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McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco, Inc.

Citations: 612 So. 2d 417; 1992 Ala. LEXIS 1539; 1992 WL 371479Docket: 1911143

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; December 17, 1992; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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McGuire Oil Company, along with Delta Oil Company and Diamond Gasoline Stations, filed a lawsuit against Mapco, Inc. and Mapco Petroleum, Inc. for violations of the Alabama Motor Fuel Marketing Act (AMFMA). Following a stipulation, Berwick Oil Company replaced Delta Oil as a plaintiff. The defendants removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds and counterclaimed, alleging violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, the AMFMA, and the Alabama Unfair Trade Practices Act. Mapco, Inc. was dismissed from the case, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiffs' AMFMA claim while favoring the plaintiffs on the defendants' counterclaims. The plaintiffs' motion for sanctions under Rule 11 was denied. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed these decisions and certified four legal questions to the Supreme Court of Alabama regarding the AMFMA's requirements for establishing liability, the relevance of market share, the nature of intent as a defense, and the applicability of the 'meeting competition' defense when pricing fuel slightly below competitors. The excerpt also outlines the petroleum industry's structure in Alabama, detailing the roles of jobbers and dealers in the gasoline supply chain.

Plaintiffs, who are jobbers in the wholesale and retail gasoline market, include McGuire Oil, Berwick Bay, and Diamond Gasoline, each selling branded or unbranded gasoline in the Mobile area. The defendant, Mapco, is an independent refiner selling non-branded gasoline and was accused of violating the Alabama Motor Fuel Marketing Act (AMFMA) by selling gasoline below cost at two retail locations, allegedly for 596 days at one site and 821 days at another, resulting in estimated losses of $250,000 for the plaintiffs.

The AMFMA prohibits selling gasoline below cost, defined under § 8-22-6, and the plaintiffs argue that injury to competitors suffices for liability under the act. They reference prior court interpretations that support this view, asserting that the legislature intended to protect individual competitors from predatory pricing practices. The defendant counters that the AMFMA requires proof of injury to competition as a whole rather than just individual competitors, citing the need for an injurious effect on competition as a critical element of a violation.

The legislative findings when enacting the AMFMA highlighted the public interest in motor fuel marketing and identified that unfair competition arises when marketing costs are subsidized through other operations, such as cross-subsidization from profits in other areas or locations.

Independent motor fuel marketers, such as dealers, distributors, jobbers, and wholesalers, struggle to survive against predatory subsidized pricing from competitors, which undermines their marketing operations and threatens competition in the petroleum industry. This practice is deemed inherently predatory and could ultimately harm consumers. The legislature, through the enactment of the Alabama Motor Fuel Marketing Act (AMFMA), aimed to promote fair competition and prevent monopolies and deceptive trade practices in the sale of motor fuel. Specifically, the AMFMA prohibits selling motor fuel below cost with the intent to harm competitors or reduce competition, defining such actions as unfair and deceptive. 

The Act outlines that "competition" includes any entity competing within the same market area and distribution level. It is unlawful for any party to offer motor fuel at a price lower than what is charged to others in the same market area if this practice injures competition. Interpretation of the AMFMA emphasizes that legislative intent must be ascertained from the statutory language and purposes. Recent case law supports the view that injury to even a single competitor can constitute a violation of the AMFMA, reinforcing the notion that protecting competition includes safeguarding individual competitors. Cases like Star Service and Money Back illustrate that below-cost pricing practices that harm competitors are actionable under the AMFMA.

Injury to a competitor is sufficient to establish a violation of the AMFMA, making the defendant's market share irrelevant for determining injury to competition. The plaintiffs contend that lack of injurious intent should be treated as an affirmative defense, requiring factual determination by the trier of fact, thus disallowing summary judgment based solely on this defense. Conversely, the defendant claims that if evidence shows no harmful intent in pricing practices, summary judgment is appropriate. The legislature specifies that only sales below cost that injure competition are prohibited, and the Act allows the State to establish a prima facie case by demonstrating a below-cost sale and its injurious effect, while permitting defendants to show lack of harmful intent as a defense or in mitigation of penalties. 

The discussion also addresses the 'meeting competition' defense under Section 8 of the AMFMA. Defendants argue they should be allowed to further lower prices below competitors' after a plaintiff matches a below-cost price, asserting that independent gasoline companies must sell at lower prices to compete with major brands. Plaintiffs, however, argue that the meeting competition defense does not permit below-cost undercutting. The argument highlights the competitive dynamics between independent and major brand gasoline companies, with the assertion that the AMFMA allows independents to utilize the 'meeting competition' defense effectively. The author expresses disagreement with the court's position on this matter.