United States v. MacIas-valencia

Citations: 510 F.3d 1012; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 28012; 2007 WL 4246068Docket: 06-10711

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; December 5, 2007; Federal Appellate Court

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the applicability of the mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) for Salvador Macias-Valencia, who was convicted of conspiracy and attempted possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, despite no actual methamphetamine being present during the offense. The court affirmed the district court's decision, emphasizing that a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 carries the same mandatory minimum sentence as the substantive offense under § 841. 

Defendant argued that the absence of actual contraband should exempt him from the mandatory minimum sentence; however, the court rejected this argument, noting that the statutory language does not require the presence of actual drugs for the minimum sentence to apply. The court highlighted that the established principles indicate that a conspiracy conviction inherently includes the same penalties as the substantive offense, regardless of the presence of actual controlled substances. The defendant was ultimately sentenced to two concurrent 120-month sentences for each offense, with the district court indicating that it would have imposed a lesser sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines if not for the mandatory minimum requirement. The appeal was deemed timely, but the court upheld the mandatory minimum sentencing.

The analysis of legal statutes reveals that the Defendant's argument lacks support. The starting point for statutory interpretation is the text itself, as articulated in *United States v. Buckland*. Section 846 states that any person attempting or conspiring to commit an offense is subject to the same penalties as for the completed offense. In this case, the object of the conspiracy and attempt was the violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which criminalizes possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. The penalties for this violation vary with the substance's type and quantity, with § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) imposing a minimum of 10 years imprisonment for offenses involving 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. 

The statutory language is explicit, applying the same penalties for inchoate crimes, like attempt and conspiracy, which do not require the completion of the underlying offense. The legislative history reinforces this interpretation, emphasizing the necessity of adhering to unambiguous text without contrary legislative intent. The Supreme Court's examination of an earlier version of § 846 in *Bifulco v. United States* indicated that its original limits on sentencing were exceeded, prompting Congress to amend the statute in 1988 to align the penalties for attempts and conspiracies with those for substantive offenses under § 841(a). 

Subsequent judicial interpretations, including those from the Seventh and Sixth Circuits, affirmed that penalties for conspiracy mirror those for substantive offenses, even in cases lacking actual contraband. For instance, in *United States v. Kottmyer*, the Sixth Circuit upheld a mandatory minimum sentence under § 841(a) despite the absence of illegal substances during a conspiracy related to cocaine distribution.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed that a statutory minimum sentence applies in cases of conspiracy or attempt to distribute controlled substances, regardless of whether actual contraband is involved. The court noted that even if Kottmyer had taken delivery of baking soda, he would still be guilty of conspiracy and attempt, making the nature or existence of the packages irrelevant. The court referenced past cases, indicating that previous discussions on similar issues were not binding since they did not directly address the applicability of mandatory minimum sentences in the absence of contraband. Specifically, they distinguished this case from United States v. Steward and United States v. Myers, where the mandatory minimum was not at issue because the sentences imposed were based solely on Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that Congress intended for conspiracy and attempt convictions to carry the same penalties as actual distribution, affirming the district court's imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence. The panel also indicated that the case was suitable for decision without oral argument and highlighted the impracticality of requiring actual contraband for triggering mandatory minimum sentences in reverse sting operations, which they believed was not the intent of Congress.