Marshall v. Housing Authority of City of Taylor

Citations: 866 F. Supp. 999; 1994 WL 608783Docket: A-91-CA-856-SC

Court: District Court, W.D. Texas; August 23, 1994; Federal District Court

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Plaintiffs Velerk Marshall and Lucinda Caruther, represented by Lucille Caruther, initiated legal action against the Housing Authority of the City of Taylor (THA) and its Director, Ina Sanders, regarding THA's policy that disallows public housing applications from families with heads of household under eighteen who lack judicial emancipation. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in February 1992, while the Defendants filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment in March 1992. 

The Plaintiffs' claims include violations of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, HUD regulations against categorical exclusions, federal regulations requiring consideration of individual circumstances, and due process violations regarding tenant selection policies. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with jurisdiction established under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Both parties consented to the magistrate judge presiding over the case.

After reviewing relevant federal statutes and HUD regulations, the court concluded that THA's requirements related to the age and emancipation status of the head of household comply with the Housing Act and HUD regulations. Consequently, the court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment but mandated that THA document its policy in writing as per HUD regulation 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(d). The summary judgment standards defined under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were also reiterated, clarifying the burdens of proof for both parties in the summary judgment process.

The non-moving party must present specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial, rather than relying on general allegations. If the response indicates only a "metaphysical doubt" about material facts, it fails to meet this standard. Without such evidence, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must view evidence favorably towards the non-moving party and make reasonable inferences in their favor. The court is tasked with assessing whether a "material" fact question exists, which is defined as a dispute over facts that could affect the outcome of the case under applicable law. A fact question is "genuine" if a reasonable jury could potentially favor the non-moving party. The court does not resolve factual controversies but determines if a dispute exists, with all doubts resolved against the movant. The standard of review focuses on whether a rational trier of fact could side with the non-moving party based on the evidence presented.

In the procedural background, Plaintiffs Velerk Marshall and Lucinda Caruther, represented by Lucille Caruther, initiated this action on November 6, 1991, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and a proposed class. Their motion for class certification was withdrawn on October 27, 1992. They challenge the Taylor Housing Authority's (THA) policy of denying public housing applications solely on the basis of the head of household being an unemancipated minor and seek damages and attorney's fees for the resulting inconveniences. The factual background outlines that the Housing Act aimed to address the housing shortage for low-income families, leading to the establishment of the THA, which is obligated to follow HUD regulations. The THA's established policy is to deny admission to public housing for families where the head of household is an unemancipated minor.

Under the THA policy, Plaintiffs are ineligible for public housing until they reach the age of majority or have their legal disabilities removed, as per Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 31.01, et seq. This policy is intended to ensure that leases with minors are legally enforceable. The policy has not been documented in writing. 

Lucinda Caruther, born June 4, 1974, applied for THA housing in July 1991 at age seventeen, but her application was denied because she was an unemancipated minor, despite living independently from her parents for over a year. She returned to live with her family and later became a THA resident on June 15, 1993, after reaching the age of majority. Initially, her mother represented her in the lawsuit.

Velerk Marshall, born October 12, 1973, applied for THA housing in November 1990 at age seventeen, also denied due to her status as an unemancipated minor. She lived apart from her mother and had not seen her father for years. After turning eighteen on October 18, 1991, she reapplied but was unable to secure an apartment due to the inability to pay a security deposit; she eventually moved into THA housing on May 1, 1993.

Both Plaintiffs argue that the THA's policy imposes additional eligibility requirements beyond those mandated by the Housing Act, which specifies that public housing should only be rented to low-income families and does not mention age or emancipation as conditions for eligibility. The THA has not claimed mootness in this case, anticipating ongoing challenges to its policy concerning unemancipated minors.

States are prohibited from changing eligibility requirements for federal programs, as established in Carleson v. Remillard. Local public housing authorities also cannot impose additional requirements that exclude applicants, as stated in Hann v. Housing Authority of Easton. The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants violated the Housing Act by imposing extra eligibility criteria. However, the Court finds that the Texas Housing Authority (THA) did not create additional requirements by mandating applicants to be emancipated minors or of majority age. Instead, the THA aimed to comply with the Housing Act and HUD policies, which require public housing agencies to manage their projects effectively to ensure rental collection as per 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4).

The Vandermark ruling supported the York Housing Authority's policy of denying Section 8 participation to individuals with unpaid debts, which aligned with the Housing Act’s goals. Similarly, a policy barring unemancipated minors from Reading Housing Authority housing was deemed consistent with the Housing Act’s management principles in Rivera v. Reading Housing Authority. The THA's policy regarding unemancipated minors was based on concerns over the enforceability of contracts with minors, as Texas law defines the age of majority as 18 and outlines a process for emancipation. Under Texas law, contracts with non-emancipated minors are voidable, except for necessaries. While lodging is recognized as a necessary, whether it qualifies as such is a factual question for the jury, complicating the THA's ability to assess minors on a case-by-case basis.

Ultimately, the THA's requirement for applicants to be of majority age or emancipated does not constitute an additional eligibility requirement but ensures that lease contracts are legally enforceable. The Plaintiffs also claim violations of HUD regulations, arguing that the policy against unemancipated minors constitutes an unlawful categorical exclusion under 24 C.F.R. § 960.204.

Federal regulations on public housing admissions require Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) to establish policies that consider individual family needs while promoting social and financial soundness in public housing. These policies must not automatically deny admission to specific groups of eligible applicants, such as unwed mothers or families with children born out of wedlock. The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' policy on minors violates regulations mandating the consideration of individual circumstances, arguing that the Defendants categorically exclude minors without evaluating their individual attributes.

However, the THA's policy aligns with HUD regulations. The Rivera court upheld a similar policy from the Reading Housing Authority, which required minors to achieve emancipation to enter leases, finding it does not impute negative attributes to minors as a group. This policy does not automatically deny minors admission since they can acquire housing through emancipation.

Furthermore, HUD's Public Housing Occupancy Handbook permits PHAs to set minimum ages for admission to ensure legally enforceable contracts, acknowledging that some states may allow minors to sign leases if emancipated. Thus, THA’s policy conforms to HUD regulations and does not exclude minors categorically; it instead follows HUD's guidance on admissions, which promotes the admission of emancipated minors.

The HUD comments on regulations at 24 C.F.R. § 966.53(f) clarify that a "tenant" must be an "adult," with the definition of contractual capacity determined by state or local law. Emancipated minors, recognized by some states as having capacity to assume tenancy, can be classified as "adults" under HUD's definition if state law permits. HUD allows local policies that exclude unemancipated minors, and its interpretations of regulations receive significant deference in legal contexts, as established in U.S. v. Larionoff and Pennzoil Co. v. F.E.R.C. 

The Texas Housing Authority (THA) is noted to have a policy ensuring enforceability of leases under state law, in alignment with HUD regulations. However, the Plaintiffs claim THA violated 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(d) by failing to document its policy against admitting unemancipated minors, alleging this omission infringes upon their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. They seek both declaratory and monetary relief due to exclusion from housing under an unwritten policy. HUD regulations require that local housing authorities adopt, publicize, and specify tenant eligibility policies in writing. The Defendants have not contested the lack of written policy, leading to the conclusion that THA has not complied with HUD's documentation requirements.

Each Plaintiff was informed post-application that they would not be admitted due to their minor status. The Court determined that the THA's failure to document its policy against leasing to unemancipated minors did not directly injure the Plaintiffs, resulting in a denial of their request for monetary relief. However, the THA was found to be noncompliant with 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(a) for not writing and publicizing its policy. Consequently, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief, ordering the THA to document its policy in accordance with 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(d). Additionally, it noted a revision by HUD in July 1991 addressed applicants with handicaps but inadvertently omitted prior language regarding minors, which remains applicable as HUD intends to maintain this language.