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AKROSIL DIV. OF INTERN. PAPER v. Ritrama Duramark

Citations: 847 F. Supp. 623; 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 46; 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2429; 1994 WL 64945Docket: 93-C-254

Court: District Court, E.D. Wisconsin; February 16, 1994; Federal District Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, Akrosil Division of International Paper Company sued Ritrama Duramark, Inc. for breach of contract regarding unpaid siliconized paper liners. Akrosil sought damages for the unpaid amount, while Ritrama counterclaimed, alleging a breach of a settlement agreement from June 25, 1992. This dispute centered around whether the alleged 'Minneapolis agreement' constituted a settlement or a modification under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) subject to the statute of frauds. Akrosil moved for summary judgment on Ritrama's counterclaim, asserting that the statute of frauds rendered the agreement unenforceable. The court denied the motion, citing unresolved factual disputes about the agreement's nature and applicability of the U.C.C., and the predominant factor test's role in classifying mixed agreements. The decision left the factual assessment to a jury, emphasizing the complexity of the agreement's classification and the need for further fact-finding concerning whether it was primarily a goods or services contract. Consequently, the court ruled against granting summary judgment, allowing Ritrama's counterclaim to proceed to trial.

Legal Issues Addressed

Classification of Mixed Agreements

Application: The court applied the predominant factor test to determine whether the Minneapolis agreement is subject to the U.C.C., considering whether it involved goods or services. The ambiguity surrounding the agreement's primary purpose led to the denial of summary judgment.

Reasoning: A key issue for the court's consideration is whether the Minneapolis agreement is classified as a settlement agreement or a contract for the sale of goods.

Statute of Frauds under U.C.C.

Application: Akrosil argued that the Minneapolis agreement was a contract modification subject to the U.C.C.'s statute of frauds. The court determined that factual disputes about the agreement's nature precluded summary judgment based on this argument.

Reasoning: Akrosil argues for dismissal of this counterclaim, citing the statute of frauds, which requires a written agreement for sales over $500, asserting that no sufficient writing exists to indicate a contract.

Statute of Frauds under Wisconsin Law

Application: Ritrama contended that Wisconsin's general statute of frauds did not apply to the Minneapolis agreement, arguing it could be performed within one year. This issue remained unresolved due to factual ambiguities.

Reasoning: Ritrama also asserts that Wisconsin's general statute of frauds, Wis. Stat. 241.02(1), does not apply because the Minneapolis agreement could have been performed within one year.

Summary Judgment Standard

Application: The legal standard for summary judgment requires the absence of genuine issues of material fact, evaluated in favor of the nonmoving party. In this case, the court found that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the nature of the Minneapolis agreement, thus denying the motion for summary judgment.

Reasoning: The legal standard for summary judgment requires the absence of genuine issues of material fact, evaluated in favor of the nonmoving party.