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Goins v. League Bank and Trust
Citations: 857 S.W.2d 628; 1993 Tex. App. LEXIS 1436; 1993 WL 164636Docket: 01-92-00602-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; May 20, 1993; Texas; State Appellate Court
The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court's summary judgment in favor of League City Bank and Trust against Rena M. Goins, administratrix of her deceased husband's estate, regarding a promissory note. The court also upheld the severance of Goins' counterclaim against the Bank and its officer, Dean Starnes. Goins had filed a counterclaim alleging tortious interference related to the property sale, but the court found it did not meet the criteria for a compulsory counterclaim as it was not against the Bank in the same capacity that it had initiated the lawsuit. The court emphasized that a counterclaim must arise from the same transaction as the original claim and noted that Goins did not dispute the Bank's secured claim. Consequently, the trial court acted within its discretion in severing Goins' counterclaim. Goins' challenge to the severance was overruled. Goins contends that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the Bank, as the request for this relief was not included in the Bank's motion. Goins specifically objects to the classification of the claim as a matured, secured claim under Section 306(a)(2) of the Texas Probate Code, which governs secured claims against estates. Section 306(a) requires that when filing a secured claim, a claimant must specify whether they wish the claim to be treated as matured and paid in due course, or as a preferred debt secured by specific property. The Bank timely elected to proceed under section 306(a)(2) in its original petition. Goins argues that the grounds for summary judgment must be explicitly stated in the motion, citing relevant case law and procedural rules. However, the court finds this argument inapplicable, noting that the classification of the debt is not an additional ground for recovery, and is automatically triggered by the established default on a promissory note. The Bank successfully demonstrated its claim through various evidence, including the promissory note and a deed of trust, which Goins did not contest. The Bank was not required to specify additional relief for the court to grant the judgment. Consequently, since the Bank's claim was validated, the classification as a matured, secured claim was mandated by its election. Goins' objection is overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.