Healy v. Langdon

Citations: 511 N.W.2d 498; 245 Neb. 1; 1994 Neb. LEXIS 20Docket: S-91-1206

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court; January 28, 1994; Nebraska; State Supreme Court

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James P. Healy, as Special Administrator of Sherry L. Healy's estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Dr. Robert M. Langdon, alleging negligence for failing to warn Sherry L. Healy of chemotherapy side effects. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Langdon, ruling that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed this decision, remanding the case for further proceedings.

Sherry Healy underwent chemotherapy starting in September 1987 after her cancer diagnosis. She experienced respiratory issues after receiving her seventh dose of bleomycin on November 25, 1987. Although Dr. Langdon withheld the eighth dose due to concerns of lung inflammation, her condition deteriorated, leading to a lung collapse by December 29, 1987, and her death on January 22, 1988. The autopsy indicated no active cancer but showed lung scarring, with Dr. Langdon attributing her death to "bleomycin lung."

Healy filed the wrongful death action on January 19, 1990, referencing Nebraska's wrongful death statutes, while Dr. Langdon contended that the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act's professional malpractice statute of limitations applied, which begins at the time of the alleged malpractice. The court determined the action fell under the professional malpractice statute and ruled that the limitations period started on November 25, 1987, the date of the last treatment, thus declaring the case time-barred.

Healy appealed, claiming the court erred by not applying the wrongful death statute's limitations and the continuing treatment exception. The court emphasized that summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact, focusing on whether such issues exist rather than how they would be resolved.

In Quality Equipment Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., the Nebraska Supreme Court outlined the standards for summary judgment. The moving party must demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and provide evidence warranting judgment as a matter of law. Once the moving party meets this burden, the opposing party must present evidence showing a material fact issue that prevents judgment. When reviewing a summary judgment order, appellate courts favor the opposing party and consider all reasonable inferences from the evidence.

Dr. Langdon contends he is entitled to summary judgment based on the statute of limitations for professional malpractice. However, the court disagreed, noting that in Nebraska, the statute of limitations for professional malpractice typically begins when the wrongful act occurs, adhering to the occurrence rule. An exception exists, known as the continuing treatment exception, which postpones the statute of limitations until the completion of the treatment related to the wrongful act. This exception aims to prevent premature litigation, allowing physicians the opportunity to correct any mistakes during treatment.

The court has previously merged the continuing treatment exception with the occurrence rule, establishing that in medical malpractice cases, the limitations period begins when the treatment related to the wrongful act concludes. This case represents the court's first application of this general rule to a failure-to-warn claim, referencing two prior cases involving similar failure-to-warn situations where patients developed cancer after not being informed of the risks associated with their treatments.

In Smith, a patient who received allergy treatments involving x-ray radiation injections in 1970 was examined by a physician in 1972 and filed suit in 1981. The physician's demurrer was sustained because the claim did not link the 1972 examination to the prior treatment. However, it was noted that if the examination was a follow-up to the x-ray treatments, it would be considered continuing treatment, allowing the claim to proceed beyond the 10-year statute of repose. In Tiwald, another patient received x-ray treatments until 1969 and continued with drug therapies, last examined in 1974, but filed suit in 1983. The court granted summary judgment for the physician, determining that the subsequent therapies did not constitute continuing treatment, thus barring the claim under the statute of repose.

Both cases highlighted that the relevance of subsequent treatments to prior unwarned treatments affects the statute of limitations; if related, the limitations period does not start until the end of the subsequent treatment, whereas if related merely to the original malady, it begins immediately after the prior treatment.

In the current case involving Dr. Langdon and Sherry Healy, it was alleged that Dr. Langdon failed to warn her about the fatal risks of chemotherapy. After complications arose, Dr. Langdon ceased chemotherapy but continued treatment for those complications. This follow-up treatment was determined to be related to the unwarned treatment, meaning the statute of limitations only began after the complications treatment ended. The exact end date of this treatment remains unclear, but evidence suggests Dr. Langdon monitored her lung condition starting December 4, 1987, and possibly continued until her death on January 22, 1988. The petition was filed within two years of her death, leading to the conclusion that it was timely. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the conclusion of treatment, making summary judgment inappropriate and allowing the case to proceed under either the professional malpractice or wrongful death statute of limitations.

The trial court dismissed the case based on the statute of limitations without addressing additional issues raised by Dr. Langdon's summary judgment motion. Legal precedent indicates that a correct outcome won't be overturned simply due to incorrect reasoning. The court evaluated whether the evidence presented justified the summary judgment favoring Dr. Langdon. Dr. Langdon claimed entitlement to summary judgment, asserting James Healy did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding the standard of care and its breach. Dr. Langdon supported his motion with his affidavit and deposition excerpts, stating he informed Sherry Healy about the potential side effects of chemotherapy, including death.

James Healy countered this by providing evidence suggesting a breach of the standard of care. He presented his own affidavit claiming he was present during discussions about chemotherapy side effects and that Dr. Langdon never warned Sherry Healy about the risk of death. Additionally, a "Consent to Chemotherapy" form signed by Sherry Healy did not list death among the potential risks, further supporting Healy's claims. The conflicting evidence between Healy's affidavit and Dr. Langdon's statements indicated a genuine issue of material fact, which should be resolved by a jury. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, determining that the wrongful death action was not barred by the statute of limitations and that a genuine issue regarding a breach of duty existed.