Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Taylor v. Jackson
Citations: 123 Cal. App. 2d 199; 266 P.2d 605; 1954 Cal. App. LEXIS 1166Docket: Civ. 15602
Court: California Court of Appeal; February 16, 1954; California; State Appellate Court
MacArthur Taylor, a minor represented by his mother Clara Taylor, filed a lawsuit for injuries sustained after being struck by Warren L. Jackson's automobile while attempting to cross West Street in Oakland. Clara Taylor also sought damages for medical expenses related to her son's injuries. The jury ruled in favor of Jackson, prompting the Taylors to appeal. The incident occurred at the intersection of West and 37th Streets, where Jackson was driving south on West Street, facing a line of stopped cars in the northbound lane due to a traffic light. MacArthur, age 5, ran from behind these stopped cars into Jackson's lane. There was conflicting evidence regarding the exact crossing point, with some witnesses stating he crossed in an unmarked crosswalk while others claimed it was slightly south of it. Jackson testified he did not see MacArthur until it was too late, traveling at 15 to 20 miles per hour and braking only upon spotting the child. Skid marks indicated he attempted to stop shortly before impact. The street conditions were clear and dry. The appellants argued that there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict for the respondent, asserting that Jackson violated Vehicle Code section 560(a) by failing to yield to a pedestrian in a crosswalk, which constitutes negligence per se. While violations of statutory standards can amount to negligence, courts recognize that circumstances may provide justification for a driver's actions, as demonstrated in previous cases. The appellant was initially found negligent for violating Vehicle Code section 560 by failing to yield the right of way. However, the evidence suggested that the jury could reasonably conclude that the appellant's actions were not those of an ordinarily prudent person, given that his view was obstructed by a preceding vehicle and the respondent suddenly appeared in front of him. The jury was permitted to determine whether the statute's violation constituted negligence per se, particularly in light of the unexpected presence of a child and the accident occurring outside a crosswalk. The court upheld the jury's implied conclusion based on the evidence presented. The appellants’ claims regarding instructional errors were deemed without merit. They contested an instruction about potential negligence by a third party and another stating that a minor could not be found contributorily negligent. The court clarified that the minor's inability to be guilty of contributory negligence was clear. Concerns about the absence of an instruction on the negligence per se standard were addressed, as the court provided adequate guidance on the presumption of negligence following a Vehicle Code violation. Regarding separate lawsuits for damages by the mother, the jury was instructed that if she was negligent in allowing her child to be on the street unattended, the verdict should favor the defendant. The appellants misinterpreted this instruction as barring recovery for both mother and child due to contributory negligence. The court clarified that both parties were entitled to separate damages and that the instruction correctly reflected the law concerning the mother's claims. The motion to augment the record was denied, and the judgment was affirmed.