Smith v. State

Citations: 512 S.E.2d 19; 236 Ga. App. 548; 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 672; 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 104Docket: A98A2280

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; February 3, 1999; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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Charles Smith was convicted after a bench trial for driving under the influence (DUI), driving without a license, and driving without proof of insurance. He appeals the DUI and driving without a license convictions, arguing that the trial court wrongly denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his stop, claiming the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion. The Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld the trial court's decision, stating that the evidence must be viewed favorably to support the trial court's findings.

The arresting officer testified that she observed Smith weaving erratically within his lane shortly after an automobile race ended, a time known for increased drunk driving incidents. Despite following him without seeing any legitimate reason for his weaving, she formed a suspicion based on her experience linking such behavior to alcohol impairment. The court referenced previous cases, particularly Semich v. State, where weaving within a lane, alongside other factors, justified a stop despite not being a crime on its own. The court concluded that Smith’s weaving provided reasonable suspicion of intoxication, allowing the officer to conduct a stop for public safety. Ultimately, the court affirmed that the officer's actions were reasonable and not arbitrary, emphasizing the need to prevent potential danger to the public.

The trial court's denial of Smith's motion to suppress evidence was upheld. Smith contended that he was entitled to Miranda warnings when asked to exit his vehicle for field sobriety tests, claiming he was under arrest because the officer indicated he could not leave. However, the court found that roadside questioning during a routine traffic stop does not equate to custodial arrest. Miranda protections apply only when a person's freedom of action is significantly restricted, akin to formal arrest. The officer's observations of Smith's weaving, slurred speech, and expired license supported the decision to conduct sobriety tests, but did not indicate that Smith was in custody prior to his formal arrest. The trial court concluded that a reasonable person in Smith's situation would not perceive their detention as anything more than temporary, and therefore, Miranda warnings were not required until after his arrest for DUI.

The trial court's decision regarding the motion to suppress evidence was upheld, as it was not clearly erroneous, supported by the precedent set in State v. Dible. The court compared the case to Hughes v. State, where the Supreme Court affirmed that an arrest occurred when an officer told a detainee he could not leave, noting that the facts in Hughes involved more than a temporary detention. In this instance, the officer was still investigating when Smith was asked to step out of the car, and there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's ruling. The appellate court must accept the trial court's factual determinations unless found clearly erroneous.

Additionally, Smith claimed the trial court abused its discretion by allowing evidence of two prior DUI convictions from Oregon, arguing that the state failed to demonstrate the comparability of the Oregon statute to Georgia's DUI law, that the convictions improperly introduced character evidence, and that the prejudicial impact outweighed probative value. However, the court allowed the evidence, citing its relevance to demonstrate Smith's "bent of mind" and course of conduct. The introduction of prior DUI offenses is permissible to establish a pattern of behavior, and the trial court's decision to admit such evidence is typically not disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion. Prior DUI offenses are relevant to prove a defendant's intent to drive under the influence, thereby affirming the admissibility of the evidence in relation to the current charge.

Smith incorrectly interprets OCGA § 40-6-391(h)(3) as necessitating a different outcome. This statute considers out-of-state convictions as 'prior convictions' only if they substantially conform to Georgia law, which pertains to punishment and sentencing rather than the admissibility of evidence during the guilt phase. Other references in Chapter 6 focus on sentencing, not evidentiary issues, which are addressed in Title 24 of the Code. Evidence of a prior offense does not require a conviction, meaning the state was not obligated to prove that Smith would have been convicted under Georgia law for the similar transaction evidence to be admissible. The relevant factor was Smith's previous DUI behavior, irrespective of the state in which it occurred. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the probative value against potential prejudice of the DUI evidence.

Smith also contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay travel expenses for Oregon police witnesses. However, OCGA § 17-11-1 permits the imposition of costs against a convicted defendant, including witness expenses. Despite Smith's claims that the costs did not accrue in the trial court or involved prosecution officers, no authority prohibits charging such costs for witnesses who testify about similar transactions. Additionally, expenses for hotel and airline travel fall under 'all costs accruing in the trial courts' as outlined in OCGA § 17-11-1. The judgment was affirmed with no identified errors.