Price v. Beker

Citations: 629 So. 2d 911; 1993 WL 492536Docket: 92-2649

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; January 26, 1994; Florida; State Appellate Court

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The District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of a claim against JFK Medical Center, Inc., the employer of a physician, after the claimant settled with the physician. The trial court had concluded that the dismissal barred any further claims against the employer, relying on the precedent set in Jones v. Gulf Coast Newspapers, Inc. The appellate court disagreed, emphasizing that the dismissal was based on a settlement rather than a true adjudication on the merits. The key issue is whether the dismissal of the active tortfeasor also prevents claims against the passive tortfeasor (the employer). The Jones decision's reasoning—linking the liability of the employer to that of the physician—was found inapplicable here, as there was no finding of fault against the physician. The court noted that statutory changes have moved away from automatic releases among joint tortfeasors, as highlighted by Florida Statutes § 768.041(1), which states that a release for one tortfeasor does not release others from liability for the same tort. This ruling underscores an evolving legal landscape that prioritizes justice over rigid interpretations of liability.

Section 768.31(5) outlines the implications of a release or covenant not to sue given in good faith to one or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death. It states that such a release does not discharge other tortfeasors from liability unless explicitly stated, but it reduces claims against them by the amount specified in the release. Additionally, the tortfeasor receiving the release is discharged from any liability for contribution to other tortfeasors. This statutory framework allows parties to settle claims without affecting their claims against others, including passive tortfeasors, who may receive a credit for any settlement amounts paid.

The document raises questions regarding the treatment of settlements that include a dismissal with prejudice between settling parties. Although limited case law exists on this topic, references are made to notable cases. Walsingham v. Browning asserts that a dismissal with prejudice constitutes a decision on the merits, but its reasoning is critiqued for not being directly supported by precedent. Contrarily, Apstein v. Tower Investments emphasizes that the intent of the settling parties should guide the effects of a consent dismissal with prejudice.

The court in Hertz Corp. v. Hellens determined that a passive tortfeasor is not released by a settlement involving an active tortfeasor, affirming that passive tortfeasors are protected under the statute. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments aligns with this interpretation, indicating that a consent judgment does not extinguish claims against non-sued parties and that settlements do not discharge the obligations of others liable for the same harm. Payments received in such settlements reduce the obligations of remaining tortfeasors but do not eliminate them entirely. The document concludes that the same policy considerations apply to consent judgments in this instance, supporting this approach.

Adopting the policy from the Restatement of Judgments aligns with legislative intent in sections 768.041(1) and 768.31(5), rejecting the notion of a decision on the merits when none exists. Particularly, if the active tortfeasor compensates the claimant to secure a dismissal, the justification for this notion diminishes, as the claimant has effectively succeeded in obtaining compensation. In this case, it is clear that the settlement agreement, which led to the consent order of dismissal, did not intend to bar the claimant from pursuing the passive tortfeasor, as explicitly stated in writing. The court's ruling upholds this agreement, leading to a reversal and remand for further proceedings. The excerpt also references Eason v. Lau, where a dismissal with prejudice against a joint tortfeasor was treated as a release under the same legislative sections. Additionally, it clarifies that a primary tortfeasor cannot use a release or covenant not to sue as a defense against an indemnity claim from a secondarily liable party, emphasizing that such actions do not breach any agreements made with the injured party.