Whataburger, Inc. v. Rockwell

Citations: 706 So. 2d 1220; 1997 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 457; 1997 WL 283760Docket: 2950891

Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; May 30, 1997; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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Whataburger, Inc. appealed a jury verdict awarding Robert Rockwell, Jr. $50,000 in compensatory damages for injuries sustained during a fight at a Whataburger restaurant. The incident occurred in September 1994 when Rockwell and his wife stopped for food. While waiting, Rockwell was verbally harassed by a group of young men, leading to escalating threats. The restaurant manager, Violet Stringfellow, instructed both parties to move outside if they intended to fight, although the timing of her actions was disputed. Rockwell requested the police be called, but the details surrounding this request were also contested. Once outside, a fight ensued, resulting in Rockwell being struck in the head with a brick.

Rockwell's complaint alleged that Whataburger was negligent for failing to adequately respond to his request for police protection, while Whataburger claimed it had no duty to protect Rockwell from third-party criminal acts. The appellate court examined whether there was sufficient evidence to justify jury consideration of Rockwell’s claim, emphasizing that the focus was not solely on Whataburger’s general duty to protect customers, but rather on whether its actions or inactions contributed to Rockwell's injuries. The court reiterated that in negligence cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the existence of a duty of care from the defendant, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) that the breach resulted in the plaintiff's injuries.

The existence of a duty to exercise due care hinges on the foreseeability of harm resulting from a lack of care. In Alabama, merchants are not required to guard against criminal acts by third parties unless they are aware of imminent threats to invitees. If a shopping center's operation does not create a conducive environment for crime, there is no general duty to protect against such acts unless there is knowledge of an impending harm. The determination of a duty is typically a legal question for the trial court but may be submitted to a jury if factual disputes exist, as doing otherwise would undermine the jury's role in fact-finding. 

In the case presented, evidence suggested that the manager of Whataburger failed to act when a fight was likely, contrary to company policy to call the police. The timing of the police call was disputed, making it unclear whether the manager was aware of the imminent danger to Rockwell. Thus, the determination of whether Whataburger owed a duty to protect Rockwell depended on factual findings by the jury. The trial court correctly denied Whataburger's motions for summary judgment and directed verdict, as issues of negligence and proximate cause are generally for the jury, and there was sufficient evidence suggesting that the fight was foreseeable. The jury could conclude that the manager’s failure to act timely contributed to Rockwell’s injury.

The jury reasonably concluded that the actions of three young men posed a threat to Rockwell, leading to a determination that the manager's failure to promptly contact the police constituted negligence, which was a proximate cause of Rockwell's injuries. The trial court appropriately submitted the issues of negligence and proximate cause to the jury and denied Whataburger's motion for a directed verdict. Whataburger contended that Rockwell was contributorily negligent, but such determinations are typically for the jury, especially when reasonable minds may differ on the facts. The appellate court upheld the jury's verdict, affirming that it was not against the preponderance of the evidence. Judge Robertson concurred, emphasizing that Rockwell's repeated requests for police assistance established a duty of care for the manager, who not only failed to act but actively endangered Rockwell. Dissenting Judge Crawley argued that Alabama law limits a premises owner's liability for third-party criminal acts unless special circumstances exist, asserting that the majority opinion did not adequately consider these legal precedents.

The court's ruling in Moye clarifies the principles of premises liability, specifically addressing the reluctance to impose liability for third-party criminal acts due to the absence of a legal duty and proximate cause. According to Alabama law, premises owners have no initial duty to protect against such acts unless criminal activity is foreseeable. This foreseeability is determined by the number and frequency of prior criminal incidents at the location, which must be objectively verifiable. In cases where a special relationship exists—such as a hospital's duty to a sedated patient or a hotel's duty to an abused guest—liability may arise. Notable cases include Young v. Huntsville Hospital, where the hospital was held liable for a sexual assault due to its special relationship with a patient, and Thetford v. City of Clanton, where the hotel manager's actions led to a fatal assault on a guest, raising questions about foreseeability and the hotel’s duty to protect its guests' privacy and safety. These cases underscore the nuanced evaluation of foreseeability and the obligations of premises owners in contexts involving potential criminal acts.

The hotel in Young established a special relationship with the victim, creating a duty to protect against unauthorized access, which is an exception to the general rule that premises owners are not liable for third-party criminal acts. However, no such special relationship exists between Rockwell and Whataburger, as Rockwell was not dependent on Whataburger for protection, nor did Whataburger owe a special duty to him. Thus, Rockwell cannot claim liability based on the special relationship exception from Moye.

The court referenced the Nail v. Jefferson County Truck Growers Association case, where premises liability was established due to prior knowledge of escalating animosity between two factions at a market leading to a violent confrontation. The significant factor was that the market management had been informed of the ongoing conflict, making the criminal acts foreseeable. In contrast, the situation at Whataburger involved a brief exchange of words and threats among patrons without a long-term feud. The mere observation of the events by the manager does not constitute foreseeability for premises liability under Moye, as the altercation developed rapidly and lacked the prolonged context found in Nail.

The duty in cases of foreseeable criminal activity requires taking reasonable precautions. "Precaution" is defined as measures taken in advance to prevent harm. In the case of Nail, the Market had prior knowledge of issues among its tenants and could have acted to ensure safety. Conversely, Whataburger lacked sufficient notice to prevent the fight involving Rockwell and his assailants, as the manager became aware of the altercation only after it had begun. This lack of notice does not meet the threshold established in Moye for imposing a duty on Whataburger. The majority's decision to affirm Rockwell's judgment incorrectly applies a subjective standard of foreseeability, which was rejected by the state supreme court. Rockwell failed to provide evidence of a history of violent incidents at Whataburger, and the confrontation was sudden and unanticipated. The majority's reasoning implies that premises owners could be liable based on subjective judgments about their actions, which could lead to an unreasonable expectation of safety akin to an insurance obligation for patrons. There was no special relationship or previous incidents that would create a duty for Whataburger to protect its patrons. The dissent argues that a directed verdict should have been granted in favor of Whataburger, as Rockwell did not establish the necessary elements of negligence: duty of care, breach, injury, and causation.

The critical issue determining whether a directed verdict should have been granted by the trial court is the existence of a duty from Whataburger to Rockwell to protect him from the criminal acts of third parties. The determination of such a duty is a legal question for the trial judge, not a factual question for the jury. Under Alabama law, Whataburger does not have a duty to protect Rockwell from the criminal actions of others, as established in case law. While store owners may have a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect invitees from criminal attacks, this duty typically arises only in situations involving special relationships or circumstances, which are not present in this case.

The "special relationship" exception, as outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, requires either a duty to control a third person's actions or a relationship that grants the invitee a right to protection. No such relationship existed between Whataburger and the assailants. Furthermore, the second exception, which has been applied in rare cases involving significant dependency on the premises owner for safety, does not apply to Rockwell's status as a business invitee. 

In a similar case, Douglas v. McDonald's Corp., the court affirmed summary judgments for the defendants, emphasizing that no duty was breached when an invitee was attacked. Rockwell's argument that Whataburger had "specialized knowledge" of potential criminal activity, thereby imposing a duty to protect, hinges on establishing foreseeability through evidence of prior criminal acts on or near the premises. This foreseeability is essential for the imposition of a duty to protect against criminal acts.

In Nail v. Jefferson County Truck Growers Ass'n, Inc., the defendant was deemed to have "specialized knowledge" of potential danger due to observed tensions at its facility prior to the plaintiff's injury. Rockwell claimed that Whataburger had actual or constructive knowledge of a threat based on a confrontation leading to his injury, but failed to provide evidence of prior incidents that would alert Whataburger to such risks. Employees recognized the assailants as regular customers but were unaware of any violent behavior from them. Rockwell's reliance on Facemire v. Konover Management South was deemed inappropriate, as the latter case involved a defendant that had assumed a duty to secure an event and failed to act on known threats. In contrast, Whataburger had not assumed such a duty and had called the police in response to the incident. Rockwell argued that earlier police intervention could have prevented his injury, but this was seen as speculative. The court noted that Alabama appellate courts have not established foreseeability based on impending assault theories and concluded that imposing liability on Whataburger would conflict with existing legal standards and unduly burden merchants. Ultimately, Rockwell's status as a business invitee did not create a special duty for Whataburger to protect him from third-party criminal acts.

The determination of whether a duty exists is a legal question for the court, as established in Sungas, Inc. v. Perry. A directed verdict should have favored Whataburger, leading to dissent on that basis. The Tennessee Supreme Court has amended its stance from the Cornpropst opinion, now recognizing that conditions surrounding a business can be relevant in assessing foreseeability of harm to customers. In McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, the court expanded liability criteria, stating that businesses are liable if they know or should know of imminent harm from criminal acts, and that other relevant conditions, such as the frequency and nature of crimes near the premises, must also be considered. The excerpt also suggests that a case like Facemire might have had a different outcome if decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court instead of a federal court, referencing Dailey v. Housing Authority for the Birmingham District, where the Alabama Supreme Court found no duty to protect on a landlord who provided voluntary security.