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California Democratic Party v. Jones
Citations: 984 F. Supp. 1288; 1997 WL 725980Docket: CIV. S-96-2038 DFL
Court: District Court, E.D. California; November 24, 1997; Federal District Court
Proposition 198, adopted by California voters in March 1996, transformed the state's primary elections from a closed system to an open or blanket primary system, allowing all voters to participate regardless of their party affiliation. Under the new law, all eligible voters, including those unaffiliated with any political party, can vote for any candidate in the primary elections. This contrasts with the previous closed primary system, where voters could only vote for candidates within their registered party. Proposition 198 mandates that only one ballot be provided for all voters, with candidates listed randomly, not by party affiliation. The political parties involved in the lawsuit argue that this change infringes upon their First Amendment right to association. However, the court determined that Proposition 198 is constitutional and valid, allowing voters greater freedom in selecting candidates across party lines, with the candidate receiving the most votes for each party becoming that party's nominee for the general election. Registered voters in California can now participate in a blanket primary, allowing individuals to vote for candidates across party lines, such as a Democratic voter selecting a Republican for Governor and a Democrat for Assembly. This system enables both independent voters and those registered with a party to vote in the primaries of any party. Proponents of Proposition 198, which instituted this change, argued that closed primaries promote extremism, legislative gridlock, and diminish voter choice. They claimed the open primary system would enhance voter participation, foster competition in predominantly single-party districts, make elected officials more accountable to voters, limit special interest influence, and strengthen political parties by ensuring candidates have broader support. Conversely, opponents argued that the proposition infringed upon parties' rights to select their nominees and could lead to political manipulation, likening it to allowing one sports team to influence another's coach selection. Proposition 198 was adopted with significant public support—59.51% of voters approved it, including majorities among Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. The measure received backing across various demographic groups and in every California county, reflecting a long-standing preference for open primaries among Californians. Prior to Proposition 198, California had a closed primary system, where only party members could participate in that party's primary elections. In contrast, the blanket primary allows for more inclusive voter engagement, similar to systems in a few other states, while distinguishing itself from closed and open primary formats found in numerous states. The blanket primary allows voters to choose candidates from any party on a single ballot, differing from traditional primaries that restrict voters to their registered party. This system is in use in Washington and Alaska, with Alaska having adopted it in 1947 and Washington since 1935. Louisiana employs a nonpartisan primary model where the top two candidates advance to a subsequent election, irrespective of party affiliation. Ongoing debates persist regarding the merits of closed versus open primaries, with no consensus reached. The political parties involved in this case maintain bylaws that restrict primary voting to registered party members. Specifically, the California Democratic Party requires voters to be registered Democrats, and the Republican Party seeks similar restrictions. The California Democratic Party, alongside the Peace and Freedom Party and Libertarian Party, is challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 198, which facilitates open primaries, and seeks an injunction against its implementation. The case highlights two contrasting views: political parties as autonomous entities selecting their leaders versus primaries as a public electoral process regulated by the state. Both positions are constitutionally supported, emphasizing the conflict between the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of political association and the state's authority to regulate elections. The resolution of this conflict is central to the case. The constitutionality of blanket or open primaries has not been directly addressed by the Supreme Court. In Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, the Court refrained from ruling on Wisconsin's open primary, instead acknowledging the state Supreme Court's finding that it served a compelling state interest. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, while relevant, involved a closed primary scenario and did not allow for examination of state interests in open or blanket primaries. State Supreme Courts in Alaska and Washington have upheld the constitutionality of blanket primaries against First Amendment challenges. Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the open primary did not violate the Democratic Party's associational rights, despite concerns about nonparty members voting in its primary. The Supreme Court has established a framework for evaluating challenges to state election laws based on First Amendment rights, emphasizing a balance between the burden on those rights and the state's justifications for that burden. Severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, while lesser burdens face a less stringent review. The Ninth Circuit has noted that invoking "strict scrutiny" does not guarantee a specific outcome in election law cases, and empirical evidence of state justifications is not always required. In assessing the constitutionality of Proposition 198, the court must evaluate the magnitude of burdens on political parties' associational rights and weigh these against the state's interests. The argument against the blanket primary centers on the concern that it allows nonparty members, potentially antagonistic to the party, to influence key decisions within the party, including issue positions and candidate selection. The Supreme Court in Tashjian invalidated a Connecticut statute that barred nonmembers from voting in party primaries, emphasizing the importance of associational freedoms under the First Amendment. The Court highlighted that political parties must have the autonomy to define their membership and select candidates without state-imposed limitations. While the parties asserted their right to restrict primary voting to members, the Court acknowledged that this interest, though significant, does not outright prohibit states from regulating primary elections. Open primaries, which allow non-party members to vote, were noted as a potential counterexample, suggesting that invalidating all such systems based on party objections would disrupt established election laws and could undermine candidate selection methods considered beneficial by many states. The Court recognized that states possess considerable authority to dictate how parties conduct candidate selection, including the requirement of open primaries for registered voters. The distinction between political parties and private associations was emphasized, as political parties play essential roles in government functions, such as candidate nominations. The Court pointed out that major parties do not exhibit the cohesive membership typical of private organizations, but rather reflect a diverse range of political beliefs. Ultimately, the determination of eligible voters in primaries lies with the states, underscoring the complex relationship between state authority and political party rights. Voters participating in primary elections have not engaged in traditional party affiliation practices, such as paying dues or attending meetings, and their registration alone suffices for voting eligibility. Proposition 198 allows non-party members to vote in party primaries, but this overlooks the complexities of voter behavior in a blanket primary system. The political parties argue that blanket primaries will negatively impact both major and minor parties, predicting significant cross-over voting that could disrupt candidate selection, weaken party discipline, raise election costs, lower morale among party activists, and disturb internal governance. Cross-over voters—those who vote in a party primary different from their registered party—may act with three intentions: (1) "sincere" voting for their preferred candidate to win the general election, (2) "strategic" voting for a second choice to influence the primary outcome, or (3) "raiding" by supporting a weaker candidate in an opposing party to enhance their chances of losing in the general election. The parties believe a blanket primary will increase cross-over voting compared to open primaries because voters can switch for specific contests without forfeiting their own party votes. While evidence suggests more cross-over voting will occur post-Proposition 198, the parties' claims regarding its extent and consequences may be exaggerated, particularly concerning the likelihood of raiding, which political scientists largely dispute. Professor Costantini provided evidence indicating that survey data do not support concerns about the prevalence of raiding, or "mischievous voting," under Proposition 198. In open presidential primaries, 90% to 95% of cross-over voters participate to support a preferred candidate rather than to undermine an opposing candidate. Professor Donald Olson highlighted that the conditions necessary for successful raiding are rarely met, as demonstrated by over fifty years of experience with Washington's blanket primary. Raiding, characterized by cross-party voting to select a weaker candidate in another party's primary, requires several stringent conditions: 1) a lack of meaningful competition in the voter's own party's primary; 2) adequate information to identify a vulnerable opponent; 3) coordinated effort by a significant number of voters; and 4) a willingness to abandon party loyalty. Olson asserted that these conditions are seldom fulfilled in practice. Furthermore, raiding poses little threat to minor parties, whose candidates typically have limited chances in general elections. The plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of significant raiding impacting primary outcomes. Cross-over voting may occasionally represent up to 25% of the vote but usually does not alter election results, instead affecting margins of victory. In Washington, around 10% of voters are cross-over voters, with exceptional instances reaching 20-25%. Cross-over voting is more prevalent in blanket primaries than in open primaries, though not significantly so. Professor Nagler's study found average cross-over rates of 5% in closed primaries, 10% in open primaries, and 11-15% in blanket primaries, concluding that cross-over voting in blanket primaries is not substantially higher than in other open systems. While such voting rarely changes primary outcomes, it is likely that some elections under Proposition 198 will eventually be influenced by cross-over votes. Cross-over voting occurs when voters from a noncompetitive primary party participate in a competitive primary, particularly if the outcome could influence a general election. In California, the likelihood of this phenomenon is heightened during elections, as demonstrated in the 1996 Assembly primaries where asymmetric competition was identified in several races. A cross-over rate of just 5% could have altered election outcomes, and rates in Washington have reached 20-25%, indicating that California may experience similar or even higher cross-over rates in the future. This potential for cross-over voting could shift legislative majorities and influence electoral behaviors. Under a blanket or open primary system, candidates must appeal to a broader electorate rather than just their party base, likely increasing primary campaign costs and altering candidates' political positions. Elected officials may feel less constrained by party expectations, weakening the traditional influence of party activists and possibly dampening their enthusiasm. This dynamic has been observed in Washington and may similarly affect California. The parties express concern that blanket primaries could disrupt their internal governance, fearing that nominees selected by non-party members could compromise the integrity of their governing bodies. However, these arguments are seen as weak, as parties retain the ability to modify their selection processes for Central Committee members. Additionally, the parties may need to adjust their delegate selection procedures for national conventions if blanket primaries are adopted, but this is within their discretion without state interference. Proposition 198 imposes a burden on political parties that is neither "severe" nor "negligible," as it alters the primary election process by allowing non-party members to vote in party primaries, thereby intruding on the parties' traditional rights to select their candidates. Although parties retain the ability to endorse and financially support candidates, the blanket primary system can diminish party control and may affect party morale and discipline. Historical data from other states indicates that such changes have not significantly weakened political parties, as evidenced by the competitiveness of parties in Washington and other states with open primary systems. The burden imposed by Proposition 198 is consistent across all parties and does not suggest any discriminatory intent or impact. Furthermore, the proposition leaves intact various party activities beyond the primary elections. The court concludes that while the blanket primary does impose a significant burden on associational rights, this burden is not severe. For Proposition 198 to be upheld against legal challenges, it must be justified by interests that are important but not necessarily compelling. States maintain broad authority over election conduct, including primaries, which are viewed as a crucial component of the electoral process. Proposition 198 represents a continuation of political reforms initiated during the Progressive Era. Progressives advocated for a democratic system that transcended mere competition between political parties, emphasizing the merits of nonpartisan local elections and reforms such as a comprehensive civil service system, direct legislation through initiatives and referendums, and a cross-filing system allowing candidates from different parties to run in each other's primaries. Proposition 198, aligned with these Progressive principles, aims to enhance electoral democracy and representation by permitting independent voters and minority party members in safe districts to participate in primaries, which traditionally marginalize these groups. Approximately 11% of California's electorate are independents, and many voters in safe districts feel disenfranchised since general elections are often decided in dominant party primaries. This disenfranchisement results in elected officials neglecting the interests of a significant portion of voters. Defendants argue that closed primaries empower party insiders and incumbents, producing candidates who are more partisan and less representative of the broader electorate, leading to legislative gridlock and public alienation from the political process. They contend that many candidates who could garner majority support in general elections fail to advance past the primaries, forcing voters to choose among less favorable options. Although some of these claims may be difficult to substantiate, a number are unchallenged or supported by expert testimony. The arguments are prominently presented in the ballot pamphlet, suggesting that California voters are inclined to support a blanket primary system to foster the election of more representative candidates who are independent of party and special interest influences. Voters in California have shown a preference for reduced partisanship by adopting Proposition 198, which introduces blanket primaries. Defendants argue that this system enhances representativeness and democratic participation by increasing voter turnout, which has notably declined in California over the last two decades. Blanket primaries in other states have recorded higher voter participation, suggesting that offering more choices may motivate greater engagement in elections. While the evidence supporting the competitiveness of blanket primaries compared to other systems is inconclusive, there is potential for more candidates and closer elections, which could also boost turnout. The proposition also addresses voter privacy by allowing participation without mandatory party affiliation disclosure, contrasting with closed primaries. The state has compelling interests in promoting political compromise, stability, and majority representation, as well as reducing factionalism—a concern highlighted by the framers of the Constitution. By enhancing representation and choice, and increasing participation, these interests are paramount. The voters’ perception of fairness in the electoral process is another significant state interest, as Californians feel the system is fairer when independents can participate in candidate selection. Although political parties argue for alternative methods to increase turnout, the blanket primary uniquely facilitates representativeness by allowing all voters to influence candidate choices. Unlike previous cases where parties sought to control primary voter eligibility, Proposition 198 was adopted democratically and serves the interests of the state and electorate rather than the parties. This state's interest outweighs the parties' interest in controlling primary participation. The court refrains from evaluating the blanket primary's overall efficacy, noting that if it proves detrimental, voters can reform the system in the future. The court refrains from determining the appropriateness of voters' desires for a more representative and participatory electoral system or the wisdom of slightly weakening political parties to achieve these goals. Such decisions are left to the state's populace. Each state conducts its own democratic experiments, with election law historically evolving in response to varying political dynamics. The court finds that a blanket primary addresses significant interests, thus allowing California to pursue this electoral method without permanent prohibition. The judgment favors the defendants. Proposition 198 modified the Election Code, affirming that California's primary system has been closed since 1909, with a brief prior experiment with a blanket primary deemed unconstitutional in 1900. Proposition 198 does not impact the election of party committee members, who must be nominated solely by their registered party. The court notes that voters were adequately informed about Proposition 198’s implications, contrasting it with previous cases where voters were misled. Testimony indicated long-standing public support for the concept behind Proposition 198. The distinctions between open and closed primaries are nuanced, highlighting the complexity within these electoral systems. Open primaries are defined as those where voters do not need to publicly declare or have their party preference recorded; about ten states utilize this format. Other states have "semi-open" or "semi-closed" primaries, allowing voters to request any party's ballot while recording their request or stating their party affiliation beforehand. A 1986 Supreme Court decision identified 21 states using classic closed primaries, which decreased to 16 by 1990, indicating potential changes in classification rather than law alterations. The Court also noted four states had blanket primaries, although Virginia's classification as such was likely erroneous due to its regulations against voting for multiple parties. The Democratic National Committee mandates that delegates to its national convention be selected through processes limited to Democrats, while the Republican Party enforces similar rules against blanket and open primaries. Notably, political parties did not actively oppose Proposition 198 during the election. The key legal question was whether a state could require the National Party to accept delegates chosen in violation of its rules, with Justice Powell dissenting on the basis that open primaries served compelling interests. The Court emphasized that its ruling was limited to the specific circumstances presented and did not preclude future challenges to state regulations on primary voting qualifications. The court upheld the constitutionality of the State's closed primary, rejecting challenges from two voters who sought to participate in primary elections without party registration. The court determined that the closed primary serves the legitimate purpose of protecting party members' associational rights. Defendants argued that the majority consent of party members to Proposition 198 eliminated the need for court intervention; however, the court identified three flaws in this argument. First, polls did not include minor party members, making it inaccurate to assume their support for Proposition 198. Second, polling is not a recognized method for decision-making in a democracy, and the court emphasized that legitimate party decisions require formal deliberation and voting by central committees, not merely polling. Third, the court dismissed the notion that the electorate's polling results equate to a formal decision by the party. Additionally, the court noted discrepancies among expert witnesses regarding the classification of states with open primaries, with nearly half allowing non-party members to vote in primaries. The court referenced past cases, such as Smith v. Allwright, which illustrated government limitations on political party membership, and highlighted the Libertarian Party's membership process, underscoring the potential conflict between a party's membership policies and state law. In California, state law classifies all registered voters identifying as Libertarian as members of the party. However, true membership is reserved for individuals who have signed a pledge and paid dues. Other parties, such as the Peace and Freedom Party, also grant membership under specific conditions, like being deprived of voting rights due to age or citizenship. The structure of political parties is often viewed through three lenses: the party in government, the party in the electorate, and the party as an organization. Membership is primarily defined by self-designation; for example, individuals can declare themselves Democrats or Republicans without formal obligations, merely gaining the privilege to participate in candidate nominations. In states with closed primaries, voters may need to inform registrars of party changes ahead of primary elections, while open-primary states do not require formal declarations. Notably, the differences between closed and open primaries are minimal. Some experts differentiate between independents and cross-over voters, and historical examples, such as the 1974 Alaska Republican primary, illustrate strategic voting behavior. Research indicates that a significant portion of voters either consistently vote for one party or cross over in their selections. However, the plaintiffs did not provide substantial evidence demonstrating that cross-over voting significantly impacts minor political parties. A strategic voter is unlikely to participate in a minor party's primary since the winner is not expected to succeed in the general election, and minor parties seldom have contested primaries. Minor parties claim that their primary turnout is disproportionately low compared to the general election, arguing they will be overwhelmed by non-party members who support them in the general election. However, this assumption is challenged as those non-party voters typically favor candidates who were not chosen in major party primaries. Predictions about cross-over voting rates in California, compared to other blanket primary states, remain uncertain. Professor Cain argues against the total removal of blanket primaries, emphasizing the need to protect party autonomy. Professor Olson asserts that the Washington Republican Party is robust and vital for candidate recruitment, endorsements, and fundraising, while the Washington Democratic Party, though not as dynamic, maintains above-average organizational strength. The excerpt highlights the necessity of substantial election regulation to ensure fairness and order in democratic processes, with states developing complex election codes governing various electoral aspects. The debate reflects contrasting views between those advocating for a more democratized, less corrupt political system and those who prefer strong, autonomous political parties. The cross-filing system allows candidates from one party to seek nominations from all parties, but if they fail to secure their own party's nomination, they cannot run in the general election. Dr. Quinn notes that California's cross-filing system, operational from 1911 to 1959, allowed candidates to run in both Democratic and Republican primaries, leading to the winner of one primary typically also securing the other. Incumbents often appeared on the general election ballot as nominees for both parties. A district is deemed "safe" if it has not been contested since the 1991 reapportionment, historically votes for one party, sees minimal campaign spending from both parties in 1994 and 1996, and if the incumbent garners over 55% of the votes. Evidence suggests that officials from states with blanket primaries may align more closely with the general electorate compared to those from closed primary states, with some experts arguing that blanket primary candidates adopt less extreme positions. However, there is disagreement on whether this lack of partisanship is beneficial; some believe it undermines party dynamics by reducing partisan distinction. Defendants argue that blanket primaries could enhance party representation and strength, yet the Supreme Court has been reluctant to prioritize state interests regarding party welfare, asserting that parties should determine their own interests as seen in cases like Tashjian and Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee.