State v. Ivey

Citations: 709 So. 2d 502; 1997 WL 366087Docket: CR-96-0078

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; September 17, 1997; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama addressed the State's appeal regarding the trial court's decision to grant William Ray Ivey's motion to suppress evidence. The incident occurred on June 9, 1996, when a police officer observed a vehicle with a filing cabinet protruding from its trunk and began to follow it. After the driver, Freda Compton, accelerated away upon noticing the officer, a chase ensued, ending at Ivey's driveway. The officer ordered Compton and Ivey, the passenger, out of the vehicle and questioned them about the filing cabinet. The officer's decision to search the cabinet was based on the vehicle's late-night driving, its attempt to evade police, and inconsistencies in Ivey's statements regarding the cabinet's ownership. The search revealed evidence linking the cabinet to a recently burglarized business.

The trial court concluded that while the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, he lacked probable cause to search the cabinet, thereby granting the motion to suppress. The State contended that Ivey lacked standing to challenge the search and argued that the search was lawful. Additionally, the State sought a de novo review of the trial court's findings, claiming no material dispute existed in evidence due to the presence of only one witness and the absence of formal findings from the trial court. The court noted that standard review applies unless the facts are undisputed or the trial court misapplies the law, citing that in this case, the parties did not agree on the facts presented.

The trier of fact has discretion to accept or reject a witness's testimony, and when evidence allows for multiple rational conclusions, the factfinder's decision prevails. In this case, despite the testimony of one officer, significant disputes arose, particularly regarding the timing of the officer's interaction with Ivey and the motivations behind the search of a file cabinet. A video introduced into evidence appeared to contradict portions of the officer's statements, leading to a conclusion that there was insufficient probable cause to justify the search, supporting the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to suppress.

For a warrantless search, the State argued justifications based on "probable cause plus exigent circumstances," the "automobile exception," and briefly the "plain view" doctrine. The automobile exception permits warrantless searches if there is probable cause to believe contraband is present, based on the rationale that vehicles are easily movable and have a lower expectation of privacy. Probable cause requires a reasonable belief that an offense has occurred or is occurring, established through the totality of circumstances—not mere suspicion.

In a referenced case, the court found that a police officer’s suspicion of a stolen vehicle, based solely on vague information, was insufficient for probable cause until corroborated by additional facts. In contrast, in the current case, the officer’s suspicion regarding a filing cabinet in a vehicle lacked the necessary articulable reasons to escalate to probable cause, affirming the trial court's ruling.

Ivey's inconsistent statements do not definitively establish probable cause for the search, as the officer could not confirm whether these statements were made before or after the search occurred. The trial judge, as the factfinder, is responsible for assessing witness credibility and interpreting evidence that may lead to multiple conclusions. The court will not intervene in cases of conflicting evidence if there is material support for the judge's findings. The court affirmed the trial judge’s conclusion that there was no probable cause for the search, rendering the State's argument regarding "probable cause plus exigent circumstances" unnecessary to address.

Regarding the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement, the State must demonstrate that the officer had prior justification for intrusion, discovered evidence inadvertently, and immediately recognized it as contraband. Although the first two prongs were satisfied when the officer noticed the filing cabinet in the trunk, the State failed to prove the third prong, as the officer only deemed the cabinet's presence as peculiar and did not recognize it as contraband. Consequently, the discovery of contraband cannot retroactively establish probable cause, as the officer only learned of the burglary through an unlawful search. The burden lies with the State to justify warrantless searches under established exceptions, which it did not satisfy.

Additionally, the State's claim that Ivey lacked standing to contest the search was not presented at the trial level and is therefore not preserved for review. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling, with all judges concurring.