Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.

Citations: 983 S.W.2d 1; 1996 WL 1060549Docket: 2-95-284-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 30, 1997; Texas; State Appellate Court

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James R. Gammill and Deborah Dianne Gammill, acting individually and on behalf of their deceased children, Curtis and Jaime Gammill, filed a products liability lawsuit against Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc. and American Isuzu Motors, Inc. following a fatal accident involving a 1988 Isuzu Trooper II. The Gammills claimed that the vehicle was defectively designed and uncrashworthy, specifically alleging issues with the restraint system, including a seat belt that failed to restrain Jaime during the collision. They asserted multiple design defects, including inadequacies in the seat belt mechanism and the positioning of the throttle pedal, which contributed to the accident. 

The appellants sought to recover damages for incapacitating injuries to Deborah and Curtis, and fatal injuries to Jaime. A summary judgment was issued in favor of the defendants, which the Gammills appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly disqualified their expert witnesses and struck their affidavits. The court's decision to affirm the summary judgment highlights these procedural issues as pivotal in the outcome of the case. The appellees supported their motion for summary judgment with affidavits, while the Gammills had previously designated several experts, including David Lowry, Dr. Ronald Huston, Robert Bell, and Robert Evans, to testify in their case.

On September 20, 1995, defendants sought to disqualify the Gammills' expert witnesses—Lowry, Huston, and Bell—on multiple grounds, asserting that their proposed testimony lacked scientific validity, relevance to the case, and was based on subjective beliefs rather than scientific methods. Additionally, they argued that Bell's qualification as an expert was untimely, as he was designated after the court's deadline. To support their motion, defendants referenced depositions and affidavits from Lowry, Huston, and Bell. The trial court conducted several pretrial hearings, including one on October 5-6, 1995, where Lowry and Huston defended their qualifications. The Gammills responded to the defendants' motion for summary judgment on October 12, 1995, asserting the relevance of Lowry and Huston’s testimony. On October 13, 1995, the court disqualified experts Bell and Evans, while the defendants moved to strike Lowry and Huston's affidavits the same day. Following a summary judgment hearing on October 25, 1995, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants, disqualified Lowry and Huston, and struck their affidavits. These disqualifications and motions to strike were later formalized in separate orders on November 24, 1995, which are now being appealed. The court emphasized that a defendant seeking summary judgment must demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff has no valid cause of action, which can be achieved by disproving any single element of the claim.

In Texas, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a product is defective to recover damages for harm caused by that product (Rodriguez v. Ed Hicks Imports). The appellees argued that their summary judgment motion, supported by affidavits, established that the vehicle involved in the accident was not defective and that the driver's loss of control, combined with the passenger not wearing a seatbelt, was the cause of the accident. They contended that the Gammills needed to provide evidence of a material fact dispute regarding the vehicle's defectiveness to challenge the summary judgment. The appellees also asserted that the trial court's decisions to disqualify the Gammills' experts and to strike their affidavits prevented the Gammills from demonstrating such a dispute, thus justifying the summary judgment.

The Gammills raised six points of error, claiming the trial court improperly disqualified their experts and struck their affidavits, denied motions to inspect the vehicle, and compelled a mental examination of Deborah Gammill. The court first addressed the appropriateness of disqualifying the experts and striking the affidavits. It noted that trial courts have discretion in admitting evidence, and an abuse of discretion occurs only when the court acts without proper guiding principles. The standard for admitting scientific expert testimony, as outlined in Rule 702, requires that the testimony be relevant and reliable, with the proponent needing to establish the expert's qualifications and the reliability of the testimony. Factors for determining reliability include the testability of the theory, reliance on subjective interpretation, peer review status, error rates, general acceptance in the scientific community, and non-judicial uses. The Supreme Court's guidelines allow for additional case-specific factors to be considered in evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence.

Expert testimony admissibility under Rule 702 requires that the witness be qualified and that the testimony constitutes 'scientific knowledge.' For testimony to assist the trier of fact, it must be relevant and reliable, grounded in demonstrable scientific data or logical inference. Reliability depends on the validity of the underlying theory and technique, as well as proper application in the case at hand. Any evidence straying from scientific methodology is inadmissible, and opinions lacking a scientific basis are mere speculation. Experts must consider alternative causes, as failing to do so may render their conclusions speculative. Research conducted solely for litigation purposes raises concerns about bias and admissibility. The burden of proving admissibility rests on the proponent of the evidence once an objection is raised. The trial court must determine the relevance and reliability of the expert's methods without addressing the truth of the opinions. 

In this case, the trial court found that the opinions of experts Lowry and Dr. Huston regarding Jaime's injuries and related matters were not based on reliable scientific methods and lacked careful investigation, making them subjective beliefs rather than credible scientific conclusions. The court's role is to assess the scientific validity of the methods used, and it will review the testimonies and affidavits of Lowry and Huston to evaluate their relevance and reliability. Lowry was engaged by the Gammills to examine the Trooper’s accelerator and occupant restraint systems but did not provide opinions on the accelerator’s design defectiveness. His investigations included reviewing various reports and expert affidavits related to the case.

Lowry conducted an analysis of two seat belts from a 1987 Isuzu Trooper, demonstrating that a child in the rear seat could impact the front seat during a forward motion while restrained. He testified that Jaime, who was seated in the right rear and wearing her seat belt during a collision, died due to inadequate seat belt design, which failed to restrain her effectively. He criticized the design featuring a D ring, asserting that it allows excessive movement and slack, increasing the risk of injury. Lowry noted that a properly designed seat belt should prevent the occupant from sliding forward, thus reducing the likelihood of injury. He identified alternative safety designs that could have prevented Jaime's injuries. He explained that the seat belt's failure to function correctly allowed Jaime to rotate and strike her mother’s front seat, which was evidenced by the low impact point on the seatback. Lowry concluded that the forces exerted by the seat belt contributed to Jaime's injuries and that a properly functioning restraint system would have likely saved her life. 

Lowry is an experienced professional engineer with a Bachelor's and Master's in Mechanical Engineering. He has worked for Texas Instruments, General Dynamics, and Lockheed, focusing on design engineering and fatigue assessment in aerospace applications. His extensive background includes involvement in significant military projects and quality assurance roles, emphasizing his expertise in engineering design and safety evaluations.

Lowry's professional background includes work as an automotive mechanic while pursuing a Master's degree, where he engaged in various repair tasks such as installing cruise controls and repairing critical components. He has operated a consulting firm, Forensic Analysis Consulting Technologies, for approximately four years, focusing exclusively on litigated cases. Although he acknowledged prior consulting work related to automobiles in products liability litigation, he did not specify those experiences. Current cases he is involved with include issues related to aerospace helicopter failures and other mechanical failures, suggesting a broad scope of expertise. 

The Gammills assert that Lowry is a highly qualified witness, claiming his testimony is grounded in established principles of physics and engineering. Conversely, the appellees challenge Lowry's qualifications under Rule 702, noting that he lacks experience in automobile design and manufacturing, with most of his background concentrated in fatigue and fracture analysis of fighter jets. They highlight his absence of formal training in automotive design, lack of published works outside his employment with Lockheed, and non-membership in professional engineering organizations. Additionally, his only automotive experience stems from a brief part-time job during his Master's program, which is not linked to seat belt design.

At a deposition, Lowry stated he had no established theories or conclusions regarding the Gammills' case, despite having discussed it with others and reviewed related depositions. He later testified that he believed the seat belt design was inadequate and failed to protect Jaime, contributing to her death, and noted physical evidence suggesting the impact dynamics involved in the incident.

Lowry's statements at the October 6th hearing are viewed as conclusions rather than scientific theories, mirroring opinions he expressed in his October 13, 1995 affidavit. He indicated during questioning that he refrained from forming theories prior to a thorough inspection. The record lacks evidence of any scientific principles or theories Lowry used to support his opinions. When asked about the applicability of physics to both airplanes and automobiles, Lowry referred to it as "the laws of engineering," but again provided no specific theories. 

During a July 31, 1995 hearing, Lowry transitioned from a potential expert witness to an advocate for the Gammills, attempting to persuade the court on their motion despite objections from defense counsel. The trial court cautioned him about overstepping his role, yet he continued to argue in favor of the Gammills. This behavior suggested to the court that Lowry aimed to develop a liability theory for the Gammills rather than offer fact-based expert testimony. 

The record does not indicate that Lowry conducted tests to rule out other causes, subjected his methodology to error analysis, had his theories peer-reviewed, or that his techniques were generally accepted in the scientific community. It supports the conclusion that his opinions were formed for litigation purposes, based mainly on subjective belief and speculation. Consequently, the Gammills failed to demonstrate a reliable foundation for Lowry's testimony, leading to the trial court's decision to disqualify him as an expert and strike his affidavit.

Dr. Ronald Huston, also retained by the Gammills, focused on biomechanics and injury causation, specifically regarding Jaime Gammill. In his affidavit, he opined that Jaime, the right rear seat occupant, was wearing her seatbelt when it prematurely released during the accident, resulting in fatal head injuries from striking the driver's seat back.

Dr. Huston supports his conclusions regarding Jaime's seat belt usage during the accident through multiple observations, including markings on her shirt, fibers in the seat belt webbing, and specific impacts on the driver's seat and rear corner. He identifies a defect in the design of Jaime's seat belt, noting that the three-point, single retractor system allowed looseness in the webbing due to its flow-through feature. The side button release buckle, positioned 5 inches from the seat bottom and requiring only 2½ pounds of pressure to release, is deemed prone to premature release upon impact. Dr. Huston asserts that a properly functioning lap and shoulder seat belt should have provided adequate restraint to prevent Jaime's fatal injuries. His examination confirmed that the rapid webbing spool-out arrest mechanism worked correctly. His findings were based on a comprehensive review of reports, depositions, and physical evidence related to the accident.

Regarding Deborah Gammill, Dr. Huston believes she was wearing her seat belt, which did not prevent her incapacitating injuries, as indicated by scarring on the guide loop. While some restraint was provided, it was inadequate to prevent facial injuries from contact with the steering wheel. He did not classify Deborah's seat belt as defective and did not provide scientific reasoning for her injuries. Dr. Huston holds a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering, has extensive teaching and consulting experience, and has authored numerous academic publications, although he lacks formal medical training.

Dr. Huston was deemed a qualified witness by the Gammills, who argued that his testimony was based on established laws of physics and engineering. The appellees did not dispute his qualifications under Rule 702 but challenged the reliability of his testimony under the du Pont standard. During his deposition, Dr. Huston recounted his initial contact with the Gammills' attorney in April 1995, who requested his analysis of the case, suggesting Jaime had collided with the driver's seat. He reviewed photographs of Jaime's body and discussed evidence with Lowry, who indicated potential issues with the accelerator and seat deformation.

Dr. Huston's testimony included his belief that the investigating officer's report claiming Jaime was not wearing a seat belt was erroneous. At a subsequent hearing, he stated his expertise in biomechanics and noted evidence suggesting Jaime was wearing a seat belt during the accident, although he did not detail the evidence. He had experience with various seat belt designs and had written papers on occupant biomechanics, but did not express a written opinion on the appropriateness of the D ring design referenced by Lowry, nor did he publish articles on seat belt buckles.

Despite Dr. Huston's credentials as a professor and engineer, the record lacked evidence of his qualifications to opine on Jaime's body condition or cause of death. There was no indication of the scientific theories or principles he relied upon, nor evidence that he conducted tests to rule out other causes, subjected his methodology to error analysis, tested his theories, or that his theories had undergone peer review or were accepted by the scientific community.

The trial court's findings regarding Dr. Huston's research and opinions were upheld, as they were deemed conducted for litigation purposes and based on subjective belief rather than reliable evidence. The Gammills failed to demonstrate that Dr. Huston's testimony had a solid foundation, justifying the court's decision to disqualify him and strike his affidavit. The Gammills contended that established principles of physics and engineering supported their case, referencing the decisions in Daubert and du Pont; however, they did not specify the principles used by the experts, which led to the rejection of their claims. The court emphasized that mere assertions of valid scientific principles are insufficient. 

Regarding the disqualification of experts Robert Bell and Robert Evans, the Gammills acknowledged their late designation, which was beyond the May 19, 1995 deadline set by the court's scheduling order. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to disqualify these experts, as no subsequent agreements or orders modified the deadline. The appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard in such cases, and since the Gammills did not establish good cause for the late designations, their arguments for the admissibility of Bell and Evans' testimony were rejected. The Gammills' claims that the late designation did not surprise the appellees were insufficient to counter the trial court’s ruling.

Good cause for failing to timely designate experts was not established, as evidenced by the case law cited. Merely showing qualifications of an expert does not justify delays in designation, nor does the absence of surprise or unfairness. Despite the Gammills' assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying experts Bell and Evans, they failed to provide supporting authority, leading to the overruling of this argument. The Gammills contended that the trial court erred by denying their motions to test and inspect the accident vehicle, claiming these actions hindered their ability to present evidence against the defendants' summary judgment motion. Their inspection request, filed on August 17, 1995, was heard on October 6, 1995, during which the court allowed non-destructive examinations of the vehicle by experts Huston and Lowry but prohibited destructive testing. Following their examination on October 7, affidavits were submitted; Huston did not request further tests, while Lowry indicated the need for additional inspections of the seat belts and components. The court considered these affidavits before denying the Gammills' motion on October 13, 1995.

On October 18, 1995, the Gammills filed a motion to renew inspection of a vehicle, but no hearing was held or requested, and they did not contest the denial of this request in their response to the defendants' summary judgment motion. Texas Rule 167 allows for the discovery and inspection of tangible property, stipulating that testing cannot result in destruction or alteration without court approval. The trial court had previously allowed Huston and Lowry to examine the vehicle and rejected further testing requests from Lowry. The vehicle had already been inspected multiple times by various experts. The court concluded that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the Gammills' request for further inspection.

Additionally, the Gammills filed a motion for meaningful examination of the vehicle on May 17, 1995, which was denied on August 18, 1995, after two hearings, one of which the Gammills' attorney missed due to travel issues. The trial court later reconsidered this decision but ultimately upheld the denial after further testimony on October 6, 1995. The Gammills did not provide legal authority or specific details for their proposed examination, focusing instead on a perceived bias from the trial court. The appellate court affirmed that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Gammills' motions, overruling points of error four and five.

Point of error six addresses the Gammills' claim that the trial court improperly ordered Deborah Gammill to undergo a mental examination. The order was issued on October 13, 1995, but this issue is deemed irrelevant to the appeal concerning the summary judgment. Consequently, the court does not address the matter, ruling it moot in light of the affirmed summary judgment. The court also notes that the trial court had previously considered various factors, including motions to disqualify expert witnesses and the absence of written responses from the plaintiffs regarding these motions. The trial court ruled that the defendants' motions to strike were justified, resulting in the exclusion of Lowry and Huston's affidavits from consideration in the summary judgment context. The court references the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co. Inc. v. Robinson, which emphasizes the need for scientific reliability in expert testimony. Additionally, it notes that the trial court found Lowry and Huston did not provide opinions on critical design and safety aspects of the Trooper vehicle in question, with the Gammills failing to contest these findings. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.