Hutto v. Bic Corp.

Citations: 800 F. Supp. 1367; 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19990; 1992 WL 231018Docket: Civ. A. 91-644-N

Court: District Court, E.D. Virginia; August 7, 1992; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Mary Louise Hutto filed a lawsuit against BIC Corporation in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging negligence related to the design, manufacturing, and marketing of a lighter that allegedly exploded, causing her severe burns. Hutto's claims include negligence (Count I), failure to warn (Count II), breach of express and implied warranties (Count III), designation of the lighter as an inherently dangerous product (Count IV), false advertising (Count V), and gross negligence (Count VI). She seeks reimbursement for medical expenses, compensatory, and punitive damages.

BIC Corporation filed for summary judgment, contending that Hutto could not demonstrate any defect in the lighter, and also moved to strike her claim for punitive damages, arguing it was unconstitutional under Virginia law. Additionally, BIC sought partial summary judgment on Hutto's claim for medical expenses, asserting there is no basis for such a claim under Virginia law, and sought to exclude an affidavit regarding medical expenses as inadmissible hearsay. A hearing was held on May 28, 1992, with legal representation for both parties present.

The incident occurred on March 26, 1984, when Hutto, then thirteen, retrieved a BIC lighter belonging to her brother. After using the lighter briefly, it ignited unexpectedly, resulting in severe burns. The lighter was found damaged afterward, with parts scattered in the room.

The spindle tabs in the lighter were charred, and the lighter body showed signs of a linear crack or discoloration resembling bent plastic. After the accident, Edmund disposed of all related items. For summary judgment to be granted, there must be no genuine issues of material fact when evidence is viewed favorably to the nonmoving party. The opposing party cannot rely solely on allegations but must present specific facts to demonstrate a genuine trial issue. The moving party only needs to show the absence of evidence supporting the opposing case. In BIC's April 7, 1992 motion for summary judgment, it argued there were no material facts in dispute and claimed the plaintiff's allegations hinged on proving a defect in the lighter. The plaintiff failed to provide evidence of any defect's existence, source, or nature. BIC argued that the plaintiff could not substantiate a manufacturing defect due to lack of the product for expert examination, nor a design defect as the plaintiff's expert could only speculate. In response, the plaintiff cited expert Dr. Leighton E. Sissom's testimony as evidence of a defect sufficient to create a genuine issue. The plaintiff contended that the defect was not strictly a manufacturing or design defect but simply a defect. The court acknowledged the expert's affidavit and deposition as creating a genuine issue regarding a design defect and decided not to differentiate between design and manufacturing defects at this stage. Citing Logan v. Montgomery Ward Company, the court noted that mere evidence of an explosion was insufficient to prove negligence or defect without expert testimony linking the incident to the manufacturer's fault, emphasizing the need for evidence rather than a distinction between defect types.

Hutto has established a prima facie case against BIC through the affidavit of expert Dr. Sissom, who identifies a sealing defect in the lighter, which may stem from either a design or manufacturing flaw. The critical point is that the defect rendered the lighter dangerous when it left BIC's control. The court, having determined that there is sufficient evidence linking BIC's actions to the explosion causing Hutto's injuries, finds it premature to assess the adequacy of Hutto's evidence for punitive damages, as her discovery is ongoing until August 27, 1992. Regarding BIC's motion for partial summary judgment, the company contends that Hutto cannot recover expenses for her care under Virginia law, referencing Va. Code § 8.01-36 and the case Moses v. Akers. Hutto argues she has a valid claim based on Moses and Va. Code § 8.01-37.1, asserting that both she and her parents have separate causes of action due to her status as an infant, which typically limits her ability to recover medical expenses unless certain exceptions apply. BIC asserts that Hutto does not meet any of these exceptions, while Hutto claims her parents have assigned their medical expense claims to her, and that the statute allows her to recover for expenses covered by the United States.

The Court assumes that the plaintiff's parents effectively assigned their incurred medical expenses to the plaintiff. However, this assignment does not extend the statute of limitations on the parent's claim for those expenses. Virginia law imposes a five-year statute of limitations for a parent's claim for medical expenses resulting from a tortious injury to an infant, which begins when the parent becomes liable for those expenses. The Court cites precedent affirming that this claim is not tolled by certain statutory provisions. The parent's claim accrued on March 26, 1984, and expired on March 27, 1989, rendering any claim for these medical expenses barred by the statute of limitations, as the infant-assignee stands in the parent's position.

Regarding the plaintiff's argument under Va. Code. 8.01-37.1, the Court agrees that the plaintiff can claim the reasonable value of medical expenses provided by the United States as damages. The statute's language allows the injured party to make this claim without distinction between infants and adults, and it does not create any absurdity in its interpretation. The Court refrains from ruling on the admissibility of a specific letter regarding medical services, leaving that decision to the Trial Judge. 

The Court denies BIC's motions for summary judgment and grants BIC the right to amend its pleadings to assert a statute of limitations defense concerning the assigned claim. A copy of the Opinion and Order is to be mailed to all counsel of record.

Original defendant Maidenform, Inc. was dismissed with prejudice on March 31, 1992, followed by the dismissal of BP Oil Co. and John Doe, Clothing Manufacturers, Distributors and Wholesalers on April 29, 1992, leaving BIC as the only defendant. During a hearing on May 28, 1992, counsel for BIC indicated their motion sought summary judgment on the entire complaint, while the court explored the distinction between design defect and manufacturing defect claims. Plaintiff's counsel argued that the distinction was irrelevant, asserting that the defect was the lighter's leakage. Notably, legal literature identifies key differences between design and manufacturing defect claims, emphasizing that under both warranty and negligence theories, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the goods were unreasonably dangerous when they left the defendant's control.

Virginia Code § 8.01-36 allows parents or guardians of an infant plaintiff to sue a tortfeasor for expenses related to the infant's personal injury. Additionally, Virginia Code § 8.01-37.1 states that if a person sustains injuries due to another's negligence and the United States incurs medical costs, the injured party can claim these costs as damages without the U.S. needing to intervene in the lawsuit. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2651, the U.S. has the right to recover the reasonable value of medical care provided to an injured person from a third party liable for the injury, and can assert this claim to the extent of the medical expenses incurred.

Plaintiff has a potential cause of action for medical expenses incurred after reaching the age of majority or emancipation, although no such claim has been formally asserted. The infant’s claim for the reasonable value of medical services provided by the United States could represent a separate cause of action in certain cases. The statutes of limitation governing the claims differ: the child's personal injury claim is subject to a two-year limitation under Va. Code. 8.01-243.A, allowing an infant to delay filing until reaching the age of majority, after which they have two years to initiate the action. Conversely, Va. Code. 8.01-243.B permits a parent or guardian five years to file a claim for medical expenses, lacking any tolling provision.

During a May 28, 1992 hearing, it was indicated that the plaintiff’s parents had assigned their claim for medical expenses to the plaintiff, with the assignment dated February 21, 1992. Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be included in pleadings, the Court will permit BIC to amend its pleadings since this defense was not specifically raised by the plaintiff. BIC argues that the United States claim under 42 U.S.C. 2651 is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, but since the United States is not a party to the current action, the Court refrains from ruling on the potential for a statute of limitations defense should the United States bring a separate action. The Court also does not consider the plaintiff subject to the statute of limitations defense as the assignee of the United States, given that the claim arises from statute rather than assignment.