Jackson v. Investment Corp.

Citations: 585 So. 2d 949; 1991 WL 40042Docket: 89-0399

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; August 21, 1991; Florida; State Appellate Court

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John Jackson appealed a judgment from a jury verdict in favor of the Investment Corporation of Palm Beach regarding a dispute over a jackpot amount advertised at a dog track. Jackson claimed he won a Pic-6 jackpot of $825,000 based on an advertisement in the Miami Herald, but the corporation intended to offer only $25,000. The error stemmed from a misunderstanding by a newspaper employee who misread the draft. Although the corporation paid Jackson $25,000, he sought the additional amount based on his assertion that the ad constituted a valid offer.

At trial, evidence indicated that the corporation never intended to offer $825,000, establishing the mistake. Jackson argued that the ad was an offer he accepted, while the corporation contended that it was merely an invitation to negotiate, not a binding offer. The court instructed the jury to determine whether the corporation intended to make an offer of $825,000, leading Jackson to assert that the instruction effectively directed a verdict against him because it acknowledged the lack of evidence supporting the corporation's intent.

Jackson maintained that the corporation's subjective intent was irrelevant to the existence of a contract, referencing a Florida Supreme Court ruling emphasizing that contract validity is based on external expressions rather than internal intentions.

Professor Williston articulates that the true interpretation of an offer or acceptance is determined not by the offeror's intent but by how a reasonable person in the parties' position would interpret it. The law governing reward offers also applies to advertisements, where an offer constitutes a conditional promise that creates a binding contract if accepted before revocation, as established in Shuey v. United States. The evidence and legal arguments presented raised a question for the jury, which was impeded by the trial court's instruction regarding the appellee's intent in publishing the advertisement. Although the appellee argued that the advertisement was merely an 'invitation to bargain,' this was deemed inapplicable since the advertisement did not suggest further negotiation. The court noted that acceptance occurs upon purchasing a winning ticket, thus forming a contract. The trial court's jury instruction was deemed erroneous, leading to a reversal of the judgment and a remand for a new trial. Judge Warner concurs, emphasizing that the appellant was denied the chance to argue the case effectively due to the jury instruction, particularly regarding the issues of mistake and due care related to the advertisement. Chief Judge Hersey dissents, asserting that the evidence clearly indicated the appellee's intent to offer a $25,000 jackpot, as reflected in a prior advertisement, and contends that the mistake originated from the newspaper, not the appellee. He questions whether a newspaper can bind an advertiser to a contract based on an erroneous price, reinforcing his dissenting opinion.

The dissenting opinion argues against leaving critical questions to a jury trial, suggesting affirmance based on harmless error or alternative reasoning. The motion for rehearing is denied, with Judges Downey and Hersey concurring, while Judge Warner concurs specially, clarifying his stance on the majority's decision. He emphasizes that the majority erred in instructing the jury to determine whether the appellee intended to offer a $825,000 jackpot, as it was clear the appellee did not subjectively intend this. The erroneous instruction functioned as a directed verdict for the appellee, neglecting the appellant's claim that the advertisement's publication resulted from negligence on the appellee's part.

Warner counters the dissent's position, which argues the advertising error was solely the newspaper's fault, by asserting that the appellee's lack of due care in presenting the ad constitutes a unilateral mistake. He contends that this mistake, relied upon by the appellant, should allow for relief. The jury instruction misled the jury regarding the critical issue of mistake. Furthermore, Warner argues that the appellee did not move for a directed verdict on the unilateral mistake defense, which is essential for equitable rescission, and that the trial court failed to evaluate evidence on appellee's negligence. Thus, the appellant deserves an opportunity to present his case to a jury with appropriate instructions.