Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County

Citations: 884 F. Supp. 1544; 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1725; 1995 WL 60734Docket: 89-40247-WCS

Court: District Court, N.D. Florida; February 10, 1995; Federal District Court

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Defendant Leon County filed motions for summary judgment based on lack of standing and the merits of the case, supported by various documents including depositions and affidavits. Plaintiffs responded with their own affidavits and depositions. The court cites the Celotex standard for summary judgment, emphasizing that a party must demonstrate the absence of evidence for an essential element of the opposing party's case; if successful, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show a genuine issue of material fact. The court highlights that reliance solely on pleadings is insufficient and that the substantive law determines which facts are material. The remaining claims include arbitrary and capricious substantive due process, taking without just compensation, equal protection, and a state claim for inverse condemnation. A genuine issue requires sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the party with the burden of proof, and mere speculation or minimal evidence is inadequate.

Evidence and inferences must be viewed favorably for the nonmoving party, with reasonable doubts resolved in their favor, as established in WSB-TV v. Lee. However, implausible doubts do not warrant such resolution per Earley v. Champion International Corp. Summary judgment may be granted if evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, as stated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. 

In the case of collateral estoppel, the Plaintiffs argue that they are not collaterally estopped from claiming a due process property right due to differences in issues between this and prior state litigation. Leon County initially contended that a previous judgment precluded the Plaintiffs’ claims regarding equitable estoppel and zoning changes. However, a recent reversal of the circuit court decision by the First District Court of Appeal has shifted the positions of the parties. 

The crux of the substantive due process claims is whether the Plaintiffs had a property interest, as recognized by state law, in their multi-family development, either as originally intended in 1972 or conditionally permitted in 1989. The legal principles governing collateral estoppel dictate that a federal court must give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as the state's courts would. In Florida, for collateral estoppel to apply, the issues in both actions must be identical and material, and the prior litigation must have actually adjudicated the common question. Furthermore, due process violations can occur if a party is estopped without having had the opportunity to present their case.

The court established that any uncertainties regarding whether an issue was litigated in a previous case or whether the appellant had their opportunity to present their case should favor the appellant. In Carson v. Gibson, the Florida courts applied the 'identity of issue' principle of collateral estoppel. Gibson sued Carson to enforce a charging lien related to a settlement from a lawsuit where Gibson represented Carson. Carson's defense was inadequate representation, which the trial court dismissed, finding no malpractice. Subsequently, Carson's malpractice lawsuit against Gibson was barred by collateral estoppel, as the same issue of inadequate representation was relevant in both cases.

In Bergman v. Serns, the court previously determined that Serns exerted undue influence over the deceased to obtain a gift, finding that the deceased intended to leave nothing to Serns by will. In a subsequent lawsuit, Bergman sought to revoke the probate of a will executed by the deceased. The court concluded that the issue of undue influence had been previously adjudicated against Serns, allowing Bergman to use collateral estoppel offensively.

In Munsey v. General Telephone Company of Florida, Munsey alleged sex discrimination regarding promotion denials. The federal court found that she had not performed comparable work to male colleagues. In her state court equal pay claim, the court held that the issue of work comparability was essential and had been adversely decided in the federal case, thus collaterally estopping Munsey from relitigating that issue.

The appellate court's judgment in Pelham v. County of Leon described the adoption of the Leon County Comprehensive Land Use Plan in 1990 and the enactment of Ordinance 90-31, which allowed property owners 120 days to request a determination of vested rights to develop their land contrary to the plan. If the planning department could not conclusively determine vested rights, a hearing would be conducted by a committee of county officials.

The applicant presented evidence at the hearing and had the right to a hearing before an administrative officer if dissatisfied with the administrative determination. The hearing officer could accept additional evidence and conduct cross-examinations. Judicial review by the circuit court was available under common law certiorari, limited to assessing (1) procedural due process, (2) adherence to essential legal requirements, and (3) whether the administrative findings were supported by competent evidence.

The state court established that Florida's common law of equitable estoppel was integrated into the Ordinance for determining vested development rights. The court referenced relevant case law, identifying key elements of equitable estoppel: (1) good faith reliance by the property owner on government actions, (2) a substantial change in position or incurred obligations, and (3) that it would be unjust to negate the vested rights.

The District Court of Appeal applied these principles in evaluating the plaintiffs' due process property rights. It found that during the county's review of a 1972 rezoning application, Pelham disclosed intended uses and displayed a model of the development plan. The stormwater management system was designed to address drainage issues and built at a cost of $45,000, exceeding what was necessary for the immediate property. Following the 1972 rezoning approval, development occurred from 1975 to 1989 in 14 segments, with consistent county approval for permits despite some changes to the original plan. The court concluded that a significant portion of expenditures supported future project phases, sufficient to establish the equitable estoppel claim.

The court determined that the Petitioners fully disclosed their development plans to the county, despite the hearing officer's findings regarding the lack of specific details in 1972 about building locations and quantities. The court noted that the county had consistently issued permits for construction over 18 years, acknowledging the investments made toward both developed and undeveloped land, which established a vested right for Pelham and Equity Resources against a last-minute denial from the county. 

The District Court of Appeal recognized a pending federal suit but limited its decision to the Petitioners' vested rights in zoning for a 7.5-acre undeveloped tract and the remaining 30 acres designated as Estate District. The court questioned whether a Florida court would allow the Plaintiffs to use the previous judgment as offensive collateral estoppel to support their claim of equitable estoppel in the current case. 

The critical inquiry was whether the issue at hand was essential and definitively resolved in the prior appellate decision. The court drew parallels to prior cases where collateral estoppel was deemed suitable, highlighting that issues like inadequate attorney representation or undue influence could be similar across different contexts. However, it distinguished between equitable estoppel in estate zoning versus multi-family development, noting that the dynamics of county actions and property owner reliance could vary significantly based on the development's intensity. The court emphasized that the principles of equitable estoppel hinge on fairness and the substantive consideration of issues, urging against rigid applications that could hinder justice.

The state courts did not address the issue of vested rights and good faith reliance for multi-family development, lacking knowledge of the equities between the parties. Consequently, the court must not allow Plaintiffs to use offensive collateral estoppel to prevent Defendants from litigating this distinct issue. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs lack standing to claim vested development rights based on common law equitable estoppel since they were not property owners at the time of rezoning in 1972, and that changes in title since then sever any rights to assert this claim. The argument posits that the claim related to the 1989 permit is entirely dependent on the 1972 rezoning, and thus the break in title undermines Plaintiffs' standing.

The First District Court of Appeal's decision came after the parties briefed the standing issue, and Plaintiffs did not invoke offensive collateral estoppel in response to the motion for summary judgment. During oral arguments, the court allowed discussion on this matter, where Plaintiffs defended their standing, and the Defendant countered.

Two parcels, identified as tracts 2 and 3, are central to the case. Tract 2 was owned by First Fidelity Corporation from 1974 until a foreclosure in 1979, with no Plaintiffs having ownership during this period. A potential gap in ownership of tract 2 is noted from 1980 to 1986, as Plaintiff Pelham claims that Bent Tree transferred its interest to Lake Jackson, Ltd. in 1980, where he was a limited partner. However, the Defendant disputes Pelham's affidavit, asserting it contradicts his deposition testimony, which details his limited partnership and an option to acquire a 40% interest. Pelham states he executed this option in 1986; thus, the affidavit does not contradict his earlier testimony but indicates he claims limited partnership based on an agreement to purchase a nominal interest.

Pelham's ownership of tract 2 from 1980 to 1986 is undisputed, but the legal implications of this ownership are contested. Additionally, it is established that John Stocks owned tract 3, comprising 9.64 acres (minus 1.49 acres for The Lake Club Apartments), from September 22, 1980, to June 12, 1986, with no ownership interest from the Plaintiffs during that time. Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. was not formed until October 1, 1987, and Pelham does not dispute this in his affidavits regarding tract 3. Both tracts were owned by individuals not involved in this lawsuit, and there is no indication of privity between these owners and the Plaintiffs during their ownership periods. 

If the court were to evaluate the ownership situation anew, the significant gaps in ownership would favor the Defendant regarding the standing of the Plaintiffs to pursue claims in counts II and III. However, collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of standing for three current Plaintiffs. Specifically, Pelham and Equity Resources, Inc. were the only parties opposing Leon County in the prior state case, where the District Court of Appeal affirmed Pelham's standing based on his reliance on actions taken by the county regarding property rezoning. Equity Resources was found to be controlled by Pelham and not an unrelated entity. The court concluded both had standing under Florida law concerning equitable estoppel related to estate zoning.

The standing issue in this case mirrors that of the state case, where a "successor in interest" must demonstrate entitlement to the benefit of an estoppel independently, not merely through property purchase. The same chain of title was scrutinized by the state court, and the factual elements of the Defendant's claim were accessible through public records. Pelham testified in the evidentiary hearing, providing the opportunity to clarify the ownership and corporate history relevant to each parcel and Plaintiff. Consequently, the Defendant was afforded due process regarding the standing of Pelham and Equity Resources in the prior state suit. The Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the standing of Pelham and Equity Resources, Inc. is denied due to collateral estoppel, while the other Plaintiffs, Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. and Lake Jackson, Ltd., were not part of the state litigation.

Offensive collateral estoppel's applicability between the parties raises complex factual and legal issues under Florida law. The Florida Supreme Court, in Zeidwig v. Ward, relaxed the mutuality requirement for defensive collateral estoppel against a plaintiff who lost an identical issue in a criminal case. The U.S. Supreme Court also modified the mutuality requirement for offensive collateral estoppel, allowing it when the plaintiff could not have been joined in the prior case easily. However, Zeidwig emphasized that the offensive use of collateral estoppel is distinct, referencing Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Romano, which upheld strict mutuality for offensive estoppel, asserting it applies only when the identical issue has been litigated between the same parties or their privies.

In the current case, it is established that Lake Jackson, Ltd. held title to tract 2 from 1980 until 1987 and had a privity interest with Pelham, who had a purchase option for a 40% stake during that time. Pelham has also maintained control over Equity Resources, Inc. and has been a general partner of Lake Jackson, Ltd. since 1986. Lake Jackson, Ltd. acquired tract 3 in 1988 from Equity Resources, establishing privity among Pelham, Equity Resources, and Lake Jackson, Ltd. Therefore, Lake Jackson, Ltd. can invoke collateral estoppel regarding its standing in response to the Defendant's summary judgment motion for both tracts, as it was in privity with the parties involved in Pelham v. County of Leon. The First District Court of Appeal noted Pelham's continuous ownership interest in the land since 1972.

Equity Resources has maintained ownership of the property in question since 1987, having acquired its interest from limited partnerships linked to Richard Pelham. Throughout the history of these partnerships, either Pelham or Equity Resources has generally held the general partner position, with the exception of a period from 1981-1986 when Pelham held a 40% interest in Lake Jackson, Ltd., which owned part of the property at that time. The findings confirm Pelham's continuous ownership interest in the property since October 1972, which precludes relitigation of his standing regarding Lake Jackson, Ltd. It is established that Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. has never held ownership of tracts 2 or 3, with all records indicating it is not part of the title chain. Although Pelham claims property transfers to affiliated companies, including Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd., he has not provided credible evidence to substantiate this assertion. 

Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. was formed on October 1, 1987, with Equity Resources as both a general and limited partner, aiming to acquire and develop property, but its initial contributions were cash-based. Despite Equity Resources' ownership of tracts 2 and 3, there is no indication that these were treated as assets of Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. Consequently, the lack of privity between Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. and the parties involved in the state litigation prevents it from using that judgment to claim collateral estoppel regarding its standing. Under Florida law, standing requires a "legally cognizable interest," which Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. lacks since it never owned the property. Additionally, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if there is no case or controversy as outlined in Article III of the Constitution, which mandates that a plaintiff demonstrate actual or threatened injury from the defendant's alleged illegal actions. Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. has not shown any personal injury related to the remaining counts. Therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding the standing of Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. will be granted, with judgment favoring the defendant, while the motion will be denied in all other respects.

Defendant seeks judgment on Counts II and III regarding Plaintiffs' claim of a due process property right linked to state law equitable estoppel. The lawsuit involves two tracts of land totaling 12.96 acres south of the dike along Lake Jackson in Leon County, Florida. Tract 3 was part of a 40-acre parcel acquired in 1972 by Richard Pelham and Carl Pennington from W.H. Faulk, III, while Tract 2, the western portion, was part of a 125-acre parcel also purchased from the Faulks. The property was initially under contract for Equity Resources, Inc., which transferred its interest to Bent Tree, Ltd., the developer, controlled by Pelham, who held an ownership stake in both tracts during the 1972 rezoning.

The contracts with the Faulks required rezoning of 165 acres to allow multi-family development. On August 1, 1972, the Faulks petitioned for rezoning from Agricultural 2 to RM-3, permitting multi-family dwellings. Leon County was aware of Pelham's ownership interest and development intentions during this process. Dr. B.E. Bennison from the Leon County Health Department expressed concerns in a letter regarding potential pollution from runoff into Lake Jackson and its impact on water quality. The Planning Commission deferred a vote on the rezoning following public concerns about environmental impacts. On September 18, 1972, Pelham assured in a letter to Dr. Bennison and the Planning Commission that construction would avoid flood-prone areas and included plans for holding ponds to mitigate runoff, requesting the RM-3 zoning classification.

The zoning classification in question is the only medium or high-density residential type without height limitations, allowing for vertical development to maximize residential units while preserving green space. Pelham testified that the 105-foot elevation is referenced against sea level, noting that most of tract 2 and all of tract 3 are below this contour, with only a small area above the 96.5-foot line, while the last high water mark for Lake Jackson is 96.53 feet. A model of the proposed high-rise development was presented to both the Planning and County Commissions. Pelham submitted a letter to the County Commission regarding health department concerns, and no evidence was presented to dispute the timeline of this correspondence. Initially, the Planning Commission recommended denial of the rezoning on September 18, 1972, but the County Commission approved the rezoning to RM-3 on October 17, 1972, without recorded promises related to the rezoning. Pelham claimed assurances from the Planning and County Commissions regarding development under a multi-family classification, asserting they were aware of plans for up to 1,200 units. He indicated that he did not feel legally obligated to build a dike and holding pond post-rezoning, though such infrastructure was established shortly thereafter. Pelham’s affidavit asserts that stormwater facilities installed were adequate for ongoing developments on the property. Following citizen feedback, Leon County enacted Sedimentation Ordinance number 73-10 in January 1973, and over the next seven years, the Commission addressed development impacts on Lake Jackson’s drainage basin.

Affiant initiated a development plan following two purchases from the Faulks, which included constructing multi-family housing on the property. This plan was structured into four or more phases, with infrastructure built during Phase I to support the entire development and adjacent commercial property. From 1972 to the present, excluding the 1981-1982 period due to commitments from the Leon County Commission, the property has been continuously developed in approximately fourteen phases. Improvements and expenditures were made based on the right to develop the entire tract for multi-family housing.

The stormwater retention system and road infrastructure were designed to accommodate all phases of the Villas development and the adjacent commercial property. In 1988, the Leon County Commission approved sewer facilities for the property, allowing extension to service all phases after extensive discussion. Subsequently, the sewer system was installed to serve Phases I through IV.

In 1989, a franchise agreement was approved between EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. and Talquin Electric Co. for utility services extending beyond Phase I to include Phases II, III, IV, and adjacent commercial areas. Building permits were obtained for each development phase from 1975 to 1989, with Leon County aware that these improvements were part of a comprehensive development plan including multi-family housing. Permits for utility extensions and stormwater facilities were also approved, confirming that the county recognized the general plan of development throughout the various phases. The stormwater retention facility was adequately sized to manage runoff from Phases II, III, and IV. A letter from the County Environmental Administrator in 1980 indicated that the proposed development would be "grandfathered" from certain provisions due to prior actions by the Board of County Commissioners in 1972.

The statement pertains specifically to the single-family units constructed by the Plaintiffs as Bent Tree III and IV, focusing on compliance with storm water requirements under Ordinance 73-10 related to a dike and holding pond. The issued permit, which included a "grandfathering" clause, did not apply to the current development case. In 1981 and 1982, Leon County negotiated to acquire the property involved in this lawsuit. Jim Crews, the Chairman of the Leon County Commission at the time, had multiple meetings with the Plaintiffs or their agents, during which he assured them that if they postponed applying for building permits, the Commission would refrain from enacting new land use regulations that might affect their development plans, provided those regulations included "grandfathering" provisions for the Lake Jackson property. Crews claimed he made these promises to induce the Plaintiffs not to develop the property immediately, despite their eligibility to seek permits for multi-family construction. He reiterated that their development rights were vested and that the County wouldn’t hinder their project. 

Another Commissioner, Lee Vause, corroborated this by stating that the County requested the developers to take the property off the market to facilitate acquisition efforts, assuring them that if the acquisition failed, the County would not restrict their existing multi-family development rights. Pelham, another involved party, claimed that Commissioner Nelson was also authorized to communicate this promise and that both he and Crews assured the developers that if they delayed development for about a year, their rights would remain protected. In reliance on these assurances, Pelham took the property off the market for over a year and refrained from further development. Additionally, minutes from a Board meeting indicate that on January 6, 1981, the Board discussed a proposal from John Stocks to exchange government-owned land for the Lake Jackson property, suggesting a temporary hold on construction activities for evidence of a potential exchange.

The Assistant County Manager informed the Board that no County land was available for a land swap, prompting the Board to direct the County Administrator to inquire with state officials about potential interest in a land swap through environmental acquisition programs. The Board did not vote on whether any party had a "vested" right to develop the property for multi-family housing or to promise landowners exemption from future regulations aimed at protecting Lake Jackson if they halted development efforts. Furthermore, there was no discussion or vote regarding Pelham's commitment not to develop below the 105-foot contour line. Multiple Board meetings between February 1981 and December 1982 addressed the land swap issue without reaching a decision on these matters. The December 7, 1982 meeting noted that the Florida Governor and Cabinet had approved the exchange, but due to a deadline set by Stocks, Commissioner Nelson doubted sufficient time remained to complete it. Stocks subsequently communicated a desire to terminate the exchange, with documentation of this correspondence recorded in county records. The last mention in the Commission minutes, dated January 18, 1983, indicated a notice regarding the sale of property owned by Mr. John Stocks, with no action taken. In October 1987, the County initiated efforts to develop a protective plan for Lake Jackson, leading to the formation of the Lake Jackson Technical Advisory Committee, which produced a report in January 1988. The report highlighted concerns about declining water quality in Lake Jackson due to urban runoff and emphasized the need for urgent action to address these environmental challenges.

Recommendations were made to adopt a zoning district for low-density residential use, down-zone unimproved property within the 96.5-foot contour line, and down-zone property between the 96.5 and 100-foot lines to R-1. Residential uses were recommended for the area between the 100 and 120-foot lines. These recommendations were submitted to the Leon County Commission on January 19, 1988, coinciding with a lawsuit by Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. against the County for damages and action on development plans. The Board reviewed the recommendations, which addressed drainage and development around the lake, not specific to the plaintiffs' development.

The County adopted Ordinance No. 88-6 on the same day, stating that a study by various agencies highlighted concerns regarding Lake Jackson, designated as an "Outstanding Florida Water" and "aquatic preserve," facing threats from urban runoff due to ongoing development. The Ordinance noted that reducing land development density could mitigate adverse water quality impacts and declared an emergency concerning development density in the Lake Jackson basin. Consequently, it imposed a 21-day moratorium on development orders for structures below the 120-foot contour line, expiring on February 9, 1988. 

The Commission extended this moratorium to August 9, 1988, to draft a comprehensive development Ordinance for the watershed, leading to the adoption of Ordinance No. 88-10, which echoed the findings of Ordinance No. 88-6. On February 23, 1988, the Board considered an application from Talquin Electric Cooperative, Inc. to expand sewer service to the disputed area. Plaintiff Pelham supported the application, while citizen George E. Lewis opposed any development below the 99-foot contour, presenting historical correspondence from 1972.

The master drainage plan for the expansion was previously approved, and the Commission endorsed the application. Commissioner Henderson proposed that the County pursue rezoning of the undeveloped area of Villas on the Lake to R-1. Commissioners Nelson and Vause, who supported the application, asserted that they recognized "vested rights" for the parcel and opposed any downzoning. A temporary moratorium concluded on August 30, 1988, with the enactment of Ordinance No. 88-53, which identified Lake Jackson and other drainage basins in Leon County as closed systems reliant on surface runoff and rainfall for water quality. The ordinance highlighted a decline in water quality due to urban runoff, necessitating immediate corrective action and establishing a need for interagency management.

A "special development zone" was created around Lake Jackson, where 95% of the land between contours 88 and 100 feet was to remain undisturbed, with restrictions on structures below 96.5 feet unless Commission-approved. Since then, similar regulations have been implemented for other lakes in the county, with additional zones under consideration. On October 3, 1988, Pelham communicated to Helge Swanson regarding permit applications for Phases II and III of the Villas, which had been denied due to non-compliance with the new Receiving Waters Bodies Act and the moratorium. Pelham submitted a new Phase II application claiming compliance with the new ordinance while maintaining that previous applications remained pending and asserting that no stormwater permits were required due to grandfathered rights.

The application faced multiple disapprovals, culminating in a letter dated February 24, 1989. Ordinance 88-53 was later succeeded by Ordinance No. 88-62 on October 11, 1988, maintaining the development restrictions. On June 20, 1989, Commissioner Henderson proposed rezoning the property from RM-3 to R-1, while Commissioner Yordon suggested changing it to A-1 (Agricultural 1) Limited Use.

The staff agenda for the meeting indicated that the rezoning request, while resembling a spot zone due to lack of adjacency to other A-1 properties, would align with existing zoning and land use patterns in the area. A significant portion of the Bent Tree Estates subdivision was developed under A-2 district standards. At the June 20 meeting, George E. Lewis reiterated support for the rezoning, referencing letters from Dr. Bennison and Pelham's 1972 letter, noting that much of the site is below the 100-foot contour line. On July 27, 1989, the Plaintiffs submitted a modified application for Villas of Lake Jackson Phase II, aiming to comply with Ordinance No. 88-62. The County Commission reviewed the rezoning to Agricultural 1 Limited Use on August 22, 1989, with prior Planning Commission approval. The Plaintiffs requested a 120-day extension to present a new stormwater treatment plan, but Assistant County Attorney LaCroix raised concerns about the limited use rezoning requiring re-advertisement. Consequently, the Board postponed the issue until October 24, 1989, for consideration of rezoning to both A-1 and Estate Zone. On October 3, 1989, conditional environmental permits for stormwater and landscaping were granted for the modified multi-family project, with a warning regarding pending rezoning. In Fall 1989, Pelham commenced construction on Villas Phase II. On October 24, 1989, despite Pelham's objections, the County Commission down-zoned the property to Estate Zone via Ordinances Nos. 89-37 and 89-38, and revoked the conditional permits on October 31, 1989. Pelham asserts that at the time of the down-zoning, no nearby properties were similarly zoned, and that adjacent lands totaling 5,000 acres were designated Agricultural. Additionally, he stated that from 1975 to 1989, Leon County issued multiple building and utility permits with awareness of a general plan for multi-family development on the parcels acquired from Mr. and Mrs. Faulk.

Plaintiff Pelham fails to specify which County officials had knowledge regarding the promise not to develop below the 105-foot contour line or that any official acted to relieve him of this promise. He notes that in 1988, the Leon County Commission approved sewer facilities for Phases I and subsequent phases, and in 1989, a franchise agreement for utility services covering all phases was approved. Pelham claims that from 1975 to 1989, the County approved the construction and dedication of streets intended for Phases I-IV, with an understanding that multi-family dwellings would be included in the development plan. However, he does not identify any County official who was aware of his plans to develop below the contour line or who relieved him of his promise.

Pelham states that he constructed Phase I between 1988 and 1989, and indicates that had he known about the County's intention to down-zone the remaining property, he would not have invested in extending utilities to Phase I, which cost over $300,000 attributed to Phases II-IV. He claims a total profit loss of approximately $5 to $6 million from the potential development of these phases and anticipates a net loss of $50,000 due to restrictions imposed by the Estate Zone on approximately 12 acres in dispute. He also expresses concerns about marketing single-family homes in an area surrounded by commercial and multi-family development.

The legal analysis indicates that under Florida law, a property owner does not have a vested right to maintain existing zoning merely by purchasing land. The Florida courts have established that detrimental reliance on existing zoning does not prevent a city from enforcing amendments to zoning ordinances, emphasizing that property owners can only assume that zoning regulations will not change detrimentally, unless such changes are justified by the public's health, morals, welfare, or safety.

An omission constitutes a negligent or culpable failure to act only when there is a duty to do so; mere silence or inaction does not create grounds for estoppel. The appellant county had no duty regarding zoning, and its lack of a zoning ordinance did not constitute an actionable omission for which the landowner could justifiably rely. Florida law permits equitable estoppel against local governments under specific circumstances: 1) a property owner's good faith reliance on governmental action or inaction, 2) substantial change in position or incurred expenses, and 3) the potential for significant injustice if the right acquired is denied. Such estoppel applies in rare cases where the government's actions extend beyond negligence. Several Florida cases illustrate these principles, including instances where developers incurred significant expenses based on zoning approvals without knowledge of impending changes. For example, in Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, developers spent substantial sums on plans, unaware of zoning changes, leading the court to find estoppel. Similarly, in Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., the town's approval of a rezoning request, despite future protests, resulted in estoppel when the property owner invested heavily based on that approval. In City of Lauderdale Lakes v. Corn, the court held that the city was estopped from enforcing a later zoning change against a developer who had made significant investments based on initial zoning. Lastly, in Franklin County v. Leisure Properties, Ltd., the court found estoppel where a landowner built infrastructure based on a granted zoning change, placing the burden of proof on the county to show expenditures were not aligned with the approved plans.

In Florida, documentation of vested rights or governmental authorization must be "clear, complete, and specific," as established in Harbor Course Club, Inc. v. Department of Community Affairs. The court ruled that a developer could not claim vested rights for a golf driving range due to the absence of intent in their master plan. Similarly, in City of Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., the court determined that the issuance of a foundation permit did not imply approval of unsubmitted commercial plans. These cases emphasize the equitable nature of estoppel, which is rooted in fairness. The "clean hands" doctrine requires that a party seeking equitable relief must have acted fairly, and a court may deny such relief if the party's conduct is deemed inequitable or fraudulent.

In disputes over real estate closings, this principle should not prevent enforcement of a contract when the parties' intentions are clear. Unlike the previously mentioned cases, the current matter involves a significant detail that was explicitly promised by Plaintiff Pelham regarding construction limitations in flood-prone areas. Pelham had assured the county in 1972 that no improvements would occur in areas likely to flood and that all permanent structures would be above certain elevations. However, the proposed development starts at the holding pond dike, contradicting Pelham's earlier commitments about construction elevations and concerns about water quality in Lake Jackson.

A request for rezoning to an RM-3 classification is contingent upon a commitment not to construct below the 105-foot elevation and to build significantly above the holding ponds. Plaintiffs are obligated to honor these promises to access the benefits of multi-family zoning. The promise regarding the 105-foot contour line is clear and provides a standard for development proximity to Lake Jackson's waters, while the commitment to build "substantially above" the holding ponds is more ambiguous but conflicts with plans to build near the pond dikes. These assurances were made to address concerns from Dr. Bennison's office and the public regarding runoff and water quality, leading to the withdrawal of objections to the rezoning. 

Plaintiffs cannot claim equitable estoppel while retracting key commitments from their 1972 agreement, as the refusal to allow development below the 105-foot contour line would not be considered "highly inequitable and unjust." Prior developments on other parcels do not indicate an intent to violate the original promise. Although statements from Commissioners regarding vested rights and grandfathering development rights were made, they do not alter the legal balance of equity. The defendant argues that these statements cannot support a claim of equitable estoppel as they are legal in nature.

Estoppel generally does not apply to mistaken legal statements but can apply to erroneous factual representations. In *Council Bros. Inc. v. City of Tallahassee*, a city plumbing inspector, who had authority to provide information, incorrectly advised a contractor that certain sewer system charges were not applicable. After the bid was accepted, the contractor was later informed of a $49,000 charge, leading the court to equitably estop the city from enforcing the charges due to the inspector's misleading advice. The ruling emphasized that the case's outcome did not hinge on legal versus factual misrepresentations but rather on the presence of "exceptional circumstances" stemming from the inspector's authority and the city's obligation to provide accurate information.

Conversely, in *Greenhut Constr. Co. v. Henry A. Knott, Inc.*, a contractor was misinformed by a Florida Department of Transportation employee about their qualification to bid on a project. The court found no equitable estoppel because the inquiry was about a legal question, not a factual one, and the employee was not authorized to provide a legal opinion. Additionally, the contractor did not demonstrate that it relied in good faith on this representation or that it could have prevented its disqualification. The ruling reiterated that a governmental entity cannot be estopped from enforcing the law based on mistaken legal statements, as seen in *Branca v. City of Miramar*.

An elected mayor of a city retired after a retirement plan was enacted for high-ranking officials, relying on the city attorney’s assurance of its legality. The plan later faced controversy and was declared illegal by a circuit court. The court noted the general principle that governmental entities cannot be estopped by erroneous legal statements, but also recognized that the mayor relied on the valid enactment of an ordinance when he retired. 

In a similar case, Dolphin Outdoor Advertising applied for a permit based on incorrect advice from a Department of Transportation inspector regarding sign spacing requirements. The court found equitable estoppel applicable due to the inspector's misrepresentation, despite it being legally incorrect, as Dolphin had relied on that advice and incurred expenses. 

In another case, Kuge v. State illustrated that erroneous representations about retirement qualifications can still lead to equitable estoppel if based on factual errors. 

The court concluded that Florida courts differentiate between factual and legal opinions when applying equitable estoppel against government entities, focusing on the context of the advice given. In the current case, statements from Commissioners Crews, Vause, and Nelson did not establish equitable estoppel against Leon County, as there was no evidence that Crews was authorized to provide legal opinions on "vested" rights or that any of the commissioners had the authority to promise that the plaintiffs' development would be exempt from future regulations. Commission meeting minutes indicated their authority was limited to exploring land transactions with the plaintiffs.

No vote was ever taken to authorize the Commissioners to bind the County regarding the matters at hand. Notably, affidavits and minutes from the Board of County Commissioners do not address the Plaintiffs' prior commitment from 1972 to build above the 105-foot contour line and away from the holding ponds, which they maintained during negotiations in 1981-82. Commissioner Crews suggested that the Plaintiffs had "vested rights" to develop the property, and the Commissioners indicated they would grandfather this development. However, the Plaintiffs were aware that their promised development was contingent on their earlier commitments. They failed to speak up when necessary and thus cannot seek equitable relief from the court. 

Even assuming equitable estoppel could apply to some multi-family development, any vested rights would only extend to developments above the 105-foot contour line, not near the holding ponds. On October 3, 1989, the County issued permits for a reduced-scale development, explicitly conditioned on a pending rezoning proposal, warning that development would be at the applicant's risk. The Plaintiffs had actual notice of the ongoing rezoning process, which was scheduled for a vote on October 24, 1989. Case law indicates that if a landowner is aware of a potential zoning change when obtaining a building permit, they cannot claim equitable estoppel, even with significant reliance on the permit. Furthermore, a property owner is entitled to a building permit compliant with existing zoning if no rezoning ordinance is pending at the time of application, regardless of their reliance on the municipality's position.

A zoning change is considered pending if the city's administrative department is actively pursuing it, without needing to be before the city council. Passive thoughts or comments from city employees are insufficient; there must be documented, active efforts by authorized individuals. The city council or the planning board must be aware of these efforts. The 1989 permits do not assist the Plaintiffs in their equitable analysis, as they were conditional and formal rezoning was underway, with Plaintiffs aware of these limitations. Thus, the 1989 permits do not support a claim of equitable estoppel, either alone or in conjunction with other discussed matters. Most of the land the Plaintiffs aim to develop for multi-family housing is below the 105-foot elevation, leaving only a small portion (0.43 acres) theoretically eligible for development above this contour. However, the court finds this impractical and does not believe this was the Plaintiffs' intent. The central issue is Plaintiffs' acknowledgment of their dual promise to refrain from building below the 105-foot line and to build significantly above the holding ponds, which is undisputed and critical to the equities involved. Consequently, the County is not equitably estopped under Florida law from enacting new regulations that prohibit multi-family dwellings below the 105-foot contour or near the holding ponds. The Plaintiffs' Due Process claims, based on actions from 1972 to 1989, fail due to the absence of a property interest established by state law, leading to the Defendant's entitlement to summary judgment regarding Counts II and III. Following the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in McKinney v. Pate, substantive due process claims are applicable only if the rights infringed are fundamental and constitutionally created, rather than state law-based. Thus, McKinney may limit the substantive due process claims in this case, but its analysis does not apply to legislative acts, maintaining the possibility of such claims against legislative actions.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim in Count II can only seek injunctive relief, arguing that the claim is a facial challenge to Ordinances 88-53 and 88-62, which apply broadly to all property in the Lake Jackson drainage basin. Conversely, Plaintiffs argue that damages are warranted because the County's arbitrary application of these Ordinances, rather than the Ordinances themselves, halted their property's development. They base their claim for damages on the 1989 rezoning, which they argue was a quasi-judicial act, contrasting it with the legislative nature of the original Ordinances. Under Florida law, comprehensive rezonings affecting many properties are legislative, while actions affecting a limited number of owners can be quasi-judicial. If the 1989 rezoning were deemed non-legislative, substantive due process claims would be unavailable under McKinney, as only state law-created property interests would be affected. However, the rezoning was influenced by the 1988 Ordinances' policy considerations, potentially aligning it with legislative acts according to precedent. Despite this, the court finds it unnecessary to resolve the implications of McKinney at this stage, given that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a due process property right under state law. Regarding Count IV, Plaintiffs have cited several properties in the Lake Jackson drainage area that they allege were treated differently, starting with Lake View Acres, in their equal protection claim.

Leon County has approved the development of approximately 80 single-family residences on 120 acres in Lake View Acres, utilizing more than half of the Plaintiffs' storm water treatment area. Over half of the property below the 96.5-foot contour line is designated as a permanent conservation easement serving as a forested buffer to Lake Jackson. The development features multiple storm water collection systems, with 95% of it situated above the 100-foot contour line. Compared to the multi-family Lake Club Apartments to the west, the single-family nature of this development results in less impervious surface area. The project complies with all relevant Leon County ordinances and environmental regulations.

Additionally, a multi-family development known as Sombra Del Lago, located on Little Lake Jackson and developed by Pennington and Wilson, was permitted by Leon County to utilize septic tanks and fill dirt below the 100-foot contour, as well as to establish a multi-family development on a sub-acre lot, which breaches the Environmental Matrix Ordinance. This area has green buffers that reduce the direct connection of impervious surfaces compared to the Plaintiffs' proposed apartment project.

A third property, a 158-unit development by Killearn Properties on Little Lake Jackson, was permitted without a storm water treatment facility. Details regarding this development are scarce. A fourth property, Sugar Creek Plaza (Waccamaw Center), was allowed for commercial development below the 120-foot contour line as an exception to the Lake Jackson building moratorium, situated at higher elevations between the 110 and 140-foot contour lines and draining into a larger storm water facility managed by the Northwest Florida Water Management District. 

The Eye Care Center, a fifth property, was developed without a storm water treatment facility, and its permitting by Leon County remains uncertain. It is located significantly further from Lake Jackson, at an elevation of 150 feet, and is smaller than the proposed development. The sixth property, the Hartsfield law firm, is adjacent to Lake Jackson, falls within the lake protection zone, was originally a single-family residence, is below the 100-foot contour line, operates on a septic tank with no sewer, and lacks a storm water treatment facility. The permit issued was for the replacement of an existing septic tank. Lastly, the seventh property identified is the Colson Building, used for commercial publishing.

The Colson Building is situated below the 100-foot contour line, lacks sewer infrastructure, was granted a septic tank permit to replace an existing system, and has no storm water management facility. It generates ink and other by-products. In addition, Leon County made improvements to a boat ramp on Lake Jackson, which involved excavating part of the lake's bottom without a permit.

Regarding legal analysis of Count IV, the equal protection claim does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right. Therefore, the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only requires that Ordinances 88-53, 88-62, and the Estate Zoning Ordinance be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Courts do not assess the wisdom of legislative choices in social and economic policy unless a statutory classification involves suspect lines or infringes fundamental rights. The burden of proof lies with the challenger to disprove any conceivable basis for the statutory classification.

The Ordinances are deemed to satisfy this lenient standard, as the County's interest in protecting Lake Jackson's water quality is acknowledged as legitimate and important. The methods employed, such as zoning regulations based on elevation and limiting development intensity near the Lake, are rationally related to this interest. The rationale is based on the understanding that storm water flows downhill into the Lake, and controlling development in higher elevations may reduce pollution runoff, thereby protecting water quality. Natural filtration through vegetation along the flow path further supports this approach.

Ordinances 88-53 and 88-62 establish development zones based on elevation, progressively restricting development as it approaches lower elevations, which serves the County's legitimate goal of preserving Lake water quality. The facial equal protection challenge to these ordinances lacks merit due to the established evidence. The primary claim from the Plaintiffs is an "as applied" equal protection argument, asserting that the County has granted exceptions to others in similar situations while denying them, thereby claiming intentional discrimination. To succeed in an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that similarly situated individuals are treated differently, as established in relevant case law. Distinctions between dissimilarly situated persons do not violate equal protection rights. A plaintiff must provide evidence of intentional discrimination to prove unequal application of a neutral statute; mere arbitrary enforcement does not suffice. Circumstantial evidence can be used to show purposeful discrimination, particularly if a clear pattern of adverse impact on a specific group is evident. However, the Plaintiffs here focus on differing treatment of other properties rather than establishing a clear adverse impact on themselves. The standard requires that evidence of differing treatment must indicate a pattern of irrationality, and without this, an "as applied" claim lacks a rational basis for differing treatment. It is acknowledged that proving unequal application of a zoning ordinance is challenging due to the unique nature of each parcel. Summary judgment is warranted in this case since undisputed facts demonstrate that other properties were not similarly situated to the Plaintiffs.

In Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, the plaintiffs claim discriminatory intent due to the rezoning of their property to Estate while construction was ongoing. They assert that their property is surrounded by commercial and RM-3 zoning, indicating "spot" zoning against them. However, the County's downzoning was motivated by longstanding concerns for Lake Jackson's water quality, leading to a comprehensive drainage basin plan that did not target the plaintiffs' property specifically. The enacted Ordinances 88-53 and 88-62 applied broadly, affecting a wide area around the Lake Jackson drainage basin without singling out the plaintiffs. Following the ordinances, the existing RM-3 zoning on the plaintiffs' land was inconsistent with the new regulations, prompting the County to initiate a rezoning to resolve this issue. The plaintiffs' construction permits were conditional, warning that construction would be at their own risk due to the ongoing rezoning.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any intent to discriminate or irrationality in the County's actions. Comparisons with other developments, such as Lake View Acres and Waccamaw Center, revealed that these were not similarly situated to the plaintiffs' proposed multi-family project. Lake View Acres predominantly features single-family homes and conservation easements, while Waccamaw Center is at a higher elevation and farther from the Lake. Other cited developments, including the Eye Care Center and the Hartsfield Law Firm building, lacked significant similarity to the plaintiffs' project, with no evidence of comparable impacts or zoning issues. Ultimately, no pattern of discriminatory treatment was established against the plaintiffs.

Work conducted in the area was temporary and did not result in permanent structures near the water's edge. The multi-family developments cited by Plaintiffs, Sombra Del Lago and a 158-unit project by Killearn Properties, are similar to the proposed development but are located on Little Lake Jackson, not Lake Jackson. Notably, Little Lake Jackson only connects to Lake Jackson periodically. Evidence indicates that Sombra Del Lago had fill dirt below the 100-foot contour, but there are no records of any buildings or parking lots being in that area. The Killearn Properties development lacks a stormwater facility, and there is no data on its building elevations or proximity to Little Lake Jackson.

The County's decisions regarding these developments do not suggest intentional discrimination against Plaintiffs. Since Little Lake Jackson's connection to Lake Jackson is intermittent, any stormwater runoff from these developments would rarely reach Lake Jackson. The allowance of fill dirt below the 100-foot contour for Sombra Del Lago is not relevant to Plaintiffs' plans, which involve constructing buildings rather than placing fill. The differences between the cited developments and Plaintiffs' proposal are rational and highlight the absence of intentional discrimination regarding the denial of multi-family development on Plaintiffs' 12.96 acres.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs have already developed all but this remaining parcel out of their original 165 acres, with a commitment to build above certain contour lines. Consequently, there is no reasonable inference of intentional discrimination, and the Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Count IV. Regarding Count II, which alleges arbitrary and capricious denial of substantive due process, this claim fails due to the absence of a due process property interest, rendering an alternative ruling unnecessary.

An alternative ruling addresses the complexities surrounding the "property interest" determination, focusing on a substantive due process claim against Ordinances 88-53 and 88-62, alongside the 1989 rezoning Ordinance and the County's denial of development permits. This claim encompasses both a facial challenge and an "as applied" challenge regarding the refusal to grant exceptions. For the facial challenge, a statute does not violate the Due Process Clause if it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, provided there is no fundamental interest at stake. Zoning regulations are deemed unconstitutional only if they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, lacking a significant connection to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. The challenged Ordinances satisfy this rational basis test, leading to a dismissal of the facial claim.

Similarly, the "as applied" challenge fails as the evidence does not support claims of arbitrary or capricious actions by the County, highlighting a rational distinction between the plaintiffs' development and other developments. Consequently, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Count II.

Count III's claim of a "taking" in violation of substantive due process also fails due to the absence of a recognized property interest under Florida equitable estoppel principles. Prior dismissal of the claim regarding the taking of all economic uses of the property results in judgment favoring the defendant for this claim as well. In addressing the due process takings claim, the court applies guidance from Reahard v. Lee County, noting that a claim of denial of "all or substantially all economically viable use" of property necessitates an analysis of the regulation's impact on investment-backed expectations, considering the property's zoning history and the landowner's reasonable expectations under state common law.

The land in question measures 12.96 acres, with 0.43 acres situated above the 105-foot contour line. Rezoning was granted based on the Plaintiffs' commitment not to develop below this contour line or near the holding ponds, establishing that Plaintiffs did not have reasonable expectations for such development. Consequently, their due process takings claim is deemed insufficient. 

Regarding Count V for inverse condemnation, the court previously abstained from addressing this claim to allow a related state court case to proceed. The current status of that case remains unaddressed by the involved parties, but further opportunities for discussion will be provided. 

The court's orders include: 
1. Granting Defendant's summary judgment motion as to the standing of Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd., while denying it for other Plaintiffs. 
2. Granting summary judgment on the merits of Counts II, III, and IV, with a future judgment for the Defendant expected upon the resolution of Count V.
3. Requiring parties to submit memoranda on Count V's status by February 24, 1995.
4. Staying discovery until the viability of Count V is determined, with pending discovery motions held in abeyance.
5. Cancelling the scheduled trial. 
6. Directing the Clerk to return the case file on February 27, 1995.

The excerpt further cites relevant Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding summary judgment, emphasizing that mere allegations are insufficient to counter a properly supported motion, and that specific factual evidence is required. Additionally, it notes that the status of any potential review by the Florida Supreme Court remains unclear.

The final administrative order from the state hearing officer, which is the subject of an appeal to the circuit court, indicates that the case was heard under the authority of Florida Statute 120.65(9) and a contract with Leon County. This contract appears to grant the hearing officer final authority, as reflected in the order being labeled a "final order." If the hearing had been conducted under Florida Statute 120.57, discovery per the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure would have been allowed, but it remains unclear if discovery was available in this case. 

The excerpt discusses principles of offensive collateral estoppel, emphasizing that it should only apply if the opposing party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the same issue in a previous case. The state appellate court's decision was limited to the record available to it, and collateral estoppel is applicable despite the County's failure to present sufficient evidence regarding its standing. 

Furthermore, it is noted that all property ownership changes were documented through recorded deeds in Leon County, and the property in question was lost in foreclosure on July 23, 1993. The order highlights that while there is extensive evidence, the essential facts are not disputed unless stated otherwise, with specific references to testimonies and affidavits that clarify the planning and development aspects related to the property.

Pelham's deposition on August 30, 1990, indicates that the land above the 105-foot contour measures 0.43 acres, as affirmed by Wilkes in a supplemental affidavit. Large maps supporting this claim were submitted during oral arguments. On September 25, 1972, Pelham, in his capacity as president of Equity Resources, Inc., communicated with the Board of County Commissioners regarding proposed development contingent on the granting of RM-3 zoning. He emphasized the necessity for high-rise structures along the lake to mitigate runoff from smaller buildings, although he later clarified that this representation did not pertain to the Faulk rezoning application but to a different parcel with existing office-residential zoning across U.S. Highway 27. The court will disregard this statement in summary judgment due to factual disputes regarding its applicability to the current land in question. However, the representation of high-rise development in a September 18, 1972, letter remains unchallenged, supported by a model presented to the County Commission showing high-rise buildings on specific tracts. The document references various affidavits and minutes from Board of County Commissioners records, indicating extensive documentation and evidence related to the case, including multiple entries from BCC Books that detail relevant proceedings and filings.

The Commission's considerations from February 1988 included allowing exceptions for uses that could be demonstrated to have no negative impact on Lake Jackson's water quality. The minutes of the Board of County Commissioners first reference "vested rights," though this opinion only reflects the views of two Commissioners and does not represent the Board's official stance. The rezoning process initiated with at least a majority vote, despite claims of unanimous adoption, as indicated by Chairman Nelson's comments on Agricultural Zoning analysis. A notice from the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department informed property owners about a rezoning petition on July 17, 1989, leading to a public hearing on August 22, 1989. 

Additionally, affidavits and various documents outline the properties involved, including a 125-acre parcel bought by Bent Tree, Ltd., and a 40-acre parcel bought by Pelham, with the latter being developed into Villas Phase I. Legal principles highlighted in the affidavits suggest that failing to estop the government would be inequitable for the private citizen. The property was previously unzoned, and the developer sought zoning for multi-family development. The burden of proof for summary judgment motions is governed by federal law, emphasizing that equitable relief requires the claimant to maintain "clean hands."

A party seeking equitable relief must demonstrate "clean hands," as established in Hennessy v. Hudson, meaning they cannot seek consideration from a court if they have engaged in unethical conduct. This principle is illustrated by a case where the plaintiff provided a check for a contract deposit despite knowing it was not covered by funds. The concept of clean hands remains a cited rule in Florida law, as seen in Macnamara v. Kissimmee River Valley Sportsmans' Ass'n. Additionally, zoning laws in effect at the time of a permit decision govern applications made after the required public notice, as stated in City of Boynton Beach v. Carroll. The Constitution does not create property interests but provides procedural protections for interests derived from state law, as supported by Leis v. Flynt. The Supreme Court has been cautious in recognizing new fundamental rights under substantive due process, and the definition of "property" for such purposes is not explicitly set by the U.S. Constitution. The Reserve, Ltd. v. Town of Longboat Key indicates that a substantive due process claim can arise from state law principles like equitable estoppel, though it does not address the existence of such a claim in relation to legislative actions. Assertions about storm water runoff and contaminants from Lake View Acres require personal knowledge for affidavits, as outlined in Rule 56(e).

Pelham's qualifications and personal measurements regarding the case have not been adequately established to support his opinions under Federal Rules of Evidence 701 or 702, rendering his statements insufficient as evidence for the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The ability to estimate impervious areas relative to other developments can be visually assessed without specialized expertise. There exists a genuine factual dispute concerning the volume of stormwater entering the Plaintiffs' treatment facility. Little Lake Jackson, approximately 10 acres and separated from Lake Jackson by a four-lane highway, is referenced in the context of the case. The Plaintiffs do not contest the original construction of a building but object to the recent permitting of a septic tank. There is no reliable evidence indicating that a commercial enterprise in the area is discharging harmful substances into Lake Jackson. The subsequent analysis presented in the document may not rely strictly on the case's factual record due to differing legal purposes. The Equal Protection Clause mandates equal treatment for similarly situated individuals, with intentional discrimination required to prove a denial of equal protection. Judge Kravitch's dissent suggests that rationality rather than intent should guide the analysis of claims like the one at hand. Additionally, it is noted that Lake View Acres contributes some stormwater drainage to the Plaintiffs' holding pond. The School Board's rule is presumed valid, shifting the burden to demonstrate a lack of rational connection between the Board's actions and its educational interests. A facial challenge to the legislation focuses on whether the County had a legitimate rationale for its decisions. Federal courts refrain from reassessing the motives behind legislative actions but may examine if a rational basis exists for governmental decisions. Lastly, a Florida ruling indicates that takings claims are not ripe for federal court review until state remedies have been exhausted.