State v. Noel

Citations: 585 So. 2d 652; 1991 WL 165278Docket: 91-KA-1283

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; August 29, 1991; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Robin L. Noel was charged with solicitation for oral sex under LSA-R.S. 14:89(2) on January 7, 1991, and pled not guilty at her arraignment on January 11. On January 17, the trial date, she changed her plea to guilty for an attempted crime against nature and was sentenced to one year at hard labor. On May 10, 1991, the State filed a multiple offender bill, leading to a hearing on May 16, where the court found her a second offender and imposed a fifteen-month sentence.

Noel appealed, raising three assignments of error: (1) the denial of her Motion to Quash, (2) the acceptance of her identity stipulation without informing her of her rights, and (3) the determination of her status as a double offender based on insufficient proof of prior Boykinization. The court found merit only in the second assignment, noting the trial court's error in not adequately informing Noel of her rights during the stipulation process.

Additionally, the court identified an illegally lenient sentence at the multiple offender hearing. According to La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(a), a second felony offender should receive at least half of the maximum sentence for the crime, which is five years for attempted crime against nature. Thus, the appropriate sentence should have been 30 months, but the court chose not to amend the sentence since the appeal was initiated by the defendant.

Regarding the timeliness of the multiple offender bill, the court acknowledged that while no prescriptive period is specified in La.R.S. 15:529.1(D), the Louisiana Supreme Court mandates that such a bill must be filed within a "reasonable time" after the prosecution learns of the defendant's prior felony. The court referenced the precedent set in State v. Broussard, where a significant delay in filing was deemed unreasonable. In Noel's case, the multiple bill was filed approximately four months after her initial sentencing, and the State did not provide justification for this delay. Courts evaluate the specifics of each case to determine the timeliness of the multiple bill filings.

A three-month delay in filing a multiple bill after sentencing was deemed reasonable due to the need for obtaining necessary transcripts and records from the defendant's prior conviction, as established in State v. Patterson. The State justified the delay, while the defense's argument concerning the defendant's potential release based on "good time" credit was unpersuasive due to a lack of evidence and the fact that the defendant had served less than six months of a twelve-month sentence. The defense also failed to provide legal authority for claiming that a four-month lapse was untimely, particularly given prior rulings in State v. Thompson and State v. Patterson, which upheld similar delays.

The defendant further contended that the trial court erred in accepting a stipulation regarding her identity without first informing her of her rights, as mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D). This statute requires that the defendant be made aware of the allegations against her and her rights to contest them. Previous cases, including State v. Martin and State v. Desmond, have established that a defendant must be informed of these rights before admitting to identity as the same person charged in the multiple bill. Since the trial court did not inform the defendant of her rights prior to accepting her stipulation of identity, her conviction and sentence as a multiple offender must be vacated. Additionally, the defendant argued that the State's reliance on her guilty plea from a previous conviction was flawed due to the absence of a transcript confirming that the plea was made voluntarily and with an understanding of its consequences.

A knowing and voluntary waiver of constitutional rights during a guilty plea requires that the defendant is informed of the right against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront accusers, as established in Boykin v. Alabama. While a colloquy between the trial court and the defendant is preferred to demonstrate such a waiver, it is not essential if other evidence supports it. In this case, the State provided the arrest register, bill of information, minute entry, and a guilty plea form, which the defendant signed, acknowledging her guilt and understanding of her rights. The plea form confirmed that the court addressed the defendant personally regarding her rights and that she had the opportunity to speak. The presence of counsel during the plea further validated the waiver. The combination of the plea form and minute entry satisfied the waiver requirement, rendering the assignment of error without merit. However, since the defendant was not informed of her right to remain silent as mandated by LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(D), the case is remanded for a new multiple bill hearing, while the conviction and sentence are affirmed in all other respects.