Sexton v. American Aggregates

Citations: 231 N.W.2d 449; 60 Mich. App. 524; 1975 Mich. App. LEXIS 1468Docket: Docket 19110

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals; April 24, 1975; Michigan; State Appellate Court

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On May 30, 1973, a jury awarded $800,000 to the plaintiff, represented by Larry Sexton's estate, against American Aggregates and Ernst Fuel Supply Company due to a fatal accident involving a truck driver, Clyde Hall. The defendants' motions for a new trial and/or judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied on November 28, 1973. Ernst and Hall subsequently settled by paying $637,500 to the plaintiff, while American Aggregates remained as the sole appellant. 

The appeal raised three key issues: 

1. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the "volunteer" theory concerning American Aggregates’ duty to warn drivers using the adjacent roads.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that American Aggregates’ alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages, particularly regarding the assertion that the company failed to adequately warn drivers, including Hall, about stopping at the intersection.
3. Whether the trial court improperly rejected the jury's initial verdict, which allocated $700,000 against Hall and the Fuel Company and $50,000 against American Aggregates, instead instructing the jury to return a single sum verdict.

The incident in question occurred on February 20, 1969, when Hall failed to stop at the intersection of the private road leading from American Aggregates’ gravel pit and Kensington Road, resulting in a collision that killed four occupants in the other vehicle, including two young brothers. Evidence included testimony from State Police Trooper Richard Mundy, who had previously warned American Aggregates about truck drivers failing to stop at the intersection and noted the presence of stop signs posted by the company.

Clyde Hall, the driver of the tractor-trailer in the accident, testified uncertainly about whether an agent or employee of the defendant instructed him to stop at the intersection, although he recalled that other drivers and possibly the dispatcher suggested stopping. He mentioned a conversation with a weighmaster about stopping before entering Kensington Road but admitted to ignoring stop signs and believed a running start was necessary for exiting the private road. Eyewitness accounts varied on Hall's speed as he entered the intersection, with estimates ranging from five to fifteen miles per hour.

The legal precedent established in Ray v Transamerica Insurance Co indicates that a party undertaking to provide services that may protect a third party can be liable for failing to exercise reasonable care if that failure increases the risk of harm or if there is reliance on that undertaking. While reliance was deemed crucial in Ray, dissenting views have emerged regarding its applicability. The trial court's instruction to the jury emphasized that once the defendant undertook to warn, it had a duty to exercise reasonable care.

The defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict, claiming insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff's assertion that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the damages. Both parties acknowledged that a defendant remains liable if the actions of a third party were foreseeable, though they disagreed on how this rule applied to the current case. The court must evaluate the evidence in favor of the plaintiff when considering the directed verdict motion.

The court affirmed that if there is competent evidence supporting the jury's determination, the jury's resolution should stand. In the case discussed, the foreseeability of an intervening cause, specifically Clyde Hall's failure to stop at an intersection, was critical. It was established that this negligence does not sever the connection to the defendant's liability if Hall's actions were reasonably foreseeable. Testimony from Trooper Richard Mundy indicated that he had repeatedly warned the defendant's weighmaster about gravel truck drivers neglecting to stop, suggesting a pattern of negligence that the defendant was aware of. Hall admitted to violating traffic laws by failing to stop approximately 150 times out of 400 trips. The jury found sufficient grounds to hold the defendant liable, leading to a verdict of $50,000 against American Aggregates and $700,000 against Hall and Ernst Fuel Company. The trial court later deemed the jury's initial verdict unacceptable as it did not align with legal requirements for concurrent negligence. Following the court's guidance, the jury was instructed to return a single sum verdict for all defendants, which led to a motion for mistrial by Hall and the Fuel Company. Despite discussions on jury instructions regarding liability, the court did not grant American Aggregates' request for a mistrial or to disregard the initial verdict.

The jury returned a verdict awarding $350,000 to Delmus, Jr. and $450,000 to Larry against both defendants, while finding no cause of action against the Carter estate. Joint and several liability typically applies when multiple parties' negligence causes a single, indivisible injury. Legal authority dictates that damages cannot be apportioned among jointly and severally liable tortfeasors unless the injuries are factually separable and can be assigned with reasonable certainty. Relevant case law, such as Naccarato v Grob, indicates that apportionment is inappropriate in cases like medical malpractice where defendants treat a plaintiff at different times. Conversely, in instances like Bowerman v Detroit Free Press, the court emphasized that joint tortfeasors cannot have damages assessed in varying amounts for a single tort. The core issue in determining the appropriateness of damage apportionment hinges on whether the plaintiff's injury is indivisible, as established in cases like Maddux v Donaldson and Cuddy v Horn, which affirm that simultaneous wrongful acts leading to a single injury warrant joint and several liability.

Plaintiff experienced one indivisible injury caused by the negligence of both defendants, differing from the medical malpractice scenario in Naccarato, where separate injuries were inflicted at different times. In Kearney v Clutton, the court upheld a joint liability verdict against multiple defendants, stating that the jury could not determine individual liability for portions of the converted goods. Similarly, the current defendants are jointly and severally liable, and the trial court correctly instructed the jury on this matter. 

Defendant proposed adopting a 'relative fault' rule from Dole v Dow Chemical Co, which allows for liability apportionment based on the extent of each tortfeasor's contribution to the injury. However, Michigan has not adopted this approach, as its statutes require joint tortfeasors to be liable for their pro rata share of damages. This framework prevents the implementation of 'relative fault' and aligns more closely with the doctrine of comparative negligence, which has not been established in Michigan law. The Supreme Court has suggested that any shift towards 'comparative fault' should be legislated rather than decided by the court. The total corrected verdict was $800,000, despite an initial jury verdict of $750,000.