Johnson v. Zurz

Citations: 596 F. Supp. 39; 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16306Docket: C 82-1534A, C 82-1805

Court: District Court, N.D. Ohio; May 30, 1984; Federal District Court

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The case involves Kenneth Johnson and Gregory Mitchell as plaintiffs against Judge Richard Zurz and Referee James Gill, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. Johnson, deemed indigent, faced contempt proceedings for failing to pay child support following a court order from 1979. In May 1982, a show cause order was issued by Judge Zurz, which threatened Johnson with incarceration. Johnson's request for court-appointed counsel was denied on the grounds that the Domestic Relations Court lacked the authority to do so. In response, Johnson filed a class action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming the necessity of counsel given the potential for incarceration. The court granted a temporary restraining order and subsequently a preliminary injunction. The contempt hearing scheduled for June 16, 1982, was ultimately dismissed by Judge Zurz.

The memorandum also addresses the threshold issue of class certification, emphasizing the importance of standing. It cites precedent requiring that a plaintiff demonstrate personal suffering of actual or threatened injury due to the defendant's conduct, which must be traceable to the challenged action and likely to be remedied by a favorable ruling.

Defendant argues that plaintiff lacks standing to sue, asserting that no actual injury has occurred. However, the Court finds that the threat of injury from illegal conduct suffices to meet the standing requirement. Plaintiff faces ongoing threats to his liberty, and the dismissal of a contempt hearing does not negate this threat, as it can be reinstated at any time. The Court clarifies that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not remove the court's jurisdiction to review the legality of that practice. The city's repeal of certain language does not prevent it from reenacting the same laws, and the defendant may continue his actions if the preliminary injunction is lifted. 

Defendant also claims there is no real possibility of injury; however, Ohio law stipulates potential penalties for contempt, including imprisonment. The Court finds that the plaintiff, along with others in similar situations, faces a legitimate threat of injury. The action in question involves state action, as it relates to a state judge's failure to inform indigent defendants of their right to counsel in contempt proceedings. The Court agrees that the plaintiff's class meets the criteria for class certification under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2), and thus grants the motion to certify a class consisting of indigent defendants facing potential incarceration related to contempt for non-payment of child support.

Defendant invokes the doctrines of abstention under Younger v. Harris and judicial immunity to support his motion. The Younger abstention doctrine, based on federalism and comity principles, requires federal courts to avoid interfering with state criminal proceedings unless extraordinary circumstances exist. This doctrine has been extended to certain civil actions. A key aspect is that plaintiffs must have access to state appellate processes for federal claims. In Parker v. Turner, the Sixth Circuit held that federal courts should abstain if state courts can address alleged constitutional violations. However, if state courts fail to correct unconstitutional conduct, plaintiffs can demonstrate "exceptional circumstances" for federal intervention. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that plaintiffs lack a right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings, thereby limiting their ability to seek state court remedies. Consequently, this Court can evaluate the constitutionality of the conduct in question. Additionally, courts have recognized that judges are not immune from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits when declaratory or injunctive relief is sought. The Court concludes that no valid reason exists to prevent federal courts from issuing injunctive relief against state judges for civil rights violations. Therefore, the defendant is not immune, and the Court will proceed to address the merits of the case.

A court must first assess whether a protected interest is at stake in any due process claim, as established in Board of Regents v. Roth. In this case, the plaintiff and the class face potential deprivation of physical liberty by the Domestic Relations Court, implicating the Fourteenth Amendment. The presence of counsel is essential for ensuring due process, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, which mandates the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in felony cases. Similarly, Argersinger v. Hamlin states that no individual may be imprisoned for any offense without counsel unless there is a knowing and intelligent waiver. The Supreme Court further clarified in Scott v. Illinois that indigent defendants cannot be sentenced to imprisonment without being afforded appointed counsel.

In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court summarized that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when the loss of the case may lead to the deprivation of physical liberty. The Lassiter case involved evaluating whether counsel should be appointed for an indigent parent in a parental-rights termination hearing, where the potential loss of liberty was not present, leading to a case-by-case assessment. However, in the current case where imprisonment is a possibility, there’s no need for such an individualized review, as the liberty interests of the plaintiff and class significantly outweigh state interests.

The proceeding is classified as a "civil" matter, but this distinction does not affect the core issue, which is the defendant's authority to restrict the physical liberty of the plaintiff and class members. The preservation of physical liberty is a fundamental interest in the United States, and such liberty can only be taken away with due process. The Court holds that an indigent individual ordered to appear for contempt due to non-payment of child support must be informed of the right to appointed counsel and that such counsel must be appointed upon request before the hearing. The Court acknowledges the costs associated with this requirement but emphasizes that the right to liberty under the Constitution is paramount. As a result, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted, while the defendant's motion is denied. The defendant is permanently enjoined from actions contrary to this ruling. 

On February 8, 1983, claims by Gregory Mitchell against Honorable Richard Zurz and James Gill were consolidated with this case for a pretrial hearing. The issues are similar, except that Referee Gill did not inform Mitchell of his right to counsel, leading to his sentencing and subsequent arrest warrant, which was recalled after Mitchell filed this action. Plaintiff Mitchell's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the defendants' motions for summary judgment are denied. Class certification for Case No. C 82-1534A is granted, confirming Mitchell's membership in the defined class. The Court's order permanently enjoins the defendants from inconsistent actions and concludes Case No. C 82-1534A and Case No. C 82-1805 concerning Mitchell's claims against the referees.