Boren v. Wolverine Tube, Inc.

Citations: 966 F. Supp. 457; 6 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1434; 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10993; 1997 WL 292786Docket: Civil No. 1:96CV102-D-A

Court: District Court, N.D. Mississippi; May 28, 1997; Federal District Court

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Carla Boren filed a lawsuit against Wolverine Tube, Inc., claiming her termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful discharge under state law. Wolverine moved for summary judgment on all claims. Boren was hired as a trainee for a Grade III banding operator position on November 6, 1995, under an at-will employment agreement with a 90-day probationary period, during which she could not miss more than 46 hours of work. Shortly after her hiring, Boren experienced severe physical symptoms, including a rash and breathing difficulties, which she reported to her supervisor. She was taken to the hospital and subsequently evaluated by the company physician, who diagnosed her with an allergic rash and allowed her to return to work on light duty. Following her initial training period, Boren requested a shift change due to her ongoing symptoms, which was accommodated. However, after being moved back to her original position, her symptoms recurred, leading to further absences from work.

Boren requested accommodations from Wolverine, including returning to her job on the furnace, transferring to an open forklift operator position, swapping positions with a senior employee (Bronson Tabler), or receiving a breathing mask. Wolverine denied all these requests. On December 19, 1995, Boren was terminated for excessive absenteeism, having missed over 48 hours within her first 42 days of employment, which violated Wolverine's probationary policy. Although Boren acknowledges her absences, she claims they resulted from a disability due to an allergy to D-Limonene, asserting that her firing was discriminatory under the ADA. 

The legal framework for summary judgment is outlined, stating it is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden rests initially on the party seeking summary judgment, who must show the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's claims. If a properly supported motion is presented, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial. 

For Boren's ADA claim, the defendant contends that summary judgment is warranted because she cannot establish a prima facie case. To prove this case under the ADA, Boren must show that she has a "disability," is a "qualified individual" for her job, and suffered adverse employment action due to her disability.

To withstand a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must show that genuine issues of material fact exist for each element of their claim. Under the ADA, a "disability" is defined as a physical or mental impairment that significantly limits one or more major life activities, which include working, among others. For a condition to qualify as substantially limiting in the context of work, it must significantly restrict the ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs compared to an average person with similar skills. The inability to perform a specific job does not suffice.

The court first assesses whether the plaintiff has an impairment. If confirmed or if there's a genuine dispute regarding its existence, the court then evaluates whether the impairment substantially limits major life activities. A physical impairment is characterized as any physiological disorder affecting specific body systems. The defendant argues that the plaintiff does not have an impairment that qualifies as a disability under the ADA. The plaintiff claims to be allergic to D-Limonene, reporting symptoms such as a rash, vomiting, and breathing difficulties while working. However, medical evaluations during her employment revealed only slight and unremarkable symptoms, with no definitive diagnosis. Critically, the plaintiff did not provide any medical documentation to substantiate her claims of a physical impairment, which has been deemed significant by the court, referencing previous cases where lack of medical evidence led to dismissal of claims. Consequently, the court finds it challenging to conclude that the plaintiff's symptoms constitute an impairment under the ADA without supporting medical documentation.

The court concludes that the plaintiff has not provided sufficient medical evidence to substantiate her claim of a physical impairment under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Accepting her claim without adequate documentation would undermine the requirement for a physical impairment, potentially allowing anyone with any condition to make similar claims without substantiation. The plaintiff asserts that her allergy to D-Limonene substantially limits her ability to work, but fails to demonstrate how this allergy restricts her from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs, as required by 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(I). The inability to perform a specific job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Expert testimony from Dr. Loria indicates that the plaintiff could likely work in other roles without issue and that her allergic condition is moderate and manageable with treatment. The court finds that exclusion from certain jobs, such as painting or food preparation, does not equate to exclusion from a broader range of employment opportunities. Consequently, the court rules that the plaintiff's ADA claim fails as a matter of law. Additionally, regarding her claim for intentional infliction of mental distress, the court notes that the plaintiff did not address this issue in her response, leading to the conclusion that no genuine material facts exist to warrant further consideration of this claim.

Mississippi law permits recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the defendant's conduct is outrageously intentional and foreseeable, even without physical injury. However, employment termination typically does not meet this threshold of outrageousness. In this case, the plaintiff's termination was deemed not extreme or intolerable, leading to a conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact, thus entitling the defendant to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. 

Regarding wrongful discharge, the plaintiff was an at-will employee, meaning either party could terminate the employment for any reason. Mississippi recognizes only two narrow exceptions to at-will employment: termination for refusing to commit an illegal act or reporting an illegal act. Neither exception applied here, supporting the dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim. 

The court found no genuine issues of material fact concerning the plaintiff's ADA claim, affirming that Wolverine is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the plaintiff's claims and closing the case. All relevant materials reviewed have been incorporated into the record.

In a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed favorably for the non-moving party, as established in Matagorda County v. Russell Law. Dr. Johnson reported placing the plaintiff on light duty due to her inability to operate heavy equipment while on medication. The legal definition of disability under 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(B) includes having a record of an impairment or being regarded as having one; however, the plaintiff did not argue that these definitions applied to her case, leading the court to dismiss them from consideration. 

Approximately one year after her termination, the plaintiff consulted Dr. Philip Loria, Jr., who diagnosed her with allergic contact dermatitis related to D-Limonene based on two brief consultations and literature review. He compared her reaction to common reactions to poison ivy and noted that her more severe symptoms were atypical for contact dermatitis. Typical symptoms should include itching and redness, and her symptoms resolved quickly with treatment. Dr. Loria suggested she likely had a moderate sensitivity manageable with topical treatment. 

Under the ADA, the burden is on the plaintiff to provide medical evidence of the claimed disability during employment, not after termination. Although Dr. Loria did not perform a patch test to confirm his diagnosis, he indicated he would rely on such test results. An Independent Physical Examination conducted by Dr. Robert Kaplan on February 4, 1997, included a patch test for D-Limonene, which concluded that the plaintiff was not allergic to the substance. Ultimately, even without the need for supporting evidence, the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient proof of an ADA-recognized impairment.