Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.

Citations: 746 P.2d 1319; 155 Ariz. 389Docket: 1 CA-CIV 9159

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; January 14, 1988; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed an appeal involving Richard G. Godbehere and other plaintiffs, including employees of the Maricopa County Sheriff's office, against Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. and several of its staff. The plaintiffs alleged that 58 articles published by the defendants falsely accused them of various illegal activities, including misconduct and incompetence, thereby damaging their reputations and causing emotional distress. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the libel claims but granted dismissal for the invasion of privacy claims, ruling that the defendants' conduct did not meet the threshold for 'false light' invasion of privacy. The appellate court emphasized that, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, all allegations in the complaint must be assumed true. However, it concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish a viable cause of action for false light, thus affirming the trial court's ruling. The defendants argued that First Amendment rights complicate the presumption of falsity, but the court noted that this argument pertained to the burden of proof at trial, not the standard for a motion to dismiss.

Arizona's recognition of invasion of privacy as a legal cause of action began with the case Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co. In subsequent rulings, the Arizona courts adopted Professor Prosser's classification of the tort into four distinct categories: 1) Intrusion upon seclusion or private affairs; 2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; 3) Publicity placing a plaintiff in a false light; and 4) Appropriation of a plaintiff's name or likeness for the defendant's advantage. The Restatement (Second) of Torts highlights the tort's focus on emotional distress rather than reputational harm, paralleling libel and slander laws. Arizona case law asserts that claims of emotional distress due to invasion of privacy must involve conduct that meets the threshold for intentional infliction of emotional distress, defined as extreme and outrageous behavior. The court in Duhammel v. Star emphasized that a failure to plead such a claim precludes an invasion of privacy allegation. Additionally, the requirement for demonstrating outrageous conduct applies to claims involving the disclosure of private facts, ensuring that the invasion of privacy claim cannot be used to bypass the standards for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The overarching aim of these privacy theories is to protect individuals' rights to a private life and to secure compensation for mental distress caused by privacy invasions.

Plaintiffs argue for the adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E standard regarding false light invasion of privacy, which requires showing that the false light is highly offensive and that the actor knew or acted with reckless disregard regarding its falsity. They contend this standard is less stringent than the 'outrageous conduct' standard established in Arizona case law. Arizona typically follows the Restatement unless there is contrary authority, as noted in Barnum v. Rural Fire Protection Co. However, in Duhammel, the court specified that extreme outrageousness is necessary for claims of invasion of privacy based on false light, a standard reiterated in Rutledge v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. The court emphasized that the focus of such claims is on mental anguish rather than damage to reputation. The term 'outrageous conduct' is defined as behavior that is extremely intolerable within a civilized community. The court is responsible for determining if the alleged actions meet this standard. After reviewing the complaint's appended exhibits, which depict the plaintiffs negatively, the court found these publications not extreme or outrageous enough to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, thus affirming the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim. There was agreement among parties that the formal judgment incorrectly dismissed count II, which is unrelated to invasion of privacy. The issue of costs awarded by the trial court was not contested, and the request for attorney fees from the appellee due to the appeal being frivolous was denied. The trial court's dismissal of counts III, VI, and XV was upheld, while the dismissal of count II was reversed, with the case remanded for further proceedings. Judges Kleinschmidt and Greer concurred.