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Calhoun v. State
Citations: 526 So. 2d 531; 1988 WL 59907Docket: 57778
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; June 3, 1988; Mississippi; State Supreme Court
Dexter Calhoun was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Circuit Court of Hinds County, Mississippi. He appealed the verdict, leading to a reversal and remand. The case centered around an incident on February 19, 1986, involving a confrontation between Calhoun and John Lougin, the ex-boyfriend of Tammy Jones, with whom Calhoun was living. After a heated argument over Tammy, Calhoun shot Lougin with a shotgun as he approached his car, believing Lougin intended to harm both Tammy and himself. Lougin later died from his injuries. During the trial, Calhoun claimed self-defense, arguing he feared Lougin was retrieving a weapon based on prior threats. However, the jury found him guilty. Calhoun's appeal highlighted one significant issue: the trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction (D-6) on self-defense, which stated that a person has the right to use deadly force if it appears necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm. The appeal contended that this instruction was warranted based on the evidence presented. Instruction D-4 provided to the jury defined self-defense as a necessity, allowing individuals to protect themselves from death or serious bodily harm. It emphasized that the use of deadly force is justified only if the person believes, with reasonable grounds, that they are in imminent danger. The jury was instructed that if John Lougin's actions gave Dexter Calhoun reasonable grounds to fear for his life or imminent serious injury, and if Calhoun used no more force than necessary, he must be found not guilty. The trial court rejected Instruction D-6, which argued that self-defense could also apply if Calhoun reasonably believed another person, Tammy, was in danger. The court noted that it is not obligated to provide repetitive instructions, and if the jury is adequately instructed overall, the refusal of similar instructions is not grounds for reversible error. However, the court acknowledged that the lower court's failure to include the possibility of Calhoun acting in defense of Tammy rendered its instructions on self-defense deficient. Therefore, Calhoun's verdict and sentence were reversed, and a new trial was ordered.