miranda rights can confirm that the rights were read and that the interrogation proceeded voluntarily. However, in this case, the videotape clearly demonstrates that Ramirez was informed of his rights and chose to continue with the interrogation. The case of Sliney, which relied solely on police officer testimony without a written waiver, supports the notion that the lack of an initial written waiver is not critical for admissibility when corroborated by a videotape. The evidence does not indicate police misconduct; instead, it shows a legitimate investigation into the murder of Ms. Boroski, where law enforcement had reasonable grounds to question Ramirez regarding possession of her property. The videotape contradicts claims that the interrogation was unduly lengthy or coercive. While it is generally advisable for suspects not to waive their rights, courts acknowledge the necessity of such waivers for the compelling societal interest in prosecuting criminal offenses. Ramirez’s confession, made for reasons unknown to him, should not be excluded, as doing so would undermine societal interests in justice and accountability for crime. Concurrence is noted from HARDING, C.J. and OVERTON, Senior Justice. Additional notes refer to related cases and legal principles concerning Miranda rights and the criminal justice system. In 1993, Ramirez, then fifteen, was arrested for stealing ten dollars from a truck, with adjudication withheld and placement in an alternative program that he completed successfully. Testimony revealed that at seventeen, Ramirez had learning disabilities and functioned at an eighth or ninth-grade level, with an emotional and intellectual age of thirteen or fourteen. However, this information was not presented at the suppression hearing and thus was not considered in the analysis. The record indicates that Ramirez's parents arrived after his confession, responding to a message left for them. The sheriff's deputy was aware of Ramirez's status as a minor but did not clarify when he sought to contact the parents. The videotape showed that questioning about the parents only began after Ramirez’s confession. Additionally, while the defendants in Franqui v. State were tried jointly, the separate trials of Ramirez and his codefendant do not negate the constitutional issue regarding the admission of a non-testifying codefendant's statements, which violates the right to cross-examine. Ramirez's appeal claim regarding insufficient evidence for the murder being cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) was rejected. Testimony indicated that "huffing," the inhalation of aerosol chemicals for a high, was a behavior Ramirez engaged in before the murder, as evidenced by an empty aerosol can found near the crime scene. Lastly, it was noted that law enforcement is required to inform defendants of their Miranda rights upon confrontation. Police officers are required to provide Miranda warnings to defendants before any custodial interrogation to ensure that any confession is admissible in court. Officers utilize Miranda cards to communicate these rights, emphasizing that interrogation cannot occur until these rights are conveyed. In the specific case of Ramirez, while he was questioned by two detectives, only one actively interrogated him, and the interrogation room was deemed normal-sized, contrary to implications in prior statements. The use of videotape during the interview is viewed positively as a demonstration of law enforcement's good faith. The trial court, having reviewed the videotape and live testimonies, reached conclusions that differed from the majority opinion regarding the conduct of law enforcement. The excerpt raises concerns about the majority's interpretation of whether the initial Miranda warnings rendered a subsequent waiver involuntary. It critiques the majority's departure from established legal principles that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is generally considered correct. Additionally, the excerpt contests the majority's assertion that the State carries a "heavy burden" to prove a defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver of rights, particularly for juveniles, arguing that this characterization misrepresents the legal standards set forth in prior cases. When the State seeks to suppress a defendant's statement allegedly obtained in violation of Miranda rights, it must demonstrate that the defendant waived those rights by a preponderance of the evidence. The referenced case, Connelly, highlights this requirement. The mention of Elstad indicates that similar to the current case, officers properly informed Elstad of his Miranda rights and obtained a waiver. The Supreme Court in Connelly also noted that the exclusionary rule, although serving to deter constitutional violations, significantly impacts law enforcement by preventing the introduction of relevant evidence. Additionally, Florida Statutes Section 39.037(2) mandates that when a child is taken into custody, the individual responsible must attempt to notify the child's parent, guardian, or legal custodian, continuing those efforts until notification occurs or the child is handed over to an intake counselor. If the child is delivered to an intake counselor before notification, that counselor or case manager must persist in trying to notify the parent or guardian.