Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.

Citations: 585 F. Supp. 1143; 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1111Docket: Civ. A. No. 74-AR-0469-S

Court: District Court, N.D. Alabama; April 30, 1984; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

After decertifying the class action, the Court permitted 23 individual plaintiffs to present evidence against American Cast Iron Pipe Company (ACIPCO) for separate claims. Following the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ cases on December 30, 1983, the Court granted motions to dismiss two plaintiffs under Rule 41(b) and expressed skepticism regarding the evidence from the remaining 21 plaintiffs but required ACIPCO to continue its defense.

The common features among the plaintiffs include:

1. All plaintiffs are female, thus protected under Title VII against employment discrimination. Three plaintiffs also claim protection under the Equal Pay Act.
2. The Court allowed imprecision in individual pleadings, meaning plaintiffs were not required to specify the exact discriminatory acts they faced. Commonly alleged discrimination includes issues related to job assignments, training, compensation, transfers, advancement, bonuses, pensions, maternity leave, and sexual harassment.
3. Plaintiffs assert their claims as disparate treatment, not disparate impact, requiring proof of specific discriminatory actions directed at each individual based on sex.
4. Historical and current gender distribution in job classifications at ACIPCO does not inherently prove individual claims of disparate treatment; it may, however, inform the examination of specific incidents.
5. ACIPCO's defense is centered around the assertion that no intentional discrimination occurred against any plaintiff, claiming any perceived differences in treatment are either imagined or based on reasonable evaluations compared to male and female coworkers.
6. The claims of the two black plaintiffs may be influenced by a prior consent decree from the case Pettway v. ACIPCO, which requires further examination to reconcile with the current cases.

The Court’s opinion will consider these factors as it assesses the claims against ACIPCO.

The Court confirms its prior finding from December 30, 1983, that plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence of disparate treatment in discipline, violations of Title VII regarding pregnancy and maternity benefits, or sexual harassment tolerated by ACIPCO. A thorough review of the record continues to show no convincing proof of disparate treatment concerning bonuses, pensions, job assignments, benefits, or training opportunities. The Court notes that the plaintiffs expressed dissatisfaction over ACIPCO's lack of an affirmative action program aimed at benefiting women, but clarifies that such a claim was not part of the original complaint and lacks merit under Title VII, as highlighted in Ferguson v. Veterans Administration, which established that failure to implement an affirmative action plan does not constitute a Title VII violation without evidence of discrimination.

Regarding the Pettway case, a consent decree signed on July 14, 1980, mandates that ACIPCO and its associates refrain from discriminatory practices based on race, religion, sex, or national origin and comply with Title VII in employment practices. The decree grants special privileges to certain black employees who were employed between April 1, 1971, and June 12, 1975, if it is determined that they experienced discrimination. The decree also addresses complex employment issues at ACIPCO, including seniority rights, job transfers, and promotional rights, and establishes a grievance procedure and an implementation committee to ensure compliance.

The Court acknowledges the complexity of the Pettway decree but refrains from commenting on its overall implications. It notes that the current case was assigned to a different judge than Pettway, yet seeks to reconcile findings with Pettway's rulings. Two black female plaintiffs, Waldrop and Terry, are identified as members of the affected class in Pettway and have received relief for discriminatory practices under Title VII. The Court raises questions regarding the ability of plaintiffs to pursue multiple claims based on different discriminatory grounds, particularly when one case is a class action. Furthermore, it highlights potential adverse effects of the Pettway affirmative action decree on 19 white female plaintiffs competing in the workplace. Witness testimony during the trial reflected varying interpretations of the Pettway decree, leaving the Court uncertain about its relevance.

Regarding Equal Pay Act claims, the Court intends to evaluate them similarly to Title VII claims of disparate treatment in compensation, without delving into concepts like 'adverse impact.' Plaintiffs must prove that the jobs compared require equal skill, effort, and responsibility. The Eleventh Circuit does not accept the 'comparable worth' analysis favored by many plaintiffs, thus requiring a strict examination of evidence related to claims of pay differentials based on sex. The Court concludes that progress made by women entering clerical positions at ACIPCO and the reduction of previous discrimination stemmed from EEOC claims initiated by the plaintiffs leading to this lawsuit.

Females have gained access to plant clerical jobs, and there is no longer any rule preventing them from holding such positions at ACIPCO; any existing rule was not proven in this case. The Court will analyze 21 claims of disparate treatment, starting with three plaintiffs under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. 

Annette Cox, an ACIPCO employee since 1968, filed her EEOC claim in 1972 but only sought job transfers in 1978. Despite claiming pay disparity with male counterparts, she failed to prove that her job was comparable to theirs or that she actively sought those positions. The Court found no evidence of intimidation against women at ACIPCO after her EEOC filing, and noted that seniority played a significant role under the Pettway consent decree, which she did not adequately challenge. Cox moved into a plant clerical position with equal pay, and thus her claims under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII were dismissed due to lack of credible evidence.

Brenda Morgan's case presented more substance. She began as a key punch operator in 1970 and was denied a departmental clerk position in 1971, ostensibly due to an implicit policy against women, with a male being hired instead. After scoring higher on a programming test in 1972, she was again denied a computer operator position. Morgan subsequently applied for several clerical positions but was denied each time. Her EEOC claim, filed after these denials, led to this lawsuit. The Court recognized her qualifications and linked her job denials to her gender, noting a pay differential of $200 to $300 per month for comparable positions between office and plant clerical roles, although she did not specify the pay differences in her applications.

The Court concluded that the plaintiff met her burden of proof under Title VII but not under the Equal Pay Act. Her damages for not receiving a job transfer due to sex from 1971 to 1979 amounted to $19,200. The Court noted that neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit supports a 'value of the job' analysis for different jobs under the Equal Pay Act; a female plaintiff must show substantial evidence that her job and a male's job are essentially the same. The Court criticized the analysis in American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. State as impractical and inconsistent with market conditions, emphasizing that the remedy involves ensuring job accessibility for both sexes. 

The plaintiff, Joyce Pandellis, failed to demonstrate job equivalence or compensation disparity; she compared her salaried position as a computer operator to a departmental clerk with different responsibilities and skills. Her application for a computer programmer role was denied due to lack of qualifications and openings. Although she alleged retaliation threats for her EEOC complaint, these claims were not part of the pleadings, and there was no evidence that any threats were realized.

Joyce Crane, who worked as a key punch operator, did not establish how many qualified males applied for her position or how many females applied for accounting clerks. She could not prove that her job was equal to those she compared it to, nor did she demonstrate any intentional discrimination required under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act.

Glenda Glenn, employed as a salaried stenographer, became the second female clerk in the plant. Prior to the EEOC claims, women at ACIPCO did not pursue plant jobs. There was a significant distinction between salaried and hourly paid positions, recognized in a previous consent decree, complicating comparisons. Glenn successfully transferred from her salaried job to an hourly clerk position, earning the same hourly rate as her male counterparts.

Each job at the plant is assigned a numbered rating, ensuring uniform pay for employees within the same classification, unlike salaried workers who have varying salary ranges. Glenn, who accepted the first hourly job she applied for, cannot claim discrimination under Title VII regarding transfer refusals. Her primary concern appears to be a denied raise, for which she failed to identify a comparable male employee who received one. The Court noted that Title VII does not involve job performance evaluations, and Glenn’s feelings of being patronized do not constitute a violation.

Huffman’s principal issue revolves around her job title change from ‘supervisor’ to ‘administrative assistant’ after a restructuring, which did not affect her salary. This title change does not equate to a demotion based on sex and does not support a Title VII claim. Although she applied for other positions, ACIPCO provided valid reasons for hiring others, suggesting those candidates had equal or superior qualifications. The Court emphasized the difficulty of proving discrimination in subjective evaluations based on job performance.

Black, employed since 1974, argued she was unfairly assigned a different desk than her male counterparts and claimed male clerks earned more. However, she did not demonstrate that their jobs were equivalent or that she was denied a position due to her sex. While wage disparities can be challenged under Title VII, substantial similarity in job duties must be proven, and Black admitted that her job differed from those she compared it to.

Edwards, who began working in 1965 and took maternity leave in 1971, did not return due to a loss of seniority. The policy of not holding positions during maternity leave was not a violation of federal law at that time, and she did not apply for comparable hourly jobs to support her claims.

The document outlines the legal findings regarding several employees' claims of sex discrimination under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 

1. **Claim Failure**: One employee did not invoke the Equal Pay Act and admitted to being unable to compare her job to those of male counterparts, failing to establish a case for disparate treatment based on sex.

2. **Jewell Smith**: Employed at ACIPCO from 1973 to 1980, Smith did not provide evidence that her termination was sex-based. Discussions about her absenteeism occurred prior to her termination, but no specific reasons were provided. Her claim of unequal pay relied on a 'comparable worth' theory, which does not support a Title VII claim.

3. **Julia Womble**: Womble worked as a secretary in the engineering department since 1974 and claimed that a male clerk with less responsibility earned more. Despite acknowledging her job's importance, the Court could not intervene in ACIPCO's job classification and rejected her claim based on comparable worth.

4. **Glenda Duncan**: Employed since 1971, Duncan moved to clerical roles and received equal pay to her male counterparts. She experienced a discriminatory medical benefits policy, which was later rectified, but this issue was not compensable in her case. Her role highlighted the historical pay disparity between male and female job classifications, but she did not establish a Title VII claim for sex discrimination.

5. **Rebecca Self**: Self worked at ACIPCO starting in 1971, transitioning roles until 1977 when she sought a higher-paying plant job.

Overall, none of the employees successfully proved their claims of sex discrimination or wage disparity under Title VII.

In 1982, the individual achieved a transfer to a billing clerk position in the shipping department after being denied similar transfers from 1977 to 1982, allegedly due to sex discrimination. The pay difference between office clerical and plant clerical positions was noted to be $200 to $300 monthly in favor of the latter. During the period in question, two white men and one black man, with less seniority than her, were awarded plant jobs she applied for. She faced discouragement from male supervisors, indicating a sexually motivated refusal to transfer her to a higher-paying, qualified position. Although her supervisors may have had fondness for her work, their actions reflected a patronizing bias, constituting a violation of Title VII. Consequently, she was awarded $15,000 in damages.

Mary Jane Seabury, the first female to transfer to a plant clerical position at ACIPCO in 1973, experienced initial rejection likely due to her gender. Although she later succeeded in securing a position, her claims of ongoing sex discrimination, including harassment and promotion refusals, were not substantiated. The court found no evidence of sexual harassment from ACIPCO and deemed the reasons for her promotion denials legitimate and non-discriminatory.

Jerri Ogletree, hired in 1972 as a steno-clerk, requested job changes in 1974 and 1975 but did not specify desired positions.

Mary Dianne Lee worked as a clerk in valve sales at ACIPCO from 1973 and claimed she deserved merit raises but provided no evidence of applying for higher-paying positions. Her reliance on the "comparable worth" theory was noted as not applicable under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. Karen Williams, employed as a clerk in valve sales from 1974, sought a transfer to a plant clerical position from 1974 to 1979, facing various rejections. The Court noted instances of discrimination related to her father's employment and seniority issues, concluding she would have likely succeeded in her transfer sooner if not for her sex. However, no discrimination was found during her employment from 1974 to 1979. The Court assessed her damages at $5,200 due to the pay differential she experienced. Beverly Ann Walker, employed as a plant clerical worker since 1974, received equal pay to her male counterparts but served primarily as a witness in the case. She sought a job reevaluation for higher pay but lost her appeal as per the Pettway decree.

The document addresses the claims of several employees at ACIPCO regarding discrimination and internal promotion procedures. 

1. **General Observations**: Feelings of condescension and judgment from male colleagues do not constitute sufficient evidence to bypass ACIPCO's internal promotional procedures, which are validated by the Pettway case. Once Walker engaged these procedures, she likely forfeited her claims related to this case.

2. **Daphne Gay Johnson**: Employed since 1979 as a medical invoicing typist, Johnson has applied for clerical positions but has not been selected. The Court finds no evidence linking her unsuccessful applications to gender discrimination, noting the limited availability of clerical jobs and her relatively short tenure with ACIPCO. Johnson failed to provide proof regarding the qualifications of those who were hired.

3. **Judy Lockard**: A key punch operator since 1970 and promoted to supervisor in 1979, Lockard claimed discrimination when a male was hired for a payroll clerk position she applied for, despite having similar qualifications. After her termination in 1979, she did not provide evidence to support claims of gender bias or to compare her pay with that of successful applicants. The Court concluded that she did not demonstrate disparate treatment based on sex.

4. **Velma Waldrop**: As the first black female clerk at ACIPCO, Waldrop has faced challenges in promotions despite sponsorship from her supervisor. She filed an EEOC charge alleging both race and sex discrimination. However, her case is complicated by her status as a member of the plaintiff class in Pettway, which has already addressed racial discrimination claims. The Court found no basis to separate the impacts of race and sex discrimination in her case and indicated that if ACIPCO fails to comply with the Pettway decree, Waldrop can seek remedies through that framework. 

5. **Patricia Ann Terry**: Terry, who applied for a typist position and began as a file clerk in 1977, is also noted as a black employee, but further details regarding her claims are not provided. 

Overall, the Court determined that none of the women provided sufficient evidence to support their claims of gender discrimination, and existing legal frameworks, particularly Pettway, limit their avenues for relief.

Testimony revealed that the plaintiff disagreed with the assessment of her typing as sloppy and attempted to compare her job to allegedly higher-paying positions without adequately demonstrating the differences. The court highlighted that the plaintiff did not seek a clerical job at an hourly wage and found her claims conflicted with the preclusive effect of the Pettway case, particularly as she is a member of its plaintiff class. The court expressed sympathy for the plaintiffs' counsel regarding the varying outcomes for the clients involved. It considered the individual cases of the remaining plaintiffs while ignoring certain limitations related to class certification, statute of limitations issues, and EEOC prerequisites. The court noted that the 19 white plaintiffs did not challenge the Pettway consent decree, avoiding complications regarding reverse discrimination claims. It clarified that non-parties to the Pettway decree are not bound by it, emphasizing due process rights. The court identified violations of Title VII related to ACIPCO’s past policy of restricting clerical jobs to men but declined to issue injunctive relief due to the existing Pettway injunction. Although the court found discrimination affecting three plaintiffs, it recognized that all plaintiffs contributed to a significant change in ACIPCO's policies. This change opened up plant jobs, resulting from their litigation efforts. The court invited plaintiffs' counsel to request attorney's fees, encouraging settlement discussions between the parties. An order will follow this opinion.