State v. Mims

Citations: 637 S.E.2d 244; 180 N.C. App. 403; 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 2405Docket: COA06-10

Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; December 5, 2006; North Carolina; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Tamica Yvette Mims was convicted of heroin trafficking by possession and possession of drug paraphernalia. Prior to trial, Mims moved to dismiss the charges, arguing insufficient probable cause, asserting that evidence linked another defendant, Reginald Chavis, to the crime rather than her. Mims claimed her actions were motivated by a desire to protect Chavis, her child's father, who was present during the police's execution of a search warrant. The trial court denied her motion to dismiss, and concerns about a potential conflict of interest were raised regarding Chavis's representation by the same counsel as Mims. The court indicated that the determination of conflict was a matter between clients and their lawyers, not the State's concern.

During the trial, Investigator Kelly Green testified about the execution of the search warrant at 313 Sowell Street, where Chavis was found. A police canine indicated the presence of heroin in a flight jacket and drug paraphernalia was discovered in a shoe box beneath the bed. The items included a coffee grinder, digital scales, glassine baggies, and a plate with drug residue, all confirmed to be related to heroin. Another investigator, J.C. Husketh, also testified about the search operation.

Investigator Husketh testified that the Defendant arrived at the scene during a search, approached the apartment, and claimed ownership of all items inside after Mr. Chavis was handcuffed. The Defendant was subsequently handcuffed and taken to the police station, where she was read her Miranda rights and agreed to speak. She identified herself as the resident of Apartment B at 313 Sowell Street and acknowledged the presence of drugs, specifically heroin, found in a shoe box. The Defendant explained the use of a coffee grinder for cutting heroin and described her method for packaging it, which involved weighing, bagging, and sealing to prevent loss.

During her trial testimony, the Defendant denied living at 313 Sowell Street in February 2003, stating she had only dropped off Mr. Chavis to assist with an electricity connection. She claimed to have taken responsibility for the drugs to protect him. On cross-examination, she was questioned about her lack of communication with Mr. Chavis regarding the case, her refusal to have him testify, and whether she felt his actions reflected his care for her. Ultimately, the Defendant was convicted of trafficking in heroin (a class F felony) and possession of drug paraphernalia (a class II misdemeanor). The trial court sentenced her to a minimum of 70 months to a maximum of 84 months in correctional custody, along with a $50,000 fine.

The trial court suspended the defendant's sentence of seventy to eighty-four months for heroin trafficking, imposing instead a 45-day consecutive sentence for possession of drug paraphernalia, which was also suspended. The defendant was placed on intermediate punishment with a 24-month supervised probation, during which she must not associate with known drug users or dealers, complete 72 hours of community service, and pay a $500 fine. The court ordered her to report to probation within 24 hours after release.

On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by not holding a hearing regarding a potential conflict of interest involving her defense counsel. The right to counsel, protected by the Sixth Amendment and applicable to states via the Fourteenth Amendment, includes the right to conflict-free representation. If a conflict is suspected, the trial court must investigate and ensure the defendant receives adequate legal advice. Failing to conduct such a hearing constitutes reversible error, as illustrated in the case of *State v. James*, where a defendant was convicted despite a conflict affecting his lawyer's performance.

Defense counsel alerted the trial court to a potential conflict of interest, but the court failed to conduct an inquiry, which was deemed a reversible error. The appellate court held that, while remand for a hearing is standard, the record indicated that the conflict had adversely impacted counsel's performance, prompting an order for a new trial. This principle was reaffirmed in State v. Hardison, where the appellate court criticized the trial court for denying a motion for relief without an evidentiary hearing on the conflict of interest issue. The appellate court emphasized that awareness of a potential conflict necessitates a hearing to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In the current case, the State raised concerns about a conflict involving the defendant's representation and a related charge against another individual. The trial court did not hold a hearing to evaluate the potential impact of this conflict on the defendant's right to counsel. As the defendant had not waived her right to conflict-free representation, and the record did not clarify if the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance, the matter was remanded for an evidentiary hearing, consistent with the Hardison precedent.

The State's argument relies on the Supreme Court case Mickens v. Taylor, asserting that only an actual conflict, rather than a potential conflict, obliges a trial court to conduct an inquiry. The State misinterprets Mickens, which aligns with prior rulings in James and Hardison. In Mickens, the petitioner, convicted of murder and sentenced to death, claimed ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict involving his attorney, Bryan Saunders, who had previously represented the murder victim. Following the victim's death, Saunders did not disclose this conflict when appointed to represent the petitioner. The District Court denied the habeas corpus petition, and although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged a potential conflict, it ruled that the petitioner must demonstrate an actual conflict and an adverse effect on his representation, which he failed to do. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed this requirement, stating that the trial judge's failure to inquire into a potential conflict does not lessen the petitioner's burden to prove that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. The Court concluded that, for Sixth Amendment purposes, an actual conflict must adversely affect counsel’s performance to warrant relief.

An evidentiary hearing has not yet been conducted in this case, preventing a determination of whether the Defendant was denied the right to counsel under both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. The matter is remanded to the trial court to hold a hearing concerning the potential deprivation of counsel. The Defendant bears the burden of proof to demonstrate the existence of an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected her counsel's performance, following precedents established in Mickens, Cuyler, and James. 

Additionally, the Defendant argues that her sentencing to nine months of intensive probation was erroneous due to her absence at the time the sentence was imposed. The court agrees, asserting that the written judgment represents the actual sentence, and a defendant has the right to be present during sentencing. Since the transcript lacks any mention of a nine-month probation sentence, and the Defendant was not present when the written judgment was entered, the sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for a new sentencing judgment if a new trial is not ordered post-hearing. The decision is remanded in part and vacated and remanded in part. Judges WYNN and McCULLOUGH concur.