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Wagner v. Hedrick

Citations: 383 S.E.2d 286; 181 W. Va. 482Docket: 18478

Court: West Virginia Supreme Court; August 2, 1989; West Virginia; State Supreme Court

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William Anthony Wagner was convicted of first-degree felony murder on January 8, 1983, and sentenced to life imprisonment with a recommendation of mercy. He appealed, alleging errors in the admission of evidence from a warrantless search of his clothing during emergency room treatment and testimony about a letter he allegedly wrote without the letter's production. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed his conviction, finding no reversible error.

The murder victim, Dwight Truman Elswick, was found dead on July 21, 1982, at his workplace, having been shot with a .38 caliber revolver and robbed. There were no witnesses to the crime. Later that evening, Wagner and his companion, Chatwan Smith, were involved in a motorcycle accident. State Police Trooper S.M. Pinion arrived at the scene, secured their personal belongings, and later went to the hospital where Wagner was being treated for serious injuries, including a compressed spine fracture and a fractured clavicle. At the hospital, Wagner appeared intoxicated and in pain, with a blood alcohol level of .170. Hospital staff testified that Wagner provided incoherent information for his emergency room record.

Pinion questioned Wagner but found him unable or unwilling to respond due to pain. Wagner's clothing was stored beneath his bed, and when Pinion searched the pockets, he found only cash and a gold coin, which he deemed insignificant. A nurse later provided Wagner's Ohio driver's license, raising Pinion's suspicions since the motorcycle had Rhode Island tags that were reported stolen. Pinion contacted the State Police, where Dispatcher Buzz Keesee informed him of an active APB for "Anthony Wagner," wanted for robbery and murder in Williamson. Pinion alerted the doctor about two emergency room patients potentially involved in the crime, particularly noting Chatwan Smith, who was possessive of a large sum of cash. After a doctor retrieved $2,750 from Smith, Pinion learned from Corporal B.L. Baker about the connection between Wagner and a recent murder. Police suspected Wagner had purchased a motorcycle with cash earlier that day and was involved in a robbery of up to $7,000. Pinion observed a gold coin in Wagner's pants pocket and, along with Baker, considered Wagner a suspect. They decided to secure the gold coin and cash without a warrant due to the circumstances, as Pinion felt he had probable cause to arrest Wagner. He instructed hospital staff to keep Wagner secure and later placed Wagner's belongings in evidence. Corporal Baker subsequently sought a search warrant for Wagner's duffle bags, citing the need to find stolen property and evidence related to the murder of Dwight T. Elswick, supported by Pinion's claim that Wagner possessed the gold coin belonging to Elswick.

Trooper Pinion executed a search warrant, leading to the retrieval of money from Chatwan Smith and a 1903 gold coin, which he had kept in an envelope until handing it to Corporal Baker. In addition, a .38 caliber revolver was discovered in a duffle bag. Later that evening, Wagner was arrested and read his Miranda rights. Prior to the trial, a suppression hearing involved testimonies from Trooper Pinion, Corporal Baker, Wagner, Smith, and ten hospital employees regarding events on July 21, 1982. The court ruled on various motions, including Wagner's attempt to suppress the gold coin and associated evidence. The court highlighted that the search of Wagner's pockets was justified as Trooper Pinion had probable cause for arrest based on information from Baker and an issued APB for Wagner. It was noted that Pinion was fulfilling his statutory duty to identify accident victims, not conducting a criminal evidence search. Consequently, the court found no Fourth Amendment violation in the initial search, which did not unreasonably affect Wagner's property interests. Wagner contended that the search of clothes under his hospital bed violated his Fourth Amendment rights, claiming the initial search's discovery of the gold coin invalidated subsequent evidence as "fruits of the poisonous tree." The court reiterated that Fourth Amendment protections hinge on a legitimate expectation of privacy, which can vary based on circumstances. Ultimately, it was established that without a reasonable expectation of privacy, a search may not be deemed unreasonable under the Constitution.

William Anthony Wagner's expectation of privacy regarding the contents of his pants pockets was deemed unreasonable while he was in the emergency room of Logan General Hospital. The circumstances surrounding his admission significantly diminished any privacy expectation, as he was in a public space frequented by medical personnel and law enforcement. Trooper Pinion had a legitimate reason to be in the emergency room as part of his investigation of an accident involving Wagner.

Wagner's choice not to secure his personal belongings, despite being offered the option to store them safely, further weakened his claim to privacy. Pinion's search for identification was narrowly focused and motivated solely by the need to complete an accident report, rather than as a pretext for seeking evidence related to a murder investigation. Although Wagner had previously provided information upon arrival, he was not in a condition to respond to Pinion's queries due to lethargy, pain, and intoxication.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches; however, the context of a minor intrusion, such as Pinion's search for identification, may be deemed reasonable under the circumstances. Pinion attempted less intrusive methods to obtain identification before searching Wagner's pants pockets, indicating a legitimate purpose for his actions.

Trooper Pinion conducted a limited search of Wagner's pants pockets solely to find identification, which was deemed reasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. This case presents complexities that diverge from typical Fourth Amendment analyses, as the search was not aimed at obtaining evidence of criminal activity. Police officers often have duties beyond apprehending criminals, including assisting individuals in danger. Consequently, a search conducted in good faith for such purposes can lead to admissible evidence in court. The trial court's suppression hearing supported the conclusion that Trooper Pinion acted reasonably given the circumstances in the hospital emergency room, where identifying accident victims was challenging. 

While the State argued that an emergency exception justified the search, the court rejected this claim, noting that the emergency doctrine allows limited warrantless searches only when there is an immediate need to protect human life, and no such medical emergency existed in Wagner's case since he was receiving treatment. The search was more akin to a routine identification check rather than a response to an emergency. The court declined to categorize the search strictly within exceptions to the warrant requirement, emphasizing that some cases do not fit neatly into established categories, and decisions should be based on a detailed analysis of the facts.

A decision regarding the legality of a search must consider the specific facts of the case in relation to the Fourth Amendment’s objectives. The warrantless search of Wagner's pants pockets by Pinion was deemed reasonable and conducted in good faith to locate identification for an accident victim, not violating Wagner's rights or his reasonable expectation of privacy. While individuals in hospital emergency rooms maintain Fourth Amendment protections, their privacy expectations can be reduced based on the circumstances of their admission. Consequently, the trial court's ruling on the legality of the search and the subsequent warrantless seizure of a gold coin, justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances, is upheld.

The document also addresses the second assignment of error concerning the trial court's decision to allow testimony about a letter allegedly written by Wagner to Chatwan Smith without requiring the letter's production. During her testimony, Smith claimed Wagner confessed to her about committing a robbery and shooting a man. The defense introduced a letter from Smith to Wagner that indicated the police were attempting to wrongly accuse him of murder and referred to money that was supposedly his. Smith explained she wrote the letter in response to Wagner's claims of innocence. The defense aimed to use the letter to challenge Smith's credibility. During redirect examination, Smith disclosed that the money mentioned in the letter had come from a "date" and was given to Wagner, while also admitting to feeling "lovesick" when she wrote it. The defense objected to Smith discussing the letter's contents due to its absence from evidence, but the objection was overruled, allowing her testimony to proceed.

Wagner requested Smith to falsely characterize money as "prostitute money," claiming he had earned it through various games. Smith testified about this letter, which Wagner argues violated his due process rights by allowing testimony regarding a document not presented in court, thereby impeding his constitutional right to confront witnesses. The court rejected Wagner’s argument, asserting that Smith's testimony did not violate the best evidence rule as per West Virginia Rule of Evidence 1002. Rule 1004(4) provides that an original writing is not needed if it does not relate closely to a controlling issue. The court deemed the letter's content collateral, as it was only relevant to explaining Smith's contradictory statements about Wagner. The jury had sufficient evidence to assess Smith's credibility without the letter's production. Consequently, the trial court's admission of Smith's testimony was upheld, with no due process violation found, affirming the trial court's decision. Justice Miller dissented, emphasizing the importance of warrant requirements under the Fourth Amendment and criticizing the majority for deviating from established legal principles regarding warrantless searches.

The "caretaker" function aims to secure an individual for their protection and requires identifying them to contact family. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has not endorsed warrantless searches based on caretaker activities. The Newman case, cited by the majority, allowed a limited search for identification to return an intoxicated person home solely based on statutory authority and does not support warrantless searches in nonemergency situations. In this case, the defendant was in medical care, negating the need for police intervention. The majority's concern for the defendant's belongings is unfounded, as the officer failed to secure them after searching. The majority's justification for the search relies on W.Va. Code, 17C-4-7, about reporting vehicular accidents, which does not justify overriding privacy expectations. The search for identification appeared to be a pretext for gathering evidence, especially since identifying information was already available at the admissions desk. The officer's actions, such as directing a search for a weapon and ignoring hospital protocols, further suggest ulterior motives. Testimony from hospital staff undermines the majority's position and indicates the search was not merely for identification. Additionally, a separate issue regarding the application of the recidivist statute has been resolved, clarifying Wagner's eligibility for parole after ten years due to incorrect application of the statute and suppression of his statements for failure to prove proper advisement of rights.

West Virginia Code § 17C-4-7 mandates that written reports be filed for accidents on public highways resulting in bodily injury, death, or property damage exceeding $250. Specifically, § 17C-4-7(c) requires law enforcement officers investigating such accidents to submit a report within 24 hours of completing their investigation. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, emphasizing the necessity of probable cause for warrants. This protection is mirrored in Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz established a "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, which requires both a subjective expectation of privacy by the individual and societal recognition of that expectation as reasonable. The case Sullivan v. District Court highlighted that a nurse could not claim a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding a jacket left in a common area, as it was accessible to others. The court ruled that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because the individual lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy under those circumstances. Additionally, the ruling in Buchanan v. State concluded that hiding drugs under a mattress in a hospital emergency room did not afford a reasonable expectation of privacy due to frequent access by medical personnel. United States v. Mankani reiterated that while hotel occupants have Fourth Amendment protections, the temporary nature of hotel stays limits the justifiable expectation of privacy.

Randall Day, an attendant at Logan General Hospital, testified that he was responsible for securing the personal property of accident victims. He recalled asking Wagner if he wanted a gold coin locked up, to which Wagner replied "no," leading Day to return the coin to Wagner's pants pocket and place the pants back in a basket. Day emphasized that had Wagner wanted the coin locked up, it would have been done. 

Legal references include LaFave's commentary on the Supreme Court's lack of a ruling on this specific search type, noting the case of Cady v. Dombrowski, which upheld a warrantless vehicle search under community caretaking functions. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Pichany declined to apply the community caretaking exception to a warrantless search of an unlocked warehouse where stolen equipment was discovered. 

The court rejected the State's claim that the search issue had been previously litigated, asserting that the matters raised were not adequately presented in Wagner's earlier pro se petitions. LaFave also referenced State v. Newman, where the search of an intoxicated woman's purse for identification was deemed appropriate and not intrusive under the circumstances. 

Regarding evidence, West Virginia Rule of Evidence 1002 requires original writings for content proof unless otherwise stated. Wagner contended that the State did not establish a foundation for Smith's testimony, which was introduced by Wagner's attorney to challenge her credibility. Once Smith's letter was admitted, she was allowed to clarify inconsistencies between her letter and her testimony, as per Rule 613, which entitles a witness to explain prior statements when extrinsic evidence is presented. Smith explained that her letter was a response to Wagner's claim of innocence and his request for her to state the money was related to prostitution.

No hearsay objection was raised against Smith's testimony. Searches conducted without prior judicial approval are generally deemed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and West Virginia's Constitution, with limited exceptions that must be well-defined and justified by exigent circumstances. Such exceptions primarily pertain to the necessity of protecting or preserving life. The case of Cady v. Dombrowski is noted for addressing the police's "caretaking" roles regarding towed vehicles, but it does not support a broader interpretation relevant to homes under the Fourth Amendment. The author criticizes the majority's framing of the urgency to find identifying information as an "emergency," highlighting that West Virginia law allows officers up to twenty-four hours to file their reports, indicating that the investigation's completion does not hinge on immediate identification.