Rivera v. State

Citations: 647 S.E.2d 70; 282 Ga. 355; 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 1987; 2007 Ga. LEXIS 486Docket: S07P0151

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; June 25, 2007; Georgia; State Supreme Court

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Reinaldo Javier Rivera was convicted by a jury of multiple serious offenses, including malice murder, three counts of rape, four counts of aggravated sodomy, four counts of aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a knife during a crime, in relation to the rape and murder of Marni Glista and the rapes of Chrisilee Barton and Tabitha Bosdell. He was sentenced to death for Glista's murder. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial, leading to his appeal. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and sentences, finding no reversible error.

The evidence indicated that on October 10, 2000, Rivera approached 18-year-old Barton under the guise of needing directions. After luring her to a parking lot and then to her stepfather's apartment, he attacked her with a kitchen knife while she was in the bathroom, subsequently raping and strangling her. Rivera attempted to kill her again by using a towel and then stabbing her multiple times in the neck, resulting in severe injuries. Despite her injuries, Barton managed to call 911. 

The police found that Rivera had exited through a back window, and he was later identified as the suspect by acquaintances after a news report. Rivera was found in a South Carolina motel following a suicide attempt and confessed to the assaults and murders of Barton, Glista, and Bosdell, providing details about the locations of the victims' remains. Glista was noted to be a sergeant in the Army who had not reported for duty when her husband sought to contact her.

An Army officer and a colleague discovered Glista's husband's vehicle at her home, with open windows and grocery bags containing a cell phone, a wallet with cash, and a store receipt dated the previous day. Despite lights being on inside, no one answered the door, prompting a call to the police. Upon entry, they found Glista lying nude on the bedroom floor, partially restrained with medical tape, making gurgling sounds. She had severe abrasions on her wrists and neck consistent with prolonged struggle and ligature strangulation. Glista's physician indicated she suffered irreversible brain damage due to a lack of blood flow and oxygen, leading to her brain swelling and subsequent brain death on September 8, 2000, with removal from a ventilator the following day. A medical examiner noted injuries indicative of sexual assault, with ligature strangulation as the cause of death.

In a related case, Rivera abducted and sexually assaulted 17-year-old Tabitha Bosdell, ultimately strangling her and disposing of her body near Interstate-20. Investigators later found skeletal remains identified as Bosdell's through dental records. The court concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support Rivera's conviction on all charges. Rivera claimed trial court error for not allowing expert testimony linking frontal lobe dysfunction to criminality but failed to object during the trial, barring the issue on appeal. The trial court properly exercised discretion under the Harper analysis, determining that the theory presented lacked scientific verifiability for admissibility in court.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting similar transaction evidence related to the murder of Tabitha Bosdell and the rapes and murders of Melissa Dingess and Tiffany Wilson, as it complied with the requirements set out in Williams v. State. The court established that: (1) the defendant committed each similar transaction, (2) there was a sufficient connection between the acts in the indictment and the proffered transactions, and (3) the evidence was introduced for valid purposes, such as demonstrating the defendant's mindset. The appellate review found no clear error in the trial court's decision, and the claim of undue prejudice was dismissed due to the trial court's comprehensive limiting instructions.

Additionally, Rivera contested the admission of audiotaped statements made to police, arguing they were involuntary due to his medical condition and the invocation of his right to counsel. However, it was determined that being hospitalized or on medication does not automatically make statements involuntary. Rivera was assessed as capable of understanding his situation, had read and acknowledged his Miranda rights, and had voluntarily signed a waiver. The court’s findings on the admissibility of the statements were supported by evidence. Rivera’s assertion that subsequent statements should not have been admitted due to his earlier request for counsel was rejected, as it was established he did not properly reinitiate contact with police following that request.

Rivera requested to speak with his wife before deciding whether to continue discussions with police. Investigators facilitated this telephone conversation and learned that Rivera wanted to reinitiate contact with them. Citing *Oregon v. Bradshaw*, Rivera contended that the State did not demonstrate a valid waiver of his right to counsel upon reinitiating contact. The court noted that Rivera's initial statement about needing a lawyer did not clearly invoke his right to counsel, which would have required the police to stop questioning him. Testimony confirmed that Rivera initiated further communication with police, confirmed his desire to do so, and was re-read his Miranda rights, which he acknowledged and waived without coercion from police. The court found no merit in Rivera's claim that allowing him to speak with his wife undermined the Edwards rule. The court also noted that it is standard practice for suspects to speak with family members while in custody, and previous cases indicated that such interactions do not invoke Miranda protections. Rivera's reinitiated communication was deemed knowing and intelligent, resulting in no error in the trial process. Additionally, the trial court appropriately limited Rivera's cross-examination of his ex-wife regarding their domestic life, as it was irrelevant to the guilt/innocence determination. Lastly, the court found no reversible error regarding a photograph identification made by a victim's husband, as Rivera did not object during the trial.

In Jones v. State, the trial court appropriately dismissed a juror who arrived late from lunch due to ongoing childcare issues, exercising its discretion under OCGA § 15-12-172. The court's decision was supported by the juror's tardiness as a valid reason for dismissal and replacement with an alternate juror.

Following the jury's guilty verdicts, Rivera sought to discuss matters with the trial court, leading to a colloquy regarding his defense strategies, including his interest in potential hybrid representation as co-counsel. Rivera argued on appeal that the court improperly imposed this co-counsel role without confirming his competency to manage his defense. The court must ensure a defendant understands the risks of self-representation, as established in Faretta v. California. Although a defendant can represent himself, they cannot demand co-counsel status unless permitted by the court.

The trial transcript indicated that Rivera did not desire self-representation but wanted his attorneys to advocate for his interests. He expressed dissatisfaction with their trial strategy and inquired about dismissing them, without making a clear request to represent himself. The appellate court noted that Rivera acted as an engaged client rather than a co-counsel, guiding his counsel in some decisions without relinquishing his right to representation. Consequently, the trial court was not obligated to further explain Rivera's rights or ascertain the voluntariness of his representation decision, as he did not waive his right to counsel.

Rivera argues that the trial court failed to ensure his competency to manage his defense, which would violate constitutional law if he were mentally incompetent. The court mandated a pretrial evaluation under OCGA 17-7-130.1 and 17-7-131, including a neurological exam and MRI. A neurologist testified that Rivera was not mentally ill and possessed above-average intelligence. The record does not show any indication of incompetence that would require the trial court to conduct a sua sponte competency inquiry. The court previously found Rivera competent during a competency hearing before trial. The defendant retains the authority to make key decisions regarding defense strategy, including whether to testify or present mitigation witnesses.

Rivera's claim that the trial court's jury instruction on intent and presumption of sound mind unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof is unsupported. The instruction aligns with Georgia law, which presumes sanity and treats insanity as an affirmative defense. The trial court's guidance was consistent with established legal standards.

During the sentencing phase, the prosecutor referenced Rivera's potential future dangerousness, which is permissible if grounded in trial evidence. Rivera expressed a desire for a death sentence, indicating an inability to control his violent fantasies, particularly toward his victims. Given his murder conviction, he faced a minimum life sentence, limiting his potential victims to those within the prison environment.

Rivera's involvement in multiple physical fights while incarcerated demonstrated that his violent tendencies were not mitigated by imprisonment, supporting the State's argument that he posed a danger to prison staff. The trial court acted within its discretion by denying Rivera's motion for a mistrial and his request for curative instructions, as the State's arguments were logically derived from the evidence presented. Rivera's challenge to a rhetorical question posed by the prosecutor regarding future victims was deemed valid but not reversible due to his failure to object at trial. The appellate court determined that even if the argument was improper, it did not likely alter the trial's outcome.

Rivera's assertion that the trial court restricted his ability to argue against the death penalty as a deterrent was unfounded, as he could not introduce evidence not presented at trial. Furthermore, he waived this argument by abandoning it before the trial court's ruling. During jury deliberations, the trial court received a request from jurors to adjourn for the evening. Although Rivera's counsel suggested a less emphatic response, no formal objection was made, resulting in waiver of that issue on appeal. Ultimately, the court found no coercion in the jury's verdict, noting the deliberation timeline indicated sufficient time for consideration.

The jury did not indicate to the trial court that it was deadlocked during deliberations. In a referenced case, the verdict was not coerced despite prolonged deliberation, as jurors communicated their deadlock and were given a modified Allen charge. Upon reaching a verdict, all jurors affirmed it was rendered freely and voluntarily. The death sentence was determined not to be influenced by passion or prejudice. The jury recommended the death sentence based on statutory aggravating circumstances: the murder occurred during the commission of another capital felony (rape), during an aggravated battery, and was determined to be wantonly vile, involving torture or depravity. Although the jury's finding regarding torture and depravity was disjunctive rather than conjunctive, this did not necessitate a reversal as other valid aggravating circumstances supported the death sentence. Evidence showed that the defendant, Rivera, engaged in brutal attacks on multiple victims, including detailed confessions of rape and murder. The crimes, aligned with past cases, justified the death penalty. The sentence was deemed neither excessive nor disproportionate, and the judgment was affirmed with concurrence from all Justices.

Rivera was indicted on multiple charges, including the rape and murder of Glista, whose offenses occurred on September 4, 2000, and she died on September 9, 2000. He was also charged with the rape of Bosdell on June 29, 2000, and Barton on October 10, 2000. The Richmond County grand jury indicted him on October 24, 2000, for these crimes, with a subsequent indictment for Bosdell's murder in Columbia County, where her remains were found. The State announced its intention to seek the death penalty on October 25, 2000, later amending it on January 23, 2004. Rivera's trial commenced on January 5, 2004, resulting in a conviction on all counts and a jury recommendation for the death penalty on January 26, 2004. The trial court imposed consecutive life sentences for three counts of rape and four counts of aggravated sodomy, along with twenty-year sentences for four counts of aggravated assault and one count of burglary with intent to commit murder, and a five-year sentence for possession of a knife during an aggravated assault. Rivera filed a motion for a new trial on February 19, 2004, amending it on January 9, 2006; the amended motion was denied on July 11, 2006. He filed a notice of appeal on July 25, 2006, which was docketed on September 22, 2006, and orally argued on February 28, 2007.