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Dykstra-Gulick v. Gulick
Citations: 604 So. 2d 1282; 1992 WL 217074Docket: 91-1992
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; September 11, 1992; Florida; State Appellate Court
Sheryl Dykstra-Gulick, the appellant, was injured as a passenger in a car owned by her husband, Douglas Gulick, the appellee. After their marriage, she initiated a negligence lawsuit against him for her injuries. The trial court dismissed her complaint with prejudice, citing interspousal immunity, which prohibits negligence claims between spouses. The appellate court reversed the dismissal with prejudice but affirmed the trial court’s ruling that interspousal immunity applies. The court remanded the case for abatement, allowing Dykstra-Gulick to pursue her claim if the marriage ends by death or divorce. Additionally, the court certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court regarding whether the doctrine should be entirely or partially abrogated to allow claims during marriage, particularly in relation to insurance coverage. Judge Dauksh expressed concern over the continued existence of interspousal immunity, noting its declining relevance and the need for judicial reform in line with other states. During oral argument, it was stated that the appellant has never consulted Mr. Gulick regarding her interests. Requiring the appellant to obtain a divorce to receive compensation for her injuries is viewed as excessively disruptive. The text questions the fairness of allowing a defense based on collusion or fraud to bar a lawsuit, suggesting it would be more just to permit the suit and let the fact-finder determine the merits of any defense raised. The Florida Supreme Court, in Raisen, emphasized that legislative bodies, not courts, should decide on changes to common law, but also noted the court's willingness to shift from contributory to comparative negligence in Hoffman. Recent judicial interpretations of statutes, such as in Johnson v. State, demonstrate a trend to favor public policy and common sense over strict statutory language. The discussion references Sturiano v. Brooks, where the court permitted a wife to pursue a negligence claim against her deceased husband's estate, citing the absence of lineal descendants to disrupt the family unit. The ruling did not address scenarios involving surviving lineal descendants, referencing Ard v. Ard for contrast.