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Lebbos v. State Bar
Citations: 806 P.2d 317; 53 Cal. 3d 37; 278 Cal. Rptr. 845; 91 Daily Journal DAR 3202; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1884; 1991 Cal. LEXIS 1244Docket: S011535
Court: California Supreme Court; March 18, 1991; California; State Supreme Court
Betsey Warren Lebbos, admitted to practice law in California since July 18, 1975, faces disbarment following a recommendation from the Review Department of the State Bar Court. The hearing panel identified nine counts of misconduct involving forty separate acts, including: 1. **Commingling Funds**: Lebbos mixed client Robert Miller's funds with her personal funds, violating former rule 8-101(A) of the State Bar Rules, though there was no intent to misappropriate. 2. **Alteration of Court Documents**: She knowingly filed and served an altered court order with a forged signature to mislead the court, violating multiple provisions of the Business and Professions Code and former rule 7-105(1). 3. **Concealment of Assets and False Testimony**: Lebbos concealed her assets from the court and counsel, providing false testimony during a deposition, violating several provisions of the Business and Professions Code and former rule 7-105(1). 4. **False Statements Against a Judge**: She made false statements to disqualify a judge and altered a stipulation without consent, further lying to the State Bar about the matter, in violation of the same provisions. 5. **Disruptive Conduct**: Lebbos appeared before a recused judge and behaved disruptively, violating multiple sections of the Business and Professions Code and former rule 7-105(1). 6. **Offensive Statements**: Between 1986 and 1987, she made a series of offensive statements against judges and opposing counsel, violating several provisions of the Business and Professions Code. 7. **False Statements in a Campaign Against the Bench**: From 1986 to 1988, she made numerous false statements about judges and others, constituting a concerted attack on the Santa Clara judicial system. The court concluded that the State Bar's recommendation for disbarment was appropriate based on the severity of the misconduct. Petitioner engaged in multiple frivolous motions to disqualify judges in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, violating several provisions of the Business and Professions Code and the Rules of Professional Conduct. She failed to apply for reconsideration as mandated by the Code of Civil Procedure and did not disclose prior adverse rulings in subsequent motions. Additionally, she sent offensive letters to judges with the intent to provoke recusals, which the hearing panel deemed a persistent pattern of harassment that disrupted the Family Court and burdened the overall justice system. Her actions led to special handling of her cases, causing additional costs and delays for other litigants. Furthermore, petitioner improperly named an individual as a plaintiff in a lawsuit without their consent, contravening legal ethics guidelines. The hearing panel recommended disbarment due to her multiple acts of misconduct, including falsehoods and document alterations, which constituted moral turpitude. The panel highlighted her pattern of misconduct, the impact on judicial administration, and her refusal to acknowledge any wrongdoing during the proceedings. Petitioner did not present mitigating evidence aside from her lack of prior discipline. In her defense, petitioner disputes the State Bar's jurisdiction and claims that her actions were constitutionally protected. She alleges she is being punished for attempting to address judicial abuses and for exercising free speech, although these assertions lack clear connections to the evidence presented in her case. The Review Department's findings and recommendations for disbarment are upheld, with the burden on petitioner to show that the decision should not stand, requiring convincing proof against the charges. Petitioner engaged in multiple acts of professional misconduct, including commingling client funds, submitting altered court documents to deceive, concealing assets from a creditor, and making false statements to a client regarding a court order. These actions constituted moral turpitude and a significant breach of professional standards, justifying disbarment. The repeated acts of dishonesty and misconduct, along with disruptive behavior during State Bar proceedings, indicate a lack of respect for legal ethics. The petitioner’s claims of misconduct by the State Bar, including allegations of racketeering and violations of federal law, lack persuasive evidence and appear to focus on undermining the disciplinary process rather than addressing her own violations. Ultimately, the seriousness of her infractions necessitates disbarment to protect the public and uphold the integrity of the legal profession. Petitioner asserts that if injured by a RICO violation, her remedy would be a private cause of action for damages in state or federal court, but fails to provide authority for claiming that a State Bar disciplinary proceeding is a proper venue to establish such a violation or that it would invalidate a disciplinary recommendation based on gross misconduct. She argues that the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits state bar courts, suggesting that state bar actions against competitors violate antitrust principles by monopolizing the legal market. However, it is noted that the Sherman Act does not apply to state actions, and disciplinary measures like suspension or disbarment are considered state actions immune from antitrust liability. Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of specific Business and Professions Code sections defining the State Bar Court's function but cannot contest these sections as her disciplinary proceedings occurred under the pre-1988 State Bar Act. Her claims regarding jurisdiction based on the amended section are deemed irrelevant. The court clarifies that the State Bar functions as an administrative arm of the court, assisting in attorney admission and discipline, with the ultimate judicial authority remaining with the court, negating her assertion of an unconstitutional delegation of power. Furthermore, her claims regarding the State Bar operating as a private court or violating free speech rights are dismissed, as the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld that mandatory dues can be used for disciplinary activities without infringing on constitutional rights. Although she mentions free speech in a specific incident involving a judge, this comment was excluded from misconduct evidence, affirming her constitutional rights were respected. Petitioner argues that the establishment of a private membership group through state power violates due process, contending that it is outside the state's police power to regulate the legal profession for private interests rather than public good. The document notes that this argument has been previously dismissed, emphasizing that attorneys, as 'officers of the court,' have historically been required to meet specific training and conduct obligations for the benefit of both the legal system and society. The regulation of the legal profession is thus deemed a matter of public interest, supported by constitutional and statutory mandates regarding judicial appointments. Petitioner claims her due process rights were violated during a hearing that recommended her disbarment for refusing to compromise her oath to the Constitution. The document clarifies that the disbarment was due to her serious misconduct, not her refusal. Petitioner also contends that the referee was incompetent and that there was no screening process for the referee's qualifications. However, the record shows that the referee performed adequately under difficult conditions and allowed petitioner to express her views on the State Bar proceedings, which were ultimately found to be baseless. The evidence presented supported the decision for disbarment. The conclusion orders the disbarment of Betsey Warren Lebbos from practicing law in California, mandating compliance with specific rules within designated timeframes. The order is effective upon final court decision, and a request for rehearing was denied on May 16, 1991. Additionally, a motion to disqualify the court members was denied, and new professional conduct rules became operative on May 27, 1989. Petitioner alleged that a judge issued an ex parte order for attorney fees favoring the opposing party after sending her client home, a claim the judge denied. The judge testified that petitioner attempted to embarrass him by remaining in the courtroom despite needing to reassign her cases, refusing to inform his clerk which case she was appearing on, and ignoring the bailiff's request to leave. Petitioner criticized the Santa Clara County court in various letters, labeling it 'dirty' and questioning the judges' abilities, while making serious accusations against judges, including allegations of illegal orders, fraud, and severe incompetence. She used derogatory language to describe judges and claimed they had engaged in improper ex parte communications. Additionally, she faced contempt for verbally attacking a judge. Petitioner made unsubstantiated claims about opposing counsel and judges, including accusations of criminal conduct and misconduct related to child custody decisions. She falsely asserted that opposing attorneys were under investigation and misrepresented the status of her professional conduct with the State Bar. Petitioner also claimed that disciplinary actions against her were part of a conspiracy related to a lawsuit against the State Bar, but there is no evidence supporting this claim. Her request to consider unrelated lawsuits was denied, and although she claimed not to have filed a petition for review, her submissions were treated as such.