Interrogatory of United States District Court: First Interstate Bank of Fort Collins, N.A. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.

Citations: 744 P.2d 1197; 88 A.L.R. 4th 841; 1987 Colo. LEXIS 642Docket: 85SA239

Court: Supreme Court of Colorado; November 2, 1987; Colorado; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Colorado addressed a question certified by the United States District Court regarding the applicability of tolling due to fraudulent concealment under Colorado's wrongful death statute. The plaintiffs, Linnea S. Hess (formerly Linnea S. Cobb) and John D. Cobb, initiated a wrongful death lawsuit against Piper Aircraft Corporation and Bangor-Punta Corporation, alleging that a defective design and construction of a Piper airplane led to the fatal crash of John David Cobb on June 2, 1978. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants concealed the aircraft's defects, which prevented them from recognizing the basis for their claim until a 1983 Wall Street Journal article revealed the issue. The plaintiffs filed their case on May 30, 1984, and the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the statute of limitations barred the claim as it began on the date of the crash. The court ultimately determined that the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions in Colorado does permit tolling for fraudulent concealment, thus allowing the plaintiffs’ claim to proceed. The applicable statute of limitations was identified as section 13-21-204, which mandates that wrongful death claims be filed within two years of the alleged negligent act.

In *Public Service Co. of Colorado v. Barnhill*, 690 P.2d 1248 (Colo.1984), the court addressed whether section 13-21-204, 6 C.R.S. 1973, constituted a 'non-claim statute,' which would bar litigation beyond a specified timeframe. The court clarified that such statutes are jurisdictional and not subject to tolling provisions, as seen in prior cases like *In re Estate of Daigle* and *In re Estate of Randall*. However, it determined that section 13-21-204 was not a non-claim statute and was therefore eligible for tolling under the general disability statute, section 13-81-103. The court recognized the wrongful death statute's purpose of aiding those affected by negligence and concluded that excluding tolling for plaintiffs with mental disabilities would contradict this intent.

The 1979 amendment to the wrongful death statute established a two-year limit for actions following alleged negligence or one year after death, whichever is later. The court noted that this statute did not explicitly state that timely filing was a prerequisite to the existence of a claim or that failure to file would bar the claim or jurisdiction. Prior judicial interpretations, particularly in *In re Estate of Randall*, highlighted the necessary language to create a non-claim statute, which was absent in this case. The General Assembly's choice of language indicated an intent to establish a statute of limitation rather than a non-claim statute. 

The court emphasized that statutes of limitation serve to promote justice, prevent unnecessary delays, and ensure defendants can adequately prepare their defenses. These principles hold less relevance when a plaintiff has acted diligently and the delay is due to the defendant's actions.

Fraudulent concealment by a defendant can prevent the statute of limitations from being enforced if the concealment continues until the limitation period expires. Historical case law, including Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal and Bailey v. Glover, supports tolling statutes for such concealment. Courts have consistently recognized this principle, as seen in Owens v. Brochner and Davis v. Bonebrake. However, in wrongful death cases, tolling is generally not permitted if meeting the limitation period is a condition precedent to filing a claim, although exceptions exist, such as in DeCosse v. Armstrong Cork Co., which emphasizes public policy against allowing wrongdoers to benefit from their deception.

In Colorado, the wrongful death limitation period is subject to tolling for fraudulent concealment, which aligns with the court's interpretation that this statute is not a non-claim statute. To successfully toll the limitation period, a plaintiff must establish five elements of fraudulent concealment: 1) concealment of a material fact that should be disclosed, 2) knowledge of the concealment by the defendant, 3) ignorance of the fact by the plaintiff, 4) intent for the concealment to be acted upon, and 5) resulting damages from the concealment. The statute of limitations does not begin until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the facts underlying their claim. The ruling reinforces that statutes of limitation should not be manipulated to protect fraudulent behavior, as doing so would contradict the statute's purpose of protecting victims.

Statutes of limitation aim to promote justice, discourage delays, and prevent the prosecution of stale claims, warranting that the limitation period should be tolled for fraudulent concealment only until a plaintiff can, through reasonable diligence, discover the necessary facts to establish a claim. In this case, Piper argues that knowledge of a death implies awareness of a potential tort claim; however, this logic is rejected. The court emphasizes that mere awareness of a death does not equate to knowledge of negligence, which must be established through the facts surrounding the incident. Often, additional time is needed for individuals to gather sufficient information regarding the circumstances of an injury or death. Consequently, determining whether a plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in uncovering the cause of a death due to negligence is generally a factual question for the jury or judge. The court affirms that the limitations period in Colorado's wrongful death statute can be tolled for fraudulent concealment of the underlying facts. Additionally, it notes that various claims, including a survival claim and an outrageous conduct claim, are subject to this tolling due to the defendants' alleged fraudulent concealment.

The court dismissed John D. Cobb's outrageous conduct claim due to his failure to demonstrate that he witnessed the crash or was in close proximity to it. The plaintiffs included Bangor-Punta Corporation as a defendant, asserting liability based on its merger with Piper Aircraft Corporation in 1978. They alleged Piper intentionally destroyed critical engineering data and documents related to defects in the Piper Model PA31T airplanes. A reference is made to Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., where sanctions were imposed on Piper for destroying documents to obstruct litigation. The applicable statute of limitations dictates the time frame for initiating civil actions. While Piper argued that the cause of action began at the date of death (June 2, 1978), it did not assert that the earlier wrongful death statute of limitations was relevant. The court concluded that the tolling of the statute for fraudulent concealment yields the same outcome under both the previous and amended versions of the statute. Additionally, the court clarified that certain statutory language does not equate to a statute of limitations, as noted in In re Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hospital.