United States v. González-Meléndez

Citation: 594 F.3d 28Docket: 19-1301

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; February 15, 2010; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Felix Gonzalez-Melendez was convicted of aiding and abetting a carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119(1) and (2). The First Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed several issues related to his conviction and sentence, including prior out-of-court statements related to the case and the handling of a jury note requesting legal instructions. The court affirmed the conviction, noting that while the trial had some issues, they were not severe enough to invalidate it. However, the government conceded that Gonzalez-Melendez was not allowed to allocute before sentencing, leading the court to vacate the sentence and remand for re-sentencing. 

The case originated from Gonzalez-Melendez's dissatisfaction after being passed over for a promotion to production manager at Essroc San Juan, despite being the sole qualified applicant. Angered by the management's decision to hire Kevin Grotheer, who had previously worked at another Essroc plant, Gonzalez-Melendez expressed a desire for Grotheer to be physically harmed. He conspired with acquaintances to carjack Grotheer, intending to intimidate him into leaving Puerto Rico. The plan was executed in November 2006, resulting in Grotheer being carjacked at gunpoint and robbed of $700 while being left unharmed on the roadside. Following the incident, Grotheer received a threatening message and ultimately relocated for his safety, eventually leaving Puerto Rico altogether due to ongoing fears.

The investigation into the carjacking involved interviews with Gonzalez-Melendez, who implicated his accomplices and expressed resentment towards Grotheer, the new production manager. During this interview, he admitted to wishing physical harm on Grotheer to prompt his departure from Puerto Rico. A grand jury subsequently indicted Gonzalez-Melendez for aiding and abetting a carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 and for using a firearm in relation to the carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At trial, he challenged various district court rulings, including jury selection procedures, evidentiary decisions regarding out-of-court statements by Grotheer and Evans, and his lack of access to prior statements made by Evans to the FBI recorded on an FD-302 Form. He also objected to the court's handling of a jury note, claiming he was not informed about it and had no chance to propose a response, which he argued violated Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Ultimately, the jury convicted him on the carjacking charge but acquitted him on the firearms charge. The district court sentenced him to 121 months, the minimum within the Guidelines, and three years of supervised release, without providing him an opportunity to allocute. A timely appeal followed. Upon initial review, the government acknowledged that the district court did not independently review the FD-302 Form, leading to a remand for this purpose and to address the handling of the jury note. On remand, the district court ordered the FD-302 Form to be disclosed to Gonzalez-Melendez's counsel and maintained that it had reviewed the Form and deemed it non-discoverable under the Jencks Act. The court also recounted its procedures regarding the jury note, stating that it had discussed it with counsel and provided the jury with relevant documents.

Appellant challenges the jury selection process in this case, where the district court utilized the 'blind strike' method, allowing both parties to simultaneously exercise peremptory challenges without knowledge of each other's strikes. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a non-capital felony defendant is typically entitled to ten peremptory challenges, while the prosecution receives six. If alternate jurors are seated, each party is granted an additional challenge specifically for those alternates. In this case, the court seated two alternates, thereby giving the defense eleven total challenges and the prosecution seven. However, the court failed to designate which jurors were alternates during voir dire, allowing strikes against an undesignated pool instead. The defendant argues this procedure violated Rule 24(c), which mandates that additional challenges be used solely against designated alternate jurors, thereby hindering his ability to exercise peremptory challenges effectively. The appellate court reviewed this issue de novo, determining that the district court erred by not designating alternate jurors during voir dire, as required by the rule. The court noted that the failure to designate the alternates impaired the defendant's rights, referencing past decisions that suggest such errors should lead to automatic reversal. However, recent Supreme Court rulings indicate that not all errors in peremptory challenges result in automatic reversal; the focus should be on whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights.

Non-constitutional errors are considered harmless when it is highly probable that they did not influence the verdict. Previous cases established that violations of Rule 24(c) did not affect defendants' substantial rights, with skepticism expressed about their prejudicial impact. In this instance, a distinction was noted due to an alternate juror being seated, but it was concluded that the jury's composition likely would not have differed significantly even if the rule had been followed. Thus, the court's error was deemed harmless.

Regarding evidentiary objections, the appellant contended that testimony about a threatening voice message should have been excluded as hearsay or unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. The court afforded considerable deference to the district court's evidentiary rulings. The hearsay argument was found insufficiently developed, lacking clarity on whether the testimony was offered for its truth or under any exceptions to the hearsay rule, leading to its waiver. The appellant's argument about undue prejudice was also deemed harmless, as substantial evidence of the appellant's animosity towards the victim was presented, including testimony about his hostile relationship and intent to harm Grotheer.

Evidence of a voicemail did not influence the trial's outcome, rendering any related error harmless, as established in United States v. Adams and United States v. Mangual-Santiago. On remand, the district court addressed a potential violation of the Jencks Act concerning the disclosure of a FD-302 Form containing statements from Lawrence Evans. The court instructed the defendant’s counsel to identify relevant trial materials but Gonzalez-Melendez refrained from arguing the issue due to ongoing appellate jurisdiction. The district court, after evaluating testimony from FBI Agent Rubén A. Marchand-Morales, determined that the FD-302 did not qualify as a "written statement of a witness" or a "substantially verbatim recital" under 18 U.S.C. 3500. Morales clarified he did not record Evans’s statement but took notes, which he used to compile the FD-302. The court reaffirmed its view that the document was a summary rather than a verbatim account and noted that Evans did not adopt or approve the statements. Reviewing the district court's findings for abuse of discretion revealed no clear error, as the nature of the FD-302 and the circumstances of its creation raised doubts about its classification under the Jencks Act.

In Goldberg v. United States, the Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of determining if prosecutors' notes were read to the witness, Newman, and if he adopted them, as per the Jencks Act. A written witness summary is not considered a statement unless there is evidence of the witness's approval after reviewing it. In the present case, Gonzalez-Melendez did not argue that the witness, Evans, adopted the notes, leading to an affirmation of the district court's finding that the 302 Form was not within the Jencks Act's scope.

Regarding the jury's first note, which requested copies of the indictment and instructions and included the phrase "please explain," the court noted that the district court failed to inform the parties about the note and its response. Although this omission typically violates Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the district court clarified its routine practice of providing such documents to the jury. Despite inconsistencies in the record, it appeared likely that the defendant was informed of the note, and any potential error in handling it was deemed harmless.

Finally, the court addressed the cumulative error doctrine, stating that individual errors that do not warrant reversal may collectively undermine confidence in the fairness of the trial. It highlighted that considerations for cumulative error include the nature and number of errors, their interrelationship, how the district court managed them, trial length, and the government's case strength.

The district court's alleged errors regarding jury selection, evidentiary objections, and handling of a jury note were deemed relatively minor and not interrelated, leading to the conclusion that the appellant's conviction should remain intact. However, the court found significant issues regarding sentencing, specifically that the appellant was denied the right to address the court prior to sentencing, as mandated by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). The right of allocution is historically significant, and its denial is typically not considered harmless. The district court's failure to invite the appellant to speak before sentencing constituted a serious error that cannot be overlooked, necessitating a reversal of the sentence without assessing prejudice. As the sentencing guidelines have shifted post-Booker, the opportunity for the defendant to advocate for a non-guidelines sentence is critical. Consequently, while the conviction is affirmed, the sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for re-sentencing to allow the appellant the opportunity to allocute.

The jury requested copies of the indictment and court instructions, along with clarification on an unspecified issue, which the district court addressed. The appellant's argument under Rule 403 was treated as preserved, although there is a strong indication it was not, as no objections were made during trial regarding witness testimony on those grounds. New objections raised on appeal are subject to plain error review only. The court affirmed that the Form was not discoverable under the Jencks Act, negating the need for a stringent harmless error review. The jury's initial note did not indicate significant confusion or need for clarification, and they continued deliberating without issue, suggesting that any confusion had resolved prior to reaching a verdict, resulting in no prejudice to the appellant. Rule 32 mandates that a defendant be allowed to address the court before sentencing. Since the case is remanded for re-sentencing, the appellant's other sentencing arguments are not addressed, and he may seek a non-guidelines sentence upon re-sentencing.