Miller v. Bailey

Citations: 621 So. 2d 1174; 1993 WL 237689Docket: 92-1178

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; June 30, 1993; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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The case involves an automobile accident on May 14, 1988, on La. Hwy. 13 in Evangeline Parish, resulting in eight personal injury suits filed by various plaintiffs against multiple defendants, including Steven S. Bailey, his liability insurer, and state departments. The accident occurred near Pierre's Place bar shortly after closing, where patrons were involved in a fight in the highway, obstructing traffic. Antonial K. Miller parked his GMC pickup truck in the northbound lane, while Bailey, who was intoxicated, approached the bar in the southbound lane. Despite being warned by his passenger, Bailey collided with pedestrians and then Miller's truck, injuring several individuals. The plaintiffs included Miller and other patrons, all of whom settled with Bailey for his insurance limit of $19,200 prior to trial. The appeals addressed the trial judge's findings of fault, apportionments of fault, and awards of damages, with the court reversing some decisions, amending others, and affirming the amended judgments.

All incidental claims against Bailey were voluntarily dismissed. After the trial, Miller's insurer, LIGA, deposited the limits of Miller's liability insurance into the court registry before being dismissed from the suits, leaving Miller liable. The insurance proceeds were distributed among various plaintiffs: Johnson ($8,770.67), Broussard ($1,403.31), Ortego ($613.95), S. Guillory ($491.16), C. Guillory ($350.83), Savant ($8,770.67), and Richard ($122.79). Defendant Pierre Catoire cleared his bar property and was absent from the trial and this appeal.

The eight consolidated suits underwent a bifurcated trial for liability and damages. Fault was apportioned as follows: Bailey (40%), Miller (10%, 15% in his own suit), State DOTD (22%), State DPS (18%), and collectively the plaintiffs (5%, with Richard at 2% and others at 3%). Damages awarded were: Miller ($12,500), Richard ($3,500), Broussard ($40,000), Savant ($250,000), S. Guillory ($14,000), Johnson ($250,000), C. Guillory ($10,000), and Ortego ($17,500).

Multiple appeals arose from the trial, with DPS contesting fault findings and Johnson's damage award, DOTD appealing fault findings, Johnson appealing his damage award, and LIGA contesting Ortego's damage award. Stacy Guillory, John Broussard, and Lisa Savant also appealed the fault apportionment and damage awards. Appellees include Richard, C. Guillory, Miller, and Ortego.

The trial judge attributed 5% fault to the plaintiffs (excluding Miller and Richard) for standing in the highway, emphasizing pedestrian duties under LSA-R.S. 32:213(A), which requires pedestrians to yield to vehicles. Testimony indicated visual obstructions from illegally parked cars heightened the pedestrians' duty of care. The judge found no manifest error in this determination. Third parties were collectively assigned 3% fault for obstructing the highway by illegal parking, as per LSA-R.S. 32:296.

Evidence indicated that vehicles parked on the shoulders of Hwy. 13 obstructed traffic, posing risks to motorists and pedestrians. This obstruction hindered Bailey's ability to maneuver safely in an emergency, contributing to the accident. The trial judge correctly assigned fault to the illegally parked vehicles, including Miller's, who was found 10% at fault in all cases except his own, where he was assigned 15% due to his violation of LSA-R.S. 32:141(A). Bailey was determined to be 40% at fault for driving under the influence and at excessive speed, failing to maintain a proper lookout for pedestrians, thereby justifying the trial judge's ruling. The Department of Public Safety (DPS) was found 18% at fault for not enforcing parking regulations and failing to post "No Parking" signs. However, it was concluded that the trial judge erred legally in this finding, as evidence suggested that the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), not the DPS, was responsible for sign placement. The DPS's duty to enforce traffic regulations does not create a specific duty to individuals in this context, as the case lacked a personal relationship between police officers and the plaintiffs, distinguishing it from other cases of liability against the DPS.

LSA-R.S. 32:296 prohibits parking that obstructs traffic, aimed at protecting motorists, which does not extend to pedestrians like the plaintiffs. The statute makes it illegal to park unattended vehicles on highway shoulders if it obstructs traffic. The police had previously directed the removal of vehicles from the highway near Pierre's Place, but on the night of the accident, the officer was occupied with another incident, and an off-duty officer was called post-accident. There was no obligation for police to have an officer present every night for enforcement. The trial judge incorrectly found that the Department of Public Safety (DPS) had a duty to enforce no-parking laws, leading to a reversal of the judgment that assigned fault to the DPS.

Additionally, the trial judge erroneously held the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) 22% at fault for not posting 'No Parking' signs and for not lowering the speed limit due to narrow shoulders. The court determined that the DOTD had no duty to post such signs and found no causal link between the absence of signs and the accident. The trial judge admitted evidence related to a letter from Trooper Meyers regarding the need for signage, but the DOTD's motion to exclude this was valid under federal law because it did not demonstrate that the highway was part of a federally funded project. The trial judge's reliance on this evidence was flawed.

Under Articles 2315 and 2317 of the Louisiana Civil Code, the DOTD's liability depends on whether it breached its duty to maintain safe highway conditions. The determination of whether the roadway was dangerously unsafe hinges on specific case facts. The trial judge concluded that the DOTD had a duty to post 'No Parking' signs due to the unsafe conditions created by parked vehicles on narrow shoulders. The DOTD contended that it did not owe a duty to enforce LSA-R.S. 32:296 and argued that the road was in good condition with no hazards present.

Prior accidents at the location were not documented, and the condition of the road and its shoulders was not deemed unreasonably dangerous for motorists. The only hazardous factor identified was the illegal parking of vehicles on both sides of Hwy. 13. The Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) was found to have no duty to post 'No Parking' signs, as parking was already prohibited on the shoulders except in emergencies, per LSA-R.S. 32:296. Motorists are expected to be aware of traffic laws, and the DOTD is not responsible for reminding them of laws they should already know. The absence of 'No Parking' signs was determined not to be a legal cause of the accident.

The court referenced the duty-risk analysis from Faucheaux v. Terrebonne Consol. Govt. to assess causation, which involves evaluating whether the defendant's conduct led to the harm, what duties were owed, if those duties were breached, and whether the risk was within the scope of the duty. The "but for" test applies to establish cause-in-fact. The inquiry into duty is a legal question regarding whether there is a law supporting the plaintiff's claim. The scope of duty relates to policy considerations about whether the risk falls within the intended protection of the duty.

The court concluded that the presence of 'No Parking' signs would not have prevented illegal parking, as motorists had disregarded previous police requests to remove their vehicles. Thus, the lack of signs was not a cause of the accident. The incident was attributed to the illegal parking, the actions of the pedestrians, and the behaviors of Miller and Bailey. The trial judge's finding of fault against the DOTD for not reducing the speed limit near the bar was also rejected, as there was no legal requirement to do so based solely on the bar's presence, and the evidence did not indicate that the speed limit was excessive.

Motorists have a responsibility to drive at reasonable speeds according to road conditions, weather, traffic, and time of day, as per LSA-R.S. 32:64. The trial judge found the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) at fault for inadequate road shoulders for parking. However, expert testimony revealed that while Hwy. 13 met historical standards, it is substandard by current design criteria, featuring narrow shoulders and roadside ditches, characteristics common in Louisiana. The judgment stated that the road shoulders did not create a hazard; instead, the hazard stemmed from motorists illegally parked on the shoulders and pedestrians in the roadway. The trial judge incorrectly determined that the narrow shoulders were defective solely due to their width and that they contributed to the accident, a conclusion deemed speculative. As a result, the assessment of 22% fault to the DOTD was reversed to 0%.

Anthony Shane Richard, a guest passenger in the vehicle driven by Bailey, was initially assigned 2% fault for not warning Bailey about roadside obstructions sooner. However, he was not a named defendant in the case, making any judgment against him void. The trial judge also erred in attributing fault to Richard in his own case because a guest passenger generally does not have a duty to supervise the driver. Despite this, Richard did not appeal or respond to the appeal, leading to the affirmation of his 2% fault in his case. 

Since neither the DPS nor the DOTD were found at fault, the 40% of fault previously assigned must be reapportioned, along with the 2% from cases involving Richard, excluding his own suit.

The guidelines from *Watson v. State Farm Cas. Ins. Co.*, 469 So.2d 967 (La. 1985) were utilized to assess fault in the case. The trial judge determined that the plaintiffs were more at fault than the third parties (illegally parked motorists) and that Bailey and Miller were more at fault than the plaintiffs, a conclusion deemed not manifestly erroneous. Fault was reapportioned as follows: for Bailey—50%, Miller—20%, plaintiffs (each)—17%, third persons—13%. In Miller's suit, the fault was adjusted to Bailey—50%, Miller—37%, third persons—13%. In Richard's case, it was Bailey—65%, Miller—20%, third persons—13%, Richard—2%. 

LIGA appealed the damages awarded to Ortego, claiming they were excessive, while several other appellants contended their awards were inadequate. The trial judge provided comprehensive reasoning for the awards, which were found to be well-supported. Notably, LIGA, as Ortego's underinsured motorist insurer, contested a $17,500 award for her injuries, arguing it was dismissed from the suit after a May 8, 1991 order, which was not construed to dismiss claims against Miller and LIGA related to Ortego. 

The court found no abuse of discretion in the damages awarded to Ortego, who suffered severe leg injuries and a painful condition requiring a wheelchair for a month and crutches for three months. Medical expenses amounted to $1,289.91, with past lost wages of $1,235.91. The total award of $17,500, including $14,974.18 in general damages, was upheld despite being on the higher side. 

Stacy Guillory's appeal for an inadequate award of $14,000 was also denied. He sustained multiple injuries, including a concussion and kidney contusion, with stipulated medical expenses of $1,852.68. The trial judge awarded $12,147.32 in general damages, which the court found to be appropriate, affirming the trial judge's discretion in damage awards.

Edwin Blaine Johnson, aged eighteen at the time of his accident, was awarded $250,000 for personal injuries, which he claims is inadequate. He suffered a concussion and aggravated preexisting hydrocephalus, a broken right leg requiring four surgeries, and multiple bruises. Medical testimony confirmed that his hydrocephalus was asymptomatic before the incident. Johnson's recovery involved extensive rehabilitation, and he can no longer engage in strenuous activities due to the risk of neurological complications. His medical expenses totaled $25,341.89, with the trial judge awarding $13,320 for home care and $211,338.11 for general damages. The court found no abuse of discretion in this award.

John Michael Broussard, who also contends his $40,000 award is insufficient, sustained a broken leg, bruises, and a blood clot after being struck by a vehicle. He was hospitalized for a week and used a wheelchair for three weeks, with a total recovery time of seven months. Broussard experiences lingering pain and a calcium buildup in his leg. His medical expenses were $9,002.18, and the trial judge awarded him $30,997.72 in general damages, which the court upheld as reasonable.

Lisa Savant, who was twenty when struck by a vehicle, asserts that her $250,000 award is inadequate. She experienced severe injuries, including a head injury, multiple fractures, and was in a coma for two weeks. Her medical history includes surgery on her leg and ongoing issues such as daily headaches and memory impairment. She took a 14.5-month medical leave due to her condition. Her past medical expenses amounted to $16,393.23, and she received $15,414 for lost wages, $6,000 for future medical needs, and $212,192.77 in general damages, with the court finding no abuse of discretion in these awards.

The court ultimately reversed the trial court's judgment regarding the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) and the Department of Public Safety (DPS), holding them not at fault for the plaintiffs' damages. Richard was also found not liable for other plaintiffs' damages, though he was assessed 2% contributory negligence in his own case.

The trial court's judgment has been amended to allocate liability among the parties involved. Specifically, in the cases of the plaintiffs (excluding Richard and Miller), liability is apportioned as follows: Bailey—50%, Miller—20%, each plaintiff—17%, and third parties—13%. For Miller, the liability distribution is Bailey—50%, Miller—37%, and third parties—13%. In Richard's case, the allocation is Bailey—65%, Miller—20%, third parties—13%, and Richard—2%. The amounts of damages awarded are affirmed, but Antonial K. Miller is the only defendant from whom judgment is rendered, resulting in Miller receiving $0 in damages. The total damages awarded to the plaintiffs, accounting for credits from LIGA (Miller's liability insurer), are specified for each individual plaintiff.

The judgment against the State and certain departments is reversed, dismissing Miller's claims against them and reducing his award to $0. The fault assessment in Miller's suit is amended to: Bailey—50%, Miller—37%, and third parties—13%. All costs from the trial court and appeal are assigned to Miller. Additionally, due to an error in the trial court's assessment of fault, each pedestrian-plaintiff is now assigned 15% fault in their respective cases. 

Lastly, 23 U.S.C. 409 establishes that certain safety reports and data cannot be used as evidence in court regarding damages from accidents at the mentioned locations.