People v. Krivda

Citations: 486 P.2d 1262; 5 Cal. 3d 357; 96 Cal. Rptr. 62; 1971 Cal. LEXIS 258Docket: Crim. 15295

Court: California Supreme Court; July 12, 1971; California; State Supreme Court

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The case involves an appeal by the People against the defendants, Judith Krivda and others, regarding the issue of whether the defendants abandoned their reasonable expectation of privacy over contraband placed in trash barrels, which were subsequently left for collection. The facts reveal that on July 1, 1968, an anonymous tip alerted Officer Gates to potential narcotic activities involving the defendants at their residence. Subsequent surveillance led officers to observe trash barrels positioned for collection outside their home, which were later searched by officers after being emptied by refuse collectors. The officers discovered marijuana remnants and other incriminating evidence. 

Defendants were charged with possession of marijuana, but the trial court had previously denied their motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the trash. After further developments, including a related appeal and a motion to "reopen" the suppression ruling, the court ultimately granted the motion to suppress on December 12, leading to the dismissal of the case. The appeal centers on the trial court's jurisdiction to reconsider the suppression motion, as the initial denial had become final. It is concluded that the proper recourse for reviewing the denial of a suppression motion lies in an extraordinary writ of mandate or prohibition, not through a renewed motion post-denial.

The appeal from the order of dismissal should be denied because the evidence sought to be suppressed was obtained through an unlawful search and seizure, and it is the only evidence that could sustain a conviction. The prosecution argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendants' renewed motion to suppress. This claim is supported by section 1538.5, subdivision (i.1], which allows defendants to file a motion to suppress or to renew a prior motion only at a special de novo hearing in superior court before trial. It also stipulates that any further review must be done through an extraordinary writ within 30 days of the denial of the motion at the special hearing. Prior cases, including People v. Superior Court (Edmonds) and People v. O'Brien, confirm that the superior court cannot entertain a renewed motion to suppress that has already been denied at a special hearing, both before and after the 30-day period for seeking extraordinary relief. Allowing such rehearings would lead to inefficiencies and undermine the purpose of section 1538.5, which is to streamline the judicial process and limit the number of times search and seizure issues can be raised pretrial. Defendants argue that their renewed motion, framed as a request to "reopen," should allow the original judge to reconsider his decision. While some cases recognize a court's inherent power to reconsider prior orders, the statute restricts defendants to one pretrial motion to suppress evidence, with no entitlement to a second hearing before trial.

The legal principles outlined indicate that procedural rulings, such as motions to suppress, are subject to modification before final judgment, as established in various cases, including Greene v. Superior Court and City of San Diego v. Superior Court. The Legislature intends for an order denying a motion to suppress to become final 30 days after issuance unless extraordinary appellate relief is sought, to prevent unnecessary relitigation and delays in trial. Courts retain the inherent authority to reconsider such orders within this 30-day window, discouraging successive motions on the same facts.

In the case at hand, the defendants did not seek reconsideration within the designated 30-day period following the denial of their motion to suppress, rendering the trial court's later order granting a renewed motion void due to lack of jurisdiction. However, since both parties have addressed the merits of the motion, the court chose to rule on it rather than remand for trial. The court concluded that the original motion to suppress should have been granted, as the prosecution acknowledged there was no additional evidence against the defendants. The People argued that the search of the defendants' trash barrels was reasonable, citing the barrels' public location and suggesting the defendants had abandoned their privacy expectation concerning the trash.

Several legal cases have evaluated searches in open fields or areas surrounding a house based on whether these spaces qualify as "constitutionally protected areas." However, this terminology does not resolve all illegal search and seizure claims. A more effective standard is the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, which assesses whether an individual's privacy expectation was violated by unreasonable government actions. The cases of People v. Edwards and People v. Bradley, although decided after the events leading to the defendants' arrest, do not introduce a new constitutional principle but rather reaffirm existing standards established in Katz v. United States. Katz determined that government surveillance activities violated the privacy expected by an individual, thus constituting an unreasonable search and seizure without prior judicial approval.

In the current case, the search's validity will be evaluated based on these principles. The facts differ from Edwards, where officers searched trash in an "open back yard area," requiring them to trespass to conduct the search. While the nature of the intrusion is relevant, it is not definitive; the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches, not merely trespasses. The key issue is whether the defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning their trash. The prosecution argues that placing the trash barrels near the sidewalk for collection indicates abandonment of the contents. However, this placement does not inherently signify that the trash was abandoned to the public or police, as many municipalities regulate trash collection, allowing only licensed collectors to remove it under specific ordinances.

Municipal ordinances typically prohibit unauthorized tampering with trash containers, suggesting that the contents of trash do not become public property merely by being placed on the sidewalk. There is an expectation of privacy when individuals dispose of their property in trash cans, as noted in the case of Edwards, where the marijuana was not visible without rummaging through the trash. The defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their trash, as it was concealed and not visible without searching the contents. The officers’ examination of the trash after it was placed in the refuse truck did not alter this expectation, as the trash had not lost its identity. 

It is acknowledged that some invasion of privacy may occur, such as by trash collectors or children, but not to the extent of police searches without a warrant. The unreasonable governmental intrusion into the defendants' privacy violated their rights. Since the marijuana found was a result of an illegal search, it should be suppressed under Penal Code section 1538.5. Additionally, the contraband found in the defendants' home was deemed "tainted fruit of the poisonous tree" and should also be excluded. The lack of further evidence against the defendants led to the proper dismissal of the action under Penal Code section 1385. The judgment of dismissal is affirmed, with concurrence from Justices Peters, Tobriner, and Mosk, while Chief Justice Wright concurs in part and dissents regarding the renewal of motions to suppress evidence.

The author disagrees with the notion that the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to trash placed at the curb adjacent to public areas. They assert that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their curbside trash and that the police's use of authorized trash collectors does not constitute an unreasonable seizure. While acknowledging that trash cans located close to a home may be protected, the author argues that this protection does not extend to trash placed in public view. They reference prior cases, including *People v. Edwards* and *Hoffa v. United States*, to illustrate that reasonable expectations of privacy are linked to the location of the trash. The author critiques the majority's reliance on *Katz v. United States* and emphasizes that expectations of privacy must be grounded in the physical context and nature of the items discarded. They conclude that individuals should recognize the risk that their discarded trash may be examined by authorities, asserting that such expectations do not warrant constitutional protection. The author would reverse the judgment, with concurrence from Justices McComb and Sullivan, while noting that a petition for rehearing was denied.

Section 1538.5(i) grants defendants in felony cases the right to challenge the validity of search or seizure in a special hearing prior to trial, provided they were held to answer at a preliminary hearing or indicted. This motion must be initiated at least 10 days after notifying the prosecution, unless the prosecution waives this timeframe. The hearing allows for de novo litigation based on evidence presented. If the motion is denied, defendants have 30 days to seek review through an extraordinary writ of mandate or prohibition.

The process under Section 1538.5 is akin to a full trial, as a superior court hears the matter as a finder of fact. Orders following such hearings resemble judgments rather than simple procedural rulings. Courts have upheld the authority to reconsider prior rulings within a 30-day period before trial. In related cases, courts have clarified that review via mandate is appropriate solely for jurisdictional issues and not for ordinary judicial errors.

Additionally, if defendants abandoned contraband found in trash, it may weaken the prosecution's case for possession. However, in this instance, the contraband led to further evidence in the defendant's apartment, supporting a conviction. The placement of trash barrels at the curb, as required by local ordinances, does not imply intent to abandon the contents, nor does a prohibition against tampering with trash containers alter this conclusion, as such ordinances serve to protect municipal collection rights.