Ellis v. State

Citations: 778 So. 2d 114; 2000 WL 1868506Docket: 1999-KA-00706-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; December 13, 2000; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

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Antwon Leshay Ellis was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and murder by the Hinds County Circuit Court, with the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirming the trial court's decisions regarding both convictions. The case involved differing accounts from witnesses about the events of August 23, 1997. Carlos Gray testified that he took Ellis and Marcus Reese to Commodore Johnson's apartment, where Ellis shot Johnson after a confrontation about drug money. Gray initially denied being present during the incident in his police statement. 

Reese provided testimony indicating that he was picked up by Ellis and others, and he overheard a conversation suggesting Ellis was planning to confront Johnson. His trial testimony contradicted earlier statements where he did not mention certain individuals present. He claimed Ellis confessed to the shooting after it occurred. 

In contrast, Ellis's defense presented a version where he claimed he and Gray went to Johnson's apartment to collect a debt, and the shooting was accidental during a struggle. Ellis moved for a directed verdict, asserting the State did not prove the necessary elements for his charges, but the trial court denied the motion. Ellis did not present any evidence in his defense and was ultimately found guilty on both counts. He subsequently filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or a new trial, which was also denied, leading to his appeal.

The legal sufficiency of the State's evidence can be challenged through motions for a directed verdict, peremptory instruction, or JNOV, with a similar standard of review for each. The court must view the evidence favorably to the State, accepting all supporting evidence as true without assessing credibility. Ellis contends there is insufficient evidence of a conspiracy with Holden to commit murder, relying on the testimony of Reese, who recounted pre- and post-shooting conversations between Ellis and Holden. Despite Ellis's assertions, the court found that the evidence, including a $10,000 life insurance check payable to Holden, supports the existence of a conspiracy. The court noted that conspiracy can be established through circumstantial evidence, requiring proof of an agreement to commit an unlawful act. Testimony indicated that Ellis and Holden were in a car together, with Ellis affirming his intent to act, and subsequently confirming the act upon return, demonstrating a meeting of minds. 

Regarding the murder charge, Ellis argues that the evidence only supports a finding of "heat of passion" manslaughter. However, the court determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that Ellis's actions—conversations with Holden, seeking out Johnson, and shooting him—constituted deliberate design to kill. Ellis's request for a jury instruction on "heat of passion" manslaughter was denied by the trial court.

A defendant is entitled to jury instructions on their theory of the case, even if the supporting evidence is weak or inconsistent. A lesser-related offense instruction must be granted unless the trial judge can definitively state that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of that lesser offense when viewing the evidence favorably towards the accused. Instructions require some evidentiary support; if any evidence can reasonably suggest a lesser offense, the court should provide that instruction.

In this case, Ellis claims his theory of "heat of passion" manslaughter is supported by witness Gray's testimony and his own statement to the police. However, the evidence does not substantiate this claim. Eyewitness accounts reveal that when Ellis shot Johnson, Johnson was unarmed with his hands up and not making threatening gestures. The argument over drug money did not constitute sufficient provocation for a "heat of passion" defense.

Ellis's police statement further undermines his argument, suggesting that the shooting was accidental rather than the result of intense emotion. He described a scenario where Johnson lunged for the gun during a struggle, indicating an accident rather than an act of passion. The evidence, including that Johnson was shot in the back and that the bullet passed through an intermediary object, contradicts the notion of uncontrollable anger. Additionally, multiple witnesses affirmed that Johnson did not display aggressive behavior towards Ellis. Overall, the evidence does not support granting a "heat of passion" jury instruction.

No reasonable jury could find Ellis guilty of "heat of passion" manslaughter, leading the trial judge to appropriately deny Ellis's request for a jury instruction on that defense. A $10,000 life insurance check payable to Holden, introduced during Williams's testimony, was deemed admissible evidence to potentially demonstrate a motive for a coconspirator, despite Ellis's claims of irrelevance and a lack of direct connection to the conspiracy. The State argued that circumstantial evidence, like the insurance proceeds, supported the existence of a conspiracy and its objectives.

Ellis contended that testimonies from Gary and Reese were undermined by prior inconsistent statements, and he asserted that the jury should have received proper instructions on this issue. He requested Defense Instruction D-5, which the trial court rejected, finding it confusing and a potential comment on the evidence. The court indicated that jury Instruction C-I already adequately addressed the credibility of witnesses and the evaluation of their testimonies, guiding jurors to assess the reliability of witnesses based on various factors, including inconsistencies and discrepancies. The court emphasized that jurors are responsible for determining the weight and credibility of witness testimonies.

The trial court made a harmless error by not allowing D-5, as jury instructions should be read together and can be covered by other instructions without requiring identical wording. Reese's and Gray's testimonies were impeached due to prior inconsistent statements, warranting the need for an inconsistent statement instruction, which the court failed to provide. Although C-1 somewhat addressed D-5's first paragraph, it did not adequately represent the second paragraph, with the error deemed harmless since the prior statement favored Ellis's case.

The admissibility of photographs is at the trial court's discretion. Ellis argued that two introduced photos were cumulative and prejudicial. Exhibit 6 depicted internal body material on Johnson's apartment floor, which was already sufficiently covered by witness testimony. Exhibit 19 showed Johnson's nude body during the autopsy. The key consideration is whether the photographs' probative value is significantly outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The court maintained that emotional impact alone does not render evidence incompetent if it serves a valid evidentiary purpose. The trial court found both photographs to have probative value and not to unfairly prejudice Ellis.

The court affirmed the trial court's refusal of a lesser-related offense instruction and found sufficient evidence for a conspiracy to commit murder, leading to the affirmation of the Hinds County Circuit Court's judgment.

Count I confirms the affirmation of a 20-year sentence for conspiracy, to run consecutively with Count II. Count II affirms a life sentence for murder, with the appellant receiving credit for time served. A dissenting opinion by Justice Banks, joined by Justices McRae and Mills, argues that the trial court improperly denied an instruction on "heat of passion" manslaughter. The dissent criticizes the majority for setting an unreasonably high threshold for granting such instructions, contrary to established precedents. The dissent highlights evidence suggesting that a reasonable jury could find grounds for manslaughter, including an argument and a physical altercation involving the victim, Johnson. While acknowledging substantial evidence against the manslaughter theory, it asserts that the jury should have been allowed to consider the lesser offense. The dissent calls for a reversal on this issue and remand for a new trial. Notably, prior inconsistent statements by witnesses were deemed substantively relevant for this case, despite not being given under oath.