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McCoy v. Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc.

Citations: 593 F.3d 737; 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 1634; 2010 WL 273893Docket: 08-2818

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; January 26, 2010; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case involves Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc.'s appeal following a jury verdict assigning 70% of the liability for a worker's injury to Augusta, with the remaining fault apportioned to Lion Oil and the injured worker himself. Initially, the injured worker and his wife sued Lion Oil, leading to a complex procedural history involving multiple parties including Augusta and the employer, Custom Fiberglass Products. Augusta challenged the jury's inability to apportion fault to Custom, citing Arkansas Code Annotated 16-55-202, but recent state Supreme Court rulings invalidated the nonparty-fault provision. The court also refused Augusta's jury instruction proposal regarding intervening proximate cause, upholding instructions that required proof of an independent event causing the damage. Additionally, the exclusion of an occupational therapist's report was contested by Augusta, but the court found no reversible error due to non-disclosure as an expert witness. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment, maintaining that fault could not be apportioned to Custom and that jury instructions were appropriate. Augusta's evidentiary challenges were also dismissed, as the court exercised its discretion in managing trial proceedings and evidentiary issues. The verdict held Augusta significantly liable for the manufacturing defect that led to the worker's injury, underscoring the importance of compliance with procedural and evidentiary standards in complex liability cases.

Legal Issues Addressed

Apportionment of Fault Under Arkansas Law

Application: The court determined that the jury could not apportion fault to Custom due to its immunity under Arkansas law, consistent with a recent Arkansas Supreme Court decision invalidating the nonparty-fault provision.

Reasoning: Consequently, the district court's refusal to permit fault apportionment to Custom was deemed appropriate.

Exclusion of Expert Testimony Under Federal Rules

Application: The district court excluded the occupational therapist's report because Augusta did not disclose the therapist as an expert witness, and the report contained hearsay.

Reasoning: The McCoys argue that the district court correctly excluded the report due to hearsay statements and because O'Dell was not disclosed as an expert witness nor was his report provided during discovery.

Federal Rule of Evidence 106 – Completeness

Application: Augusta's argument for admitting the entire report under Rule 106 was denied because it did not specify relevant portions to be admitted, similar to the precedent set in United States v. Flentge.

Reasoning: In this case, Augusta's counsel did not specify why the entire report should be admitted or identify relevant portions, similar to the situation in United States v. Flentge.

Intervening/Superseding Proximate Cause

Application: Augusta's proposed jury instruction on intervening proximate cause was rejected, as the court found that the existing instructions sufficiently included the concept and did not exclude Custom's conduct.

Reasoning: The district court's instructions allowed the jury to consider Custom's fault as an intervening cause, as it stated that Augusta bore the burden of proving an independent intervening event caused the damage.