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Vicioso v. State
Citations: 54 S.W.3d 104; 2001 WL 893909Docket: 10-99-236-CR
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 22, 2001; Texas; State Appellate Court
Wilfredy Rene Vicioso was convicted of burglary of a habitation and sentenced to life in prison based on prior felony convictions. He raised four points of error on appeal regarding the trial court's decisions: 1. The trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress his written confession, arguing it was obtained following an illegal arrest, violating his constitutional rights. 2. The confession's admission adversely impacted his substantial rights, again tied to the alleged illegal arrest. 3. During the punishment phase, the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial and failing to instruct the jury to disregard evidence regarding an unadjudicated extraneous crime. 4. The trial court also erred by not instructing the jury to disregard his confession due to the illegal arrest claim. At the suppression hearing, the State's witness, Jim Buster, testified regarding the investigation into multiple burglaries, including the "Diaz burglary." Buster detailed the investigation's progression, including contacts with Vicioso and his girlfriend, Tammy Gomez, who had prior burglary convictions. Buster acknowledged a lack of probable cause to arrest Vicioso, as evidenced by his failure to obtain an arrest warrant. The encounter escalated when Buster and Officer Westmoreland followed Vicioso and Gomez, leading to their detention. Despite questioning Gomez and obtaining no incriminating information, officers handcuffed both and transported them to the Sheriff's Department, where Vicioso underwent extensive searches. Eventually, Gomez confessed to multiple burglaries, providing details that implicated both herself and Vicioso. Buster testified that he and officers visited burglary locations based on Gomez's descriptions. After taking Gomez's written statement, Buster informed Vicioso that Gomez had confessed and a gun had been recovered, stating it was Vicioso's choice to give a statement. He indicated they had sufficient evidence, including Gomez's statement, to charge Vicioso with a felony. Vicioso requested to speak to Gomez before being read his Miranda rights, after which he confessed in a written statement about three hours after arriving at the Department. Buster confirmed no traffic citations were issued despite the vehicle crossing the center line multiple times. He clarified that Vicioso and Gomez were not free to leave after the initial stop; they were transported for questioning. Buster believed Vicioso was strip-searched upon arrival and placed in a cell only after Gomez's statement implicated him in the burglary. Buster had probable cause based on Gomez's statement but did not have a warrant at the time, obtaining one the next morning. He identified the vehicle as belonging to Gomez and noted that he focused on her during the initial detention. Vicioso’s attorney called Westmoreland, who stated he believed the vehicle stop was due to a defective taillight and acknowledged he did not communicate with Vicioso at the scene. Westmoreland confirmed that officers did not stop at the courthouse prior to the Sheriff's Department. He stated that Vicioso's Miranda rights were read about thirty minutes post-arrival, a detail Vicioso denied. Officer Heath, who stopped the vehicle for a defective brake signal, testified he handcuffed Vicioso and was instructed to transport him for further investigation. Heath, responding to whether he would have removed the handcuffs from Vicioso if requested, stated he was instructed by a superior to transport Vicioso in his patrol car. Vicioso was handcuffed, seated in the front of the vehicle, and arrived at the Sheriff's Department around 2:30 PM, where a strip-search occurred approximately ten minutes later. By 3:30 PM, Vicioso was placed in a cell. Mike Metcalf, a jailer, confirmed that he arrived at 4:00 PM and found Vicioso already strip-searched and locked in a cell. Vicioso testified that Heath began following his vehicle with flashing lights before initiating the stop. After Gomez was removed from the vehicle, Vicioso was handcuffed and placed in Heath's car; when asked if he was under arrest, Heath replied, "I don't know." Vicioso claimed he was not consulted about going to the Sheriff's Department, which he stated was bypassed for a magistrate. He was strip-searched shortly after arrival. Vicioso recounted interactions with an officer named Buster, who pressured him to confess by stating that a gun had been found and offered leniency if he cooperated. Vicioso denied receiving Miranda warnings and later expressed he would not have signed a statement had he known his rights. The prosecutor later indicated that an officer's previous testimony regarding the timing of events was incorrect. The legal standard for reviewing a motion to suppress emphasizes that appellate courts should defer to trial courts on historical facts, especially those based on credibility, while applying de novo review for pure legal questions and the determination of probable cause. Vicioso contends that his arrest was unlawful, violating the Fourth Amendment and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as he was effectively arrested when handcuffed and transported by officers during a road stop. The definition of "arrest" includes any significant restriction of movement, regardless of the officer's intent or the suspect's submission. Although the initial stop may have been lawful, the actions of handcuffing, transporting, and strip-searching Vicioso established an arrest. The arrest lacked a warrant, which was only obtained the following day, and none of the statutory exceptions in Chapter Fourteen for warrantless arrests applied. Thus, both the arrest and subsequent detention were deemed illegal. Consequently, any confession made post-arrest is considered tainted and must be excluded under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23(a), which prohibits the admission of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional provisions. Additionally, the Fourth Amendment mandates probable cause for warrantless arrests. The arresting officer admitted to lacking probable cause at the time of Vicioso's arrest, reinforcing the conclusion of its illegality. As a result, Vicioso's confession should have been excluded from evidence. Though the analysis might seem complete at this point, Texas jurisprudence requires further examination regarding confessions obtained after illegal arrests, as established in prior case law. The court must assess whether Vicioso's confession was given freely and voluntarily, thereby severing any link to his illegal arrest and rendering the statement admissible. This assessment is guided by four factors: 1) whether Miranda warnings were provided, 2) the time elapsed between the arrest and the confession, 3) any intervening circumstances, and 4) the nature and severity of official misconduct. Buster claimed he provided Miranda warnings before obtaining Vicioso's confession, which Vicioso disputed. If the warnings were indeed given, they followed a traumatic sequence of events for Vicioso, including a strip search, a body-cavity search, and threats of indictment. Approximately three hours passed between the arrest and the confession, during which Vicioso was subjected to significant stress, suggesting a lack of opportunity for thoughtful reflection. The intervening circumstances—including the invasive searches and intimidation—do not support a conclusion that the confession was freely given. The court noted that there was no probable cause or warrant for Vicioso's arrest, indicating a violation of the Fourth Amendment. This factor heavily favors Vicioso, leading to the conclusion that the taint of the illegal arrest was not attenuated. Consequently, the confession is deemed a "fruit of the poisonous tree" and should not have been admitted at trial. The court must also analyze whether the erroneous admission of the confession warrants a new trial. Under Texas law, an error of this nature requires reversal unless it can be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the conviction. The precedent from Harris v. State emphasizes the need to evaluate the potential impact of the error without considering the sufficiency of untainted evidence in isolation. The court will not assess the evidence against Vicioso absent his confession, as doing so would improperly assume the role of the jury. The inquiry focuses on determining if the statement made by Vicioso prejudiced the jurors' decision-making process. Six factors are considered: the source and nature of the error, the extent of the State's emphasis on the error, the probable implications of the error, the weight a juror might give it, and whether declaring the error harmless would encourage future violations by the State. The main evidence against Vicioso, aside from his confession, was Gomez, an accomplice witness whose testimony requires corroboration under Texas law. The trial court provided an instruction regarding the accomplice witness based on statutory requirements. A significant error identified was a violation of Vicioso's Fourth Amendment rights by law enforcement, which, if deemed harmless, could undermine the adherence to constitutional standards. The State heavily relied on Vicioso's confession, which is typically highly damaging in criminal cases, suggesting the jury likely considered it in their decision. Consequently, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury was unaffected by Vicioso's statement, leading to the conclusion that the admission of this statement constituted harmful error. Therefore, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Justice Gray dissents, arguing for the affirmation of the trial court's decision, while Vicioso raises multiple points of error related to the suppression of his confession and jury instructions. The factual background notes that Vicioso and his girlfriend were under investigation for a series of burglaries. Investigator Buster and his partner sought to question Gomez after receiving a pawn ticket linking her to a burglary at the Diaz residence. Later, deputies stopped Gomez's van for a traffic violation, but primarily to allow Buster to interview her. Vicioso was a passenger in the van. After issuing a verbal warning for the traffic infraction, Buster informed Gomez about the pawn ticket and asked to search the van, which yielded no evidence related to the burglary. Gomez was arrested and advised of her rights, while Vicioso, not advised of his rights, was handcuffed and taken separately for a "pending investigation." At the Sheriff’s Office, Gomez confessed to multiple burglaries and implicated Vicioso, even indicating where a hidden gun could be found. After about two and a half hours, she signed a written statement that included Vicioso's involvement. Vicioso underwent a strip search without any contraband found, and although Buster couldn’t recall advising him of his rights, his partner claimed that Vicioso was warned according to Miranda approximately thirty minutes after his arrival. Subsequently, Vicioso expressed a desire to talk, and after a private conversation with Gomez, he was again advised of his rights before providing a confession about several burglaries, including the Mills residence, the Diaz residence, and the Burdett residence. Although Vicioso was indicted only for the Mills burglary, the State presented redacted versions of his confession during both the guilt-innocence and punishment phases of the trial, ensuring the jury did not see the complete statement. Vicioso filed a motion to suppress his written statement, arguing it was the result of an illegal arrest, that not being taken before a magistrate tainted his confession, and that the statement was not given voluntarily. The appellate standard of review for such cases, as established in Guzman v. State, emphasizes deference to the trial court's findings regarding historical facts and credibility assessments. Appellate courts should give deference to trial courts' decisions regarding mixed questions of law and fact when the resolution involves assessing credibility and demeanor. For mixed questions not involving these factors, appellate courts may conduct de novo reviews. If the facts are undisputed and a pure question of law is presented, de novo review is also appropriate. In the case of Vicioso, the timing of his arrest is unclear. The trial court found he was under arrest when he confessed, while testimony indicated he was only detained until later. The State referenced a specific arrest time of 2:30 p.m., coinciding with Vicioso being handcuffed at a traffic stop. Vicioso contends his confession followed an illegal warrantless arrest, violating constitutional and procedural standards. The State argues the arrest was legal but suggests any potential taint was purged. It's acknowledged that Vicioso was arrested without a warrant, which is illegal unless it meets certain statutory exceptions, specifically under article 14.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. However, there is no evidence he was about to escape, leading to the assumption that the arrest was illegal. Under the Fourth Amendment and Texas law, evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest must be excluded. Nevertheless, evidence may still be admissible if it is shown to be the product of the defendant's free will, effectively purging the taint of the illegal arrest. Factors to consider for this determination include whether Miranda warnings were given, the timing between the arrest and the evidence, any intervening circumstances, and the nature of the official misconduct. In Vicioso's case, records confirm he received Miranda warnings before making his statement. Vicioso signed the Statement of Rights and initialed the warnings on his voluntary statement, which, while not sufficient alone to eliminate the taint of an illegal arrest, serves as a threshold requirement for admissibility. The first factor favors admitting the statement. The second factor, which assesses the time elapsed since the illegal arrest, generally holds little weight by itself; courts disagree on what duration sufficiently severs the link to the arrest. In this case, about three hours passed before Vicioso's statement, during which he was largely alone, allowing for some reflection on his situation, thus favoring admission of the statement. The third factor examines whether intervening circumstances broke the causal link between the illegal arrest and the confession. The State argues that the implication of Vicioso by his accomplice provided probable cause independent of the illegal arrest. Evidence implicating Vicioso came from Gomez, who was questioned separately, establishing that the probable cause for Vicioso's arrest was not a result of the illegal detention. This supports the conclusion that significant intervening events severed the causal connection between the arrest and the confession. Additionally, Vicioso's request to speak with Inspector Buster, leading to a volunteered statement, further supports the admission of the confession. The fourth factor involves evaluating the purpose and nature of police conduct. Flagrantly abusive conduct is defined as lacking probable cause or being pretextual. Although there are conflicting accounts regarding the initial stop of the vehicle, it seems it was conducted to question the driver about a burglary. The Supreme Court has ruled that brief detentions based on reasonable suspicion are permissible, even without probable cause. Overall, the factors analyzed suggest a tendency towards admitting Vicioso's statement despite the circumstances surrounding his arrest. In Terry v. Ohio, the Court acknowledged that officers possessed a pawn ticket linking a vehicle's driver to a crime, which justified temporary investigative detentions of passengers. Previous case law established that such detentions apply to individuals like Vicioso, who had a criminal history and connections to a burglary suspect. Although a firearm was later discovered, the strip and body cavity search conducted on Vicioso was deemed a significant invasion of privacy, lacking probable cause and a warrant—qualifying as a flagrant rights violation. The procedural conduct of law enforcement during Vicioso's arrest and subsequent questioning was scrutinized, particularly in light of legal precedents like Brown v. Illinois, which condemned police tactics that induce fear and confusion. However, Vicioso's confusion did not indicate that officers intended to coerce a confession, as he was allowed time to reflect before voluntarily making a statement. Furthermore, Vicioso argued that his confession was tainted by not being promptly presented to a magistrate, as required under Texas law. Although he claimed that this delay influenced his decision to confess, the court afforded deference to the trial court's findings, which indicated that Vicioso was taken before a magistrate the day after his arrest and was advised of his rights. The State provided evidence of a signed Statement of Rights, while Vicioso contended he was not informed of his rights and did not recall signing. Ultimately, the court found that the State demonstrated the confession was not tainted by the illegal arrest or delay in presentation to a magistrate. During the pre-trial hearing, the judge assessed Vicioso's comprehension of his rights, particularly regarding the admissibility of his confession. The trial court needed to evaluate conflicting facts and witness credibility to determine if Vicioso's confession would have occurred had he been promptly taken to a magistrate and given a Miranda warning. Ultimately, the trial court found no grounds to suppress the confession due to delays in this process. Vicioso contended that his confession was involuntary and a result of unlawful arrest, but the trial judge's evaluation of witness credibility led to the conclusion that the statement was made voluntarily. The court deemed the link between the illegal arrest and the confession too weak to warrant suppression and affirmed that Vicioso's statement was made without coercion. In the punishment phase, Vicioso challenged the trial court's denial of his motion for mistrial regarding evidence of an unadjudicated burglary (Burdett) presented by the State. Vicioso argued that the State had not proven his involvement beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court refused the mistrial but instructed the jury to disregard the burglary evidence unless they found Vicioso guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court's allowance of extraneous offense evidence was supported by Texas law, which permits such evidence during sentencing if deemed relevant, regardless of prior charges or convictions. The admissibility of this evidence is subject to an abuse of discretion standard, while the jury decides the factual question of whether the evidence meets the reasonable doubt threshold. The State presented evidence of an unadjudicated extraneous offense during the punishment phase of Vicioso's trial, with the jury instructed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed this offense before considering it for punishment. Vicioso's argument that the State did not meet this burden was rejected. The trial court's denial of a mistrial was evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard, which allows for error correction through jury instructions rather than a mistrial when the error is not deemed excessively prejudicial. The court found that the evidence was not so inflammatory as to impede the jury's rational evaluation of the State's proof regarding Vicioso's involvement in the Burdett burglary, or to hinder its ability to disregard the extraneous offense if the State failed to meet its burden. Vicioso also claimed that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that statements obtained during an illegal arrest are inadmissible; however, this claim was dismissed as a misstatement of the law, as subsequent statements can be admissible if they result from the defendant's free will. The trial court correctly rejected Vicioso’s requested instruction. Consequently, all four of Vicioso's points of error were overruled, leading to the conclusion that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed, despite the majority's disagreement, resulting in a respectful dissent. Gomez was not arrested or ticketed for a traffic violation, indicating a lack of statutory authority for her arrest under Chapter Fourteen. A non-constitutional error will not lead to reversal unless it affects a substantial right of the accused, as per Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). Vicioso, a convicted felon, was unlawfully in possession of a handgun. He testified that his rights were not explained to him before he signed documents, although he acknowledged in his brief that Buster claimed to have informed him of his rights and did not dispute Buster's partner's testimony regarding the Miranda warning being given shortly after his arrival at the Sheriff's Office. Vicioso criticized the officer who transported him for not reading the Miranda warning, but the State did not contest this point. The author argues that the majority's application of the law is incorrect, particularly when comparing the detention in this case to that in Townsley, which was significantly longer.