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Rolph v. City Court of City of Mesa
Citations: 618 P.2d 1081; 127 Ariz. 155; 1980 Ariz. LEXIS 275Docket: 14923
Court: Arizona Supreme Court; October 14, 1980; Arizona; State Supreme Court
Ray Justin Rolph challenges the superior court's decision to set aside a directed verdict of acquittal previously granted by the Mesa City Court magistrate regarding a charge of public sexual indecency under A.R.S. 13-1403(A)(1). The city court's acquittal was based on its finding that the statute requires contact between two separate individuals, and it did not dismiss the jury for a lesser included offense of indecent exposure under A.R.S. 13-1402(A). The state sought to appeal the acquittal ruling, arguing it did not constitute a double jeopardy violation because the directed verdict pertained to the validity of the charge rather than the factual merits of the case. Two primary legal questions arise: whether the state can appeal from a directed verdict of acquittal without violating the double jeopardy protections outlined in the Arizona Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, and whether indecent exposure is a lesser included offense of public sexual indecency. The court notes that double jeopardy attaches once the jury is sworn and proceedings commence. The state's position is supported by precedents indicating that a mid-trial directed verdict does not equate to an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause, referencing cases such as United States v. Scott, which revisited earlier rulings on the matter. In *United States v. Scott*, the Court ruled that a defendant's request to terminate his trial without a determination of guilt or innocence does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause if the government appeals a successful dismissal. However, a key distinction is made between dismissal and acquittal. In Scott, the dismissal was due to preindictment delay without any findings on guilt, while the current case involves an acquittal after a factual review, which is significant under double jeopardy principles. Acquittals are afforded special protection; they cannot be reviewed without placing the defendant in double jeopardy, as established in *United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.* and *Ball v. United States*. The state cannot appeal an acquittal, even if it claims the acquittal was erroneous. Here, the defendant was acquitted of public sexual indecency but the court did not address indecent exposure as a lesser included offense. Although not charged with indecent exposure, the defendant could potentially be convicted for it if it is a lesser included offense. The court clarified that indecent exposure, defined under A.R.S. 13-1402, does not necessarily occur in the commission of public sexual indecency under A.R.S. 13-1403, making indecent exposure a separate offense. Thus, the Superior Court's order is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings.