Rose Ex Rel. Rose v. Nebraska

Citations: 530 F. Supp. 295; 2 Educ. L. Rep. 740; 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17379Docket: Civ. 81-0-10, 80-0-164

Court: District Court, D. Nebraska; October 9, 1981; Federal District Court

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Marla Rose and Daniel Monahan, both handicapped children, challenge the validity of Nebraska and federal education statutes concerning the education of handicapped children through their next friends. They are dissatisfied with the educational placements recommended by the defendant school district. The case is currently before the Court due to the defendants' motion to dismiss based on a suggestion of mootness. 

In the case of Monahan and Rose v. State of Nebraska, the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and damages, arguing that Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-662 conflicts with the federal Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (20 U.S.C. 1401-1420). Judge Denney granted injunctive relief to Rose but denied it to Monahan, leading to appeals. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case to the District Court.

The federal Act requires states to follow specific procedural safeguards to receive federal funding for educating handicapped children, including prior written notice to parents regarding educational placements and the right to an impartial due process hearing. The Nebraska Legislature amended its statutes in 1978 to comply with the federal requirements, but plaintiffs argue that Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-662 undermines their due process rights by allowing the Commissioner of Education to override hearing officers' findings. The District Court found the Nebraska statute inconsistent with the federal Act, leading to the preliminary injunction, while the Appeals Court acknowledged potential inconsistencies that warranted the injunction.

In July 1980, the Nebraska Legislature amended Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-662, removing provisions related to the Commissioner's review of due process hearings and establishing that hearing decisions are final, subject only to judicial review. The defendants argue that these changes render the primary issue moot, asserting that the current wording of the statute should be examined, referencing relevant case law. The plaintiffs counter that injunctive relief remains pertinent due to the potential for future changes in state law that could again conflict with federal law, invoking the "capable of repetition yet evading review" doctrine established in earlier cases. However, the Court finds the likelihood of the legislature amending the law in a way that conflicts with federal law to be remote, especially since the changes were made to comply with federal requirements. Consequently, the Court concludes that the amendments moot the question of inconsistency between state and federal law.

Despite the resolution of this statutory conflict, the Court acknowledges a need to assess potential damages sustained by the plaintiffs. The defendants argue that the entire controversy is moot based on developments regarding the educational placements of the children involved. The Court will evaluate the background and current status of Marla Rose, who was notified in June 1978 of her proposed placement change from Beveridge Junior High School to the Nebraska School for the Deaf on a residential basis, to determine if justiciable issues remain.

The School District proposed a change in Marla's educational placement due to a lack of progress with the oral method of instruction. It determined that Marla required both oral and manual instruction, leading to the selection of the Nebraska School for the Deaf, the only institution equipped for her age group. Marla's parents contested this placement, initiating a due process hearing on August 14, 1978. The hearing concluded on March 23, 1979, with the hearing officer recommending dismissal of the appeal, stating that the proposed placement was appropriate under the law. The Commissioner of Education adopted this recommendation, leading Marla's father, George Rose, to file a pro se complaint challenging the decision on June 28, 1979. While litigation was ongoing, Marla's educational status was maintained, and a stipulation allowed her to attend Monroe Junior High School, mirroring her previous studies. After two weeks, her parents withdrew her and enrolled her in an unaccredited private school. Mr. Rose's lawsuit was dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party on November 29, 1979. He filed another action on February 2, 1980, which was later dismissed as duplicative. On May 16, 1980, a judge ordered Marla to return to her previous educational placement pending proceedings, which she did on November 3, 1980, until February 6, 1981, just before her 18th birthday. Marla subsequently married and moved outside the Omaha School District.

In a separate case, Daniel Monahan, who attended a private school funded by the Omaha School District, required a new educational placement after becoming confined to a wheelchair. The Millard School District recommended George Norris Elementary School, which the Omaha School District agreed to but refused to finance, citing that it could provide similar education at Hartman School. Daniel's father enrolled him at George Norris at his own expense and did not request a due process hearing. The Eighth Circuit held that Mr. Monahan was not required to exhaust administrative remedies due to the conflict between state and federal law.

Monahan's claim that state procedures conflict with the Federal Act is not effectively addressable through state administrative processes. Mr. Monahan continues to fund Daniel's education in the Millard School District, but recent amendments to Nebraska statutes eliminate the need for injunctive relief, thereby resolving the plaintiffs' primary complaint. The plaintiffs also challenge the hearing procedure and seek damages; specifically, Rose objects to the administrative hearing regarding Marla's educational placement and requests judicial review. However, the Court declines to review Marla’s placement, noting that she has not attended classes in the Omaha School District since February 6, 1981, in violation of Judge Denney's order mandating her to remain in her current educational placement. Marla's emancipation and her residence outside the Omaha School District means that the district is no longer responsible for her education, which must now be determined by the Millard School District. The Court deems reviewing Marla's prior placement unnecessary and would be akin to issuing an advisory opinion since she has not attended school for nearly eight months and continues to live outside the district. The Court also expresses reluctance to consider alleged procedural defects in the placement hearing, noting that the only significant concern was the Commissioner's review, which merely reiterated the hearing officer's decision. The disagreement between Marla's parents and the Omaha School District regarding her placement does not indicate a defect in the hearing process. Rose's claim for damages lacks foundation, as no damages arise from the Commissioner's endorsement of the decision, and her parents cannot recover private school tuition.

Marla's withdrawal from the Omaha School District was solely decided by her parents. The Fourth Circuit's ruling in Stemple v. Board of Education established that parents utilizing the hearing and review provisions of the Federal Act are obligated to keep their child in their current educational setting while those processes are ongoing. This obligation prevents parents from arbitrarily placing their child in a private school and seeking reimbursement for tuition without mutual agreement. The Eighth Circuit confirmed that Marla's parents are not entitled to compensation for private school costs, and due to Marla's current emancipation and residence outside the school district, further proceedings regarding her placement are unnecessary, rendering the action moot.

In contrast, plaintiff Monahan did not exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of his child Daniel's educational placement. Although he argued for judicial intervention due to perceived inconsistencies between state and federal laws, those inconsistencies have been resolved, negating the necessity for bypassing state procedures. The state hearing officer is best suited to make initial placement determinations. Judicial review should occur only after a final state decision is made. The Second Circuit emphasized the importance of state expertise in educational matters and the value of administrative records in informing federal court decisions. Thus, the court determined that Monahan must exhaust his administrative options before pursuing further judicial actions. Additionally, Monahan is not entitled to damages, as previously affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, which stated that the decision to place Daniel in the Millard School District was made unilaterally by his parents, who must cover the associated tuition costs.

In Rose v. State of Nebraska, CV 81-0-010, the case raises similar issues to those in CV 81-0-164, with one additional concern regarding the hearing officer's handling of case No. 80-06, which challenged Marla Rose's educational placement. The hearing officer dismissed this petition based on an existing order from Judge Denney mandating Marla's current placement. Given Marla's recent marriage and relocation outside the Omaha School District, the court finds the hearing officer's decision moot. Consequently, the court determines that the issues in CV 80-0-010 are duplicative of those in CV 80-0-164 and are rendered moot by Marla's change in status. The defendants' motion to dismiss both cases is granted, resulting in their dismissal without prejudice. Additional notes clarify Marla's marriage date, highlight the primary legal question regarding the conflict between Nebraska legislation and the Federal Act, and confirm that neither of the schools attended by Marla provided an appropriate education. The court also notes that the parties did not agree to any changes in Marla's educational placement, as required by Judge Denney's order, and briefly addresses the issue of money damages under the Federal Act, referencing a related case.