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State, Child Support Enforcement Division v. Bromley

Citations: 987 P.2d 183; 1999 Alas. LEXIS 127Docket: S-7833, S-7883

Court: Alaska Supreme Court; September 17, 1999; Alaska; State Supreme Court

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In the case of State of Alaska, Child Support Enforcement Division v. Keith W. Bromley, the Supreme Court of Alaska addressed a dispute over Bromley's child support payments. Bromley sought a refund from the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED), claiming it exceeded its authority in establishing his support obligation and that Pennsylvania law should govern his child support modification since his child resides there. The court determined that Bromley could not contest CSED's jurisdiction, thus denying his refund request. It upheld the superior court's decision to apply Alaska law for the modification.

CSED appealed, asserting that while the superior court correctly applied Alaska law, it improperly deviated from the Alaska Civil Rule 90.3 formula for calculating child support. The Supreme Court agreed, stating the superior court lacked justification for departing from the formula. Furthermore, it viewed Bromley’s request for modification as an indirect challenge to the validity of the 1993 order, leading to a reversal and remand for reconsideration based on the correct application of the child support formula.

The background of the case includes Bromley’s divorce in Maine in 1985, custody awarded to Patricia Marlar, and subsequent child support adjustments. After Marlar moved to Pennsylvania, CSED established Bromley's support obligation in 1992, which he did not appeal within the required timeframe. In 1996, Bromley registered the Maine order in the superior court, leading to ongoing disputes about the appropriate calculation of his support obligation.

Bromley requested a credit or refund for funds he claimed were wrongfully collected by CSED, arguing that CSED's 1993 establishment of his child support obligation was void ab initio. CSED opposed this claim. After a hearing, Superior Court Judge Ralph R. Beistline modified Bromley's child support obligation, reducing it to $527 per month instead of increasing it, citing unusual circumstances under Alaska Rule 90.3 (c)(1)(A) and stating that CSED had exceeded its statutory authority. CSED challenged this modification, asserting that the court misapplied Rule 90.3, and sought reconsideration, which was granted but did not change the decision. Both parties appealed: CSED contested the downward modification, while Bromley appealed the denial of his refund request and the court's choice not to apply Pennsylvania law.

In the cross-appeal, Bromley argued for a refund of payments exceeding the Maine order, asserting that CSED's 1993 child support order was void due to lack of authority, equating this with lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court will assess whether CSED's establishment of child support was indeed void. It noted that decisions lacking subject matter jurisdiction can be contested, but participation in prior proceedings complicates this. The court referenced the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which outlines conditions under which a judgment can be contested for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, emphasizing that the tribunal must have the authority to adjudicate the matter in question.

None of the three requirements to challenge CSED's jurisdiction are met in this case. First, establishing a child support decree falls within CSED's jurisdiction, as it was created by the legislature to manage child support obligations administratively. Second, even if CSED acted beyond its statutory authority, it did not infringe on another agency's powers, particularly since no parties involved resided in Maine at the time of CSED's actions. This allowed modification of the Maine order under section 611 of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Third, CSED was able to make an informed jurisdictional decision, providing Bromley with the opportunity to contest its jurisdiction and the right to appeal its decision to the superior court, which he did not exercise. As a result, Bromley cannot challenge CSED's subject matter jurisdiction in this instance.

The decision aligns with the precedent set in Dunning, where the superior court ruled that CSED lacked the authority to modify an existing out-of-state order. After initial confusion surrounding terminology, CSED sought clarification on whether its lack of statutory authority equated to a lack of jurisdiction, raising potential issues for over 1,000 related administrative orders. The court clarified that CSED's error did not constitute a manifest abuse of authority, allowing Bromley to contest the validity of the 1993 decision. Furthermore, Bromley’s argument for retroactive effect based on Dunning was rejected, as courts generally do not retroactively modify support orders without special circumstances, which were absent in this case. Thus, Bromley is not entitled to a refund based on the 1993 CSED order.

Retroactive modification of child support payments is only permissible when explicitly authorized by statute, which is not the case here; thus, Bromley is not entitled to a refund for any payments exceeding the Maine order. The determination of which state's law governs the 1996 modification of Bromley’s child support obligation involves a legal question subject to de novo review. Bromley argues for Pennsylvania law due to its connection to Shane, while CSED asserts that the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) mandates the application of Alaska law.

UIFSA, effective in Alaska since January 1, 1996, establishes that only one child support order exists at a time and grants continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to the state that issues the order, as long as a relevant party remains a resident of that state. Since Maine issued the original order, it retained jurisdiction while Bromley, Marlar, or Shane resided there. However, modification by another state is possible if certain conditions are met under AS 25.25.611 (a)(1): all parties must reside outside the issuing state; the non-resident petitioner seeks modification; and the respondent is subject to the tribunal's jurisdiction.

In this case, all conditions are satisfied: Bromley, Marlar, and Shane no longer live in Maine, Marlar (a non-resident) seeks modification, and Bromley is subject to Alaska's jurisdiction. Consequently, the superior court can modify the Maine child support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Regarding which state’s law to apply for the modification, Alaska Statute 25.25.611 (b) indicates that an order from another state is treated as if issued by an Alaska tribunal, meaning Alaska substantive law governs modifications once it assumes jurisdiction. This interpretation is supported by multiple sources, confirming that Alaska’s substantive law, rather than procedural rules alone, applies in this context.

Modification jurisdiction in child support cases, as outlined in UIFSA 611, mandates the application of the forum state's law, which in this instance is Alaska. When a state like Alaska assumes modification jurisdiction due to the issuing state (Maine) losing its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, local law governs the modification of child support obligations. The Oregon Court of Appeals has supported this interpretation, stating that once a court acquires jurisdiction over a foreign support order, it must apply its own law to determine child support amounts.

Alaska Statute AS 25.25.303, akin to UIFSA 303, reinforces that CSED must utilize Alaska's procedural and substantive law when acting as a responding tribunal. The commentary on UIFSA emphasizes the importance of applying local law for efficiency in managing interstate support cases. AS 25.25.604 establishes the conditions under which local law may not apply, but suggests that in all other scenarios, forum law should be utilized. 

The U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support also advocates that the law of the modifying state should govern in such cases, prioritizing efficiency and ease of application of local rules. Consequently, the superior court's application of Alaska law in modifying Bromley's child support obligation was appropriate and not in error.

The Superior Court's decision to deviate from Rule 90.3(a) in modifying Bromley's child support obligation is contested. CSED argues the court erred as Bromley did not seek a variance or provide evidence to justify one. The court's method of calculating child support is a legal issue, warranting no deference to the trial court. Under Rule 90.3, for sole or primary custody of one child, the non-custodial parent's adjusted annual income should be multiplied by twenty percent for support calculations, with potential variances allowed for good cause if clear evidence shows that strict adherence would result in manifest injustice.

The court found that Bromley met this burden, citing several unusual circumstances: he has never been in arrears, consistently cooperated with CSED, made payments exceeding CSED's authority, and both he and the child have never lived in Alaska, where the cost of living is higher. The court ultimately set Bromley's support obligation at $527 per month, based on Pennsylvania's guidelines, which suggest 15% of the non-custodial parent's income for child support.

However, the court's justifications for the variance are scrutinized. Bromley's lack of arrears or cooperation with CSED do not constitute unusual circumstances warranting departure from the rule. While overpayment might typically justify a variance, this argument is constrained by principles of finality, meaning it cannot serve as a basis for adjusting the support calculation in this case. Consequently, the departure from the Rule 90.3 formula was deemed unjustified.

Principles of finality, specifically res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), are critical in preventing the relitigation of claims and issues that have been previously adjudicated. Res judicata bars subsequent actions between the same parties on the same claim or related claims that should have been raised in the initial proceeding once a judgment on the merits has been rendered. Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of specific issues that have already been resolved, provided certain conditions are met: the parties involved were part of the original action, the issues are identical, the issue was conclusively decided by a final judgment, and the resolution was essential to that judgment.

Finality principles can extend to administrative decisions if a court determines that the administrative process adequately substitutes for judicial proceedings and fairness allows for preclusive effect. In the context of child support, Rule 90.3(h)(1) permits modifications under specific circumstances, highlighting the importance of finality while allowing for adjustments based on significant changes in circumstances. 

In Bromley's case, both he and the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) recognized a material change in circumstances justifying a modification of the support order. However, Bromley’s requests went beyond mere recalculation; he sought a refund for amounts he claimed were wrongfully collected based on the 1993 administrative decision. The superior court denied the refund but acknowledged Bromley’s argument by granting him a variance from the guidelines, implying that his payment history warranted a reduction. This rationale suggests that Bromley’s modification request effectively challenged the validity of the 1993 decision, constituting a collateral attack on it.

Bromley sought a retroactive modification of his 1993 support order, which is typically prohibited under federal and Alaska law. His claim is viewed as an untimely administrative appeal since it challenges an agency's prior decision, which he failed to appeal within the mandated thirty days. The superior court's variance was based on the belief that the agency's earlier decision was erroneous, rather than any change in Bromley's circumstances. Bromley's 1996 motions reiterated claims that the agency lacked authority to modify the Maine order, but the merits had already been addressed by the administrative tribunal, making the motion inappropriate. 

Additionally, the court incorrectly stated that Pennsylvania has a lower cost of living than Alaska, a claim unsupported by the record. Even if true, Alaska's guidelines do not allow for a reduction in child support solely based on relocation to a state with a lower cost of living. The guidelines suggest that a parent's increased income should correspond to a higher support obligation, and evidence showed that the children’s needs do not negate the necessity for increased support. Consequently, the superior court's decision to lower Bromley’s support obligation from $695 to $527 per month was unjustified.

The court's decision to deviate from the Rule 90.3 child support formula was not adequately justified, as it did not explain why the fact that Marlar and Shane have never lived in Alaska warranted such a departure. The court also failed to address Marlar's income, which is a requirement under Rule 90.3 (c)(1)(A) for any adjustments to the support formula. Consequently, the departure from the formula for determining Bromley's child support obligation was deemed unjustified. The court affirmed that Bromley is not entitled to a refund from CSED for past child support payments and upheld the application of Alaska law in modifying Bromley's obligation. However, due to the error in departing from Rule 90.3, the court reversed and remanded the case for a child support determination consistent with the rule.

The excerpt references various legal sources and cases concerning child support statutes and guidelines in Alaska, particularly focusing on the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and Alaska Civil Rule 90.3. It highlights the principles that govern deviations from standard child support calculations, noting that good cause for deviation exists when the formula leads to awards that significantly exceed or fall short of what is necessary for a child's reasonable needs. Key cases such as Coats v. Finn and Doyle v. Doyle are cited to support this interpretation. The excerpt also encompasses statutory references, including 42 U.S.C. 666 (a)(9), and discusses the application of these rules in the context of both state and federal guidelines. Additional case law from Alaska illustrates the judiciary's approach to child support enforcement and modification. The summary encapsulates the legal framework governing child support, emphasizing the importance of ensuring adequacy in meeting children's needs while allowing for judicial discretion.