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Veasey v. State
Citations: 507 S.E.2d 799; 234 Ga. App. 795; 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 3724; 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1294Docket: A98A1341
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; September 28, 1998; Georgia; State Appellate Court
Anthony Thomas Veasey was convicted of child molestation and appealed, asserting four errors. Evidence presented at trial indicated that Veasey, who worked with a 15-year-old victim at a resort, made inappropriate advances, including asking about the victim's sexual orientation and exposing himself in a storeroom. Veasey admitted to the exposure but contested the charges, claiming a directed verdict was warranted due to the overlap of facts in the two counts against him and asserting a lack of knowledge regarding the victim's age. The court ruled that knowledge of the victim's age is not an element of child molestation, thus denying Veasey's request for a charge on mistake of fact. The court distinguished between the offenses of child molestation and enticing a child, affirming that they are legally separate, which negated Veasey's argument for a directed verdict based on the acquittal of the enticement charge. Additionally, Veasey's claim that the child molestation statute was unconstitutionally vague was rejected, as the Supreme Court of Georgia had previously upheld the statute's constitutionality against similar challenges. The court ultimately affirmed the conviction and sentencing to first offender treatment. Veasey challenges the constitutionality of the child molestation statute, arguing that it allows for conviction without requiring knowledge that the victim is under 16 years old. The court disagrees, referencing established precedent that supports the validity of statutes lacking a knowledge requirement, as seen in Lambert v. People of the State of California. Veasey fails to provide any legal authority to substantiate his due process claim under the Georgia constitution regarding the necessity for the state to prove his awareness of the victim's age. The court observes that the Supreme Court has recognized a compelling state interest in child protection, affirming the constitutionality of the amended statute from 1995 that defines the victim's age as 16. The Due Process Clause does not mandate a knowledge element in crime definitions but ensures laws provide sufficient warning to avoid prohibited conduct. The statute in question adequately warns of the forbidden behavior. The judgment is affirmed, with both judges concurring.