Gildernew v. Quarantillo

Citations: 594 F.3d 131; 2010 WL 375932Docket: 08-6301-cv

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; February 3, 2010; Federal Appellate Court

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Francis B. Gildernew, a native of Ireland, filed a lawsuit against various U.S. government officials after the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) denied his application for naturalization. Gildernew argued that his absence from the U.S. for over fourteen months did not disqualify him from naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1427, a claim rejected by the CIS. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Gildernew's motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' cross-motion, affirming the CIS's denial. Gildernew had applied for naturalization in 2002, passed the initial requirements, and sought a reentry permit in 2004 while anticipating a one-year trip to Ireland. However, he left the U.S. in September 2004 and faced entry issues in April 2005 due to being on a TSA 'no-fly' list. He returned to the U.S. in November 2005, and while CIS initially approved his application in May 2006, it later reopened the case upon discovering his extended absence. Ultimately, the CIS denied his application in July 2006, stating that his absence during the application process rendered him ineligible for citizenship. Gildernew's appeal followed the district court's ruling.

The agency invoked 8 U.S.C. § 1427, which mandates continuous residence in the U.S. from the application date until citizenship admission, and stipulates that any absence exceeding one year breaks this continuity (§ 1427(b)). The case at hand questions whether this statute bars the Plaintiff's naturalization. The court confirmed that it does, affirming the district court's summary judgment. The Plaintiff incorrectly argued that the one-year absence provision in § 1427(b) applies solely to the period before the naturalization interview, contradicting the statute's explicit language that encompasses the entire required continuous residence period, both before and after the application filing. The Plaintiff's interpretation misreads the statute, particularly regarding a related provision that addresses absences of six months to under a year, which does not limit the continuous residency requirement to the time before filing or interview. The court noted that the two relevant clauses in § 1427(b) define the applicable period for continuous residence, including the time between application and any administrative hearing if the application is denied. Since the Plaintiff’s hearing occurred over a year after his return to the U.S., even if the earlier provision applied, it would not benefit him. Additionally, the court declined to interpret legislative intent due to the statute's clarity, rejecting the Plaintiff's argument regarding legislative history.

Plaintiff acknowledges his initial departure from the United States was voluntary but claims his subsequent absence became involuntary when he was barred from reentry in April 2005 due to errors by the Defendant-agencies. He argues that denying him eligibility is unjust since he attempted to return, yet was prevented from doing so. However, the court finds that the circumstances do not warrant relief from the statutory requirements, specifically the continuous residence requirement, nor does Plaintiff establish grounds for estoppel. The court concludes that Plaintiff's additional arguments lack merit, affirming the district court's judgment. Additionally, Janet Napolitano is substituted for Michael Chertoff as a defendant in her official capacity, and the Clerk of the Court is instructed to update the official case caption accordingly.