Bouker v. Cigna Corp.

Citations: 847 F. Supp. 337; 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2920; 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1189; 1994 WL 100368Docket: Civ. A. 94-0039

Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania; March 15, 1994; Federal District Court

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Claims of age discrimination in employment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the New York Human Rights Law (NYHRL) were brought by Edmund P. Bouker against CIGNA Corporation following Bouker's termination after 31 years of employment with Equicor, which CIGNA had acquired. Bouker, who was 52 at the time of termination, alleged that he was replaced by a younger employee, age 33, who did not have the same case management responsibilities. Bouker filed discrimination charges with both the EEOC and the New York State Division of Human Rights, but more than 60 days passed without a final determination from either agency.

CIGNA moved to dismiss the NYHRL claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court considered the allegations in Bouker's complaint as true, assessing whether he could be entitled to relief. Given that the NYHRL claim was asserted in conjunction with the federal ADEA claim, the court found it had supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim and determined that New York law would apply in this case. Ultimately, the court granted CIGNA's motion to dismiss the NYHRL claim, indicating it would not proceed.

Under New York law, age discrimination in employment is classified as an "unlawful discriminatory practice" (N.Y.Exec. Law 296(1)(a)). Individuals claiming to be aggrieved can file a verified complaint (administrative charge) with the appropriate division. Filing an administrative charge precludes the claimant from pursuing a NYHRL claim in court unless the complaint was initiated by the EEOC, which does not count as a filing under this statute. New York courts interpret N.Y.Exec. Law 297(9) to mean that a claimant who files an administrative charge elects the administrative forum, barring judicial claims. This interpretation holds that if an attorney files the charge on behalf of the claimant, it still constitutes an election of the administrative forum. The case at hand involves Bouker, who argues that his attorney's filing does not represent his election of remedy, comparing it to an EEOC referral. The statute's language suggests that an attorney's filing indeed indicates the claimant's election of the administrative route, reinforcing that the statutory procedure allows for an attorney to file on behalf of the claimant. Statutory construction principles support this interpretation, as adopting Bouker's view would create unfair disparities between represented and unrepresented claimants, leading to unreasonable consequences.

Bouker's proposed exception to the "election of remedies" rule would undermine its purpose, leading to a meaningless application of the New York statute. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius indicates that the statute applies broadly, with specific exclusions. The only exception explicitly stated in the statute occurs when the EEOC automatically refers a charge to the Division, implying no other exclusions exist, including an attorney's filing of an administrative charge on behalf of a claimant. Legislative history from the 1991 amendments confirms that the intent was to overrule a prior case and restore claimants' options without imposing forced elections, thereby limiting exceptions to the EEOC's automatic referral.

Bouker's argument equating his attorney's filing to the EEOC's referral is rejected; the EEOC's referral is an administrative action that does not engage the claimant, whereas an attorney is hired for expertise and must inform the claimant of their legal options. Therefore, an attorney's filing reflects a true election of remedies, distinguishing it from a forced election. Consequently, CIGNA's motion to dismiss Bouker's New York Human Rights Law claim is granted, resulting in the dismissal of the claim with prejudice. The order is dated March 14, 1994, and notes the relevance of who filed the charge, which was confirmed to be Bouker's attorney for compliance with ADEA requirements. The issue of supplemental jurisdiction regarding Bouker's NYHRL claim is not contested and will not be addressed.

N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a) prohibits age discrimination by employers in hiring, employment, and compensation. The term "any local commission on human rights" includes the state's Division of Human Rights. Amendments to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(9) in 1991 and 1992 clarified that filing a complaint with the EEOC does not count as a complaint under § 297(9), establishing a procedural distinction for claimants. This "election of remedies" rule means that claimants in New York cannot pursue ADEA claims until 60 days after initiating state administrative proceedings, and once an administrative charge is filed with the state, they are barred from filing a NYHRL claim in court. The EEOC automatically refers charges to the appropriate state agency, which aids compliance with the state filing requirement. The 1991 and 1992 amendments created an exception to the election of remedies rule in cases of automatic referral by the EEOC. Pro se claimants might not be aware of this exception, increasing their disadvantage. The statute differentiates between filings by claimants, their attorneys, and the EEOC, suggesting intentional exclusion of attorney filings from the exception. There is no legislative history for the 1992 amendments, but similarities to the 1991 amendments provide context for interpretation.