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Collins v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Citations: 813 P.2d 804; 15 Brief Times Rptr. 226; 1991 Colo. App. LEXIS 48; 1991 WL 25020Docket: 90CA0810
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals; February 28, 1991; Colorado; State Appellate Court
Ralph W. Collins sought judicial review after the Industrial Claim Appeals Office disqualified him from receiving unemployment benefits. Collins, a former foreman for L.P.W. Incorporated, quit his job in April 1989 following a wage reduction and increased health insurance contributions, believing he had secured a better position with another company. After separating from that second company in September 1989, he filed for unemployment benefits. The hearing officer determined he did not meet the eligibility criteria under the applicable statutes, specifically 8-73-108(4)(f) and 8-73-108(5)(e), leading to his disqualification. Collins argued that the original statute entitled him to benefits when he quit for a better job, and claimed that the Panel's use of the amended statute, effective July 1, 1989, was a retrospective application that violated the Colorado Constitution. The court noted that the amendment narrowed eligibility for construction workers leaving jobs for better opportunities, disallowing claims from other workers. It clarified that Collins, not being a construction worker, could not claim benefits under the amended statute, which he sought only after the new rules were in effect. There was no violation of the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws since the right to benefits did not accrue until after the amendment took effect, and the prior statute's criteria were not an exclusive basis for benefits. Entitlement to unemployment benefits under the prior version of 8-73-108(4)(f) could not be established until the claimant had separated from the new job he accepted, contrary to his argument that benefits accrued upon leaving his previous job at L.P.W. in March 1989. The determination of any entitlement to benefits could only occur after his separation from the better job in September 1989. The claimant's assertion that he was inappropriately deemed ineligible due to fault was rejected, as the statute, which allowed benefits if he remained at the better job for 90 days, was not applied retroactively. "Fault" is defined distinctly within the unemployment statutes and does not solely determine eligibility for benefits. Additionally, the claimant's argument for benefits due to substantial unfavorable changes in working conditions was dismissed. The hearing officer found that conditions affecting the claimant were consistent with those impacting all employees at L.P.W. during a broader economic slowdown, and there was no evidence that the claimant protested these changes or sought other employment. Therefore, the Panel's denial of benefits was affirmed on all counts.