Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Company

Citations: 146 S.E.2d 479; 266 N.C. 419; 1966 N.C. LEXIS 1364Docket: 278

Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina; February 4, 1966; North Carolina; State Supreme Court

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The case concerns whether an employee injured while holding two jobs can have his workers' compensation calculated based on the average weekly wages from both jobs or solely from the job where the injury occurred. Under the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act (G.S. 97-2(5)), "average weekly wages" are defined through five methods. The Industrial Commission used method (4) to calculate the plaintiff's average weekly wage from his cab driving job, resulting in $26.90, despite the plaintiff only having worked there for five weeks. The defendants, Yellow Cab Company and Great American Insurance Company, argue that the Commission's calculation should be limited to 60% of this figure ($16.14 per week), asserting that the Act only allows for compensation based on wages from the job where the injury occurred, except in specific circumstances outlined in method (5). Defendants maintain that the first declaration of G.S. 97-2(5) applies to all computation methods except method (5), which is not subject to this limitation.

Method (3) allows consideration of another individual's wages only if they are earned in the same class of employment, community, and by a person of equivalent grade and character. G.S. 97-2(5) mandates achieving fair results for both employer and employee, preventing disproportionate liability based on payroll and premiums. The plaintiff claims that his severe injuries justify the application of method (4), which aims to determine an average weekly wage that accurately reflects potential earnings had the injury not occurred. This method does not explicitly limit earnings to the employment where the injury happened, suggesting legislative intent to include all sources of income. In assessing disability, G.S. 97-2(9) allows for consideration of earnings from the same or any other employment, implying that exceptional cases warrant a broader interpretation of G.S. 97-2(5) to benefit the injured employee.

The court's decision in Casey v. Board of Education supports the plaintiff's position regarding wage calculations from concurrent employments. Generally, wage calculations for employees injured in related jobs include earnings from both. It is argued that the rationale for aggregating earnings from similar jobs applies equally to dissimilar jobs, as a disabled employee's financial hardship remains regardless of job similarity. Various jurisdictions have differing statutes on this issue; some allow aggregation of concurrent related employments, while others require combining all employment earnings. Notably, five states that share North Carolina's provisions also have an equivalent of the 'exceptional reasons' clause, with Michigan and South Carolina having addressed similar compensation cases, such as Buehler v. University of Michigan, where compensation was based on total earnings from both jobs.

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling, clarifying that the determination of employer liability lies with the Legislature, not the judiciary. In this case, the plaintiff's employment with multiple employers was deemed separate, meaning the university could not be held liable for compensation based on earnings from other jobs, nor could the insurer be liable for earnings not on its payroll. The facts are analogous to McCummings v. Anderson Theatre Co., where the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that although the plaintiff earned a low wage at one job when injured, his average weekly wage should reflect his combined earnings from multiple jobs. Importantly, the McCummings decision was not to be considered a precedent for computing average weekly wages under any circumstances. The case of Casey v. Board of Education was referenced, where the plaintiff’s average weekly wage was set based on his primary earnings, despite additional work that contributed to his income. The Commission found that it would be unjust to use the lower wage from extra work for calculating his average wage at the time of injury. The only issue debated in Casey was which employer bore liability. The Superior Court upheld the Commission’s findings, leading to the appeal by the City Board of Education and its insurer.

The Commission's method for calculating the plaintiff's average weekly wages was not challenged by the appellants, who solely argued that the compensation should be paid by the State School Commission instead of themselves. The case analysis indicates that the plaintiff, Casey, was not engaged in two distinct employments but rather held a single position as janitor-custodian at Southside School, with maintenance duties across the City of Durham. He received payment from two public agencies for eight months and from one for four months, but all work benefitted the Durham Board of Education funded by State allocations.

The citation of Casey in legal texts does not support combining earnings from separate employments for compensation calculations. Instead, it establishes that for dual roles under a single contract, total earnings from both capacities are relevant for compensation, regardless of differing pay rates. The statute G.S. 97-2(5) lacks explicit provisions for aggregating wages from multiple jobs for compensation purposes. The plaintiff argues that implied authority exists in method (4), which considers what the injured employee would earn without injury, suggesting all sources of income should be included.

However, the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to ensure swift remedies for injured workers while limiting employers' liabilities. The courts emphasize that they cannot create legislation under the guise of liberal construction of existing statutes. Severe injuries do not justify the aggregation of wages from separate employments. The Legislature’s intent appears to tie compensation to the average wages paid by the employer at the time of injury. Combining wages from both jobs would unfairly increase the compensation owed by the employer, who did not receive corresponding premiums for that potential liability. Method (4) establishes a standard for calculating average weekly wages that must be fair to both parties involved.

The excerpt emphasizes the legislative intent regarding the calculation of average weekly wages for injured employees. It asserts that the Legislature, having specified that an injured employee's average weekly wages should be based solely on the earnings from the employment where the injury occurred, would have explicitly allowed for the combination of wages from concurrent employments if that had been intended. The reference to De Asis v. Fram Corp. underscores that any significant changes in wage computation should not rely on ambiguous interpretations.

The text further supports this position by citing method (5), which applies to volunteer firemen and requires compensation to be based on their principal employment wage, indicating that statutory authority is necessary for any deviation from the established rule. It highlights that, apart from method (5), no provisions in the Act permit considering earnings from any employment other than the one where the injury transpired. 

Comparative references to Vermont and North Carolina laws illustrate the consistent legislative intent against aggregating wages from multiple jobs. The excerpt critiques the potential unfairness of a system where an injured worker could lose compensation from one job while still benefiting from another, even if the latter was part of the same overall earnings. 

Ultimately, the ruling concludes that the Commission lacked authority to combine earnings from different employments in determining average weekly wages, rendering its finding unsustainable. It highlights the broader implications for workers who manage multiple jobs, pointing out the unfortunate situation faced by the plaintiff and the potential systemic issue for similarly situated workers.

Only the Legislature can address the limitations faced by workers injured in one job whose injuries also hinder their ability to work in other jobs, resulting in potential financial hardship. Compensation is restricted to wages from the employment where the injury occurred, and if a statute appears unjust, legislative amendment is required rather than judicial interpretation. As a result, the plaintiff's motion for the defendant carrier to pay attorney fees under G.S. 97-88 is denied, as this statute is inapplicable given the court's finding of error in the Commission's decision. The judgment from the Superior Court, which overruled the defendants' exceptions to the Full Commission's award, is vacated. The case is remanded to the Superior Court to issue a judgment directing the Industrial Commission to award the plaintiff based on an average weekly wage of $26.90. Error acknowledged and remanded.